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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three core chapters on modern dynamic macroeconomics, which
study different aspects of the public sector labor market in a large EU economy with sig-
nificant public employment share and a non-trivial public sector wage premium over the
private sector labor compensation. The study in this dissertation adds to earlier research by
incorporating endogenous government hours and wages in the model framework and argues
that the presence of a sizable public sector labor market in European economies generates
significant interaction with the private sector labor and capital markets. In addition, the
presence of interest groups (labor unions, government bureaucracy), as well as other labor
market frictions in the public sector, is shown to be an important element of the analysis
when discussing fiscal policy reforms.
Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employ-
ment, and the public sector wage premia observed in most post-WWII European economies,
Chapter 1 examines the role of public sector unions in a general equilibrium framework. A
strong union presence in a large non-market sector is shown to be relevant for both busi-
ness cycle fluctuations and for the welfare effect of fiscal regime changes. To this end,
an otherwise standard real-business-cycle (RBC) model is augmented with a public sector
union optimization problem. The resulting theoretical setup generates cyclical behavior in
government hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with a
highly-unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970-2007. The main
findings of Chapter 1 are: (i) the model with a public sector union performs reasonably well
vis-a-vis data; (ii) overall, the public sector union model is a significant improvement over a
similar model with exogenous public sector employment; (iii) endogenously-determined pub-
lic wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms and produce
significantly higher welfare losses. Additionally, the union model requires greater changes
in tax rates to achieve a pre-specified increase in tax revenue compared to an equivalent
model with exogenous public sector hours. Thus, endogenous public sector hours and wages
in the setup are shown to be quantitatively important for public policy evaluation. Ignoring
the positive co-movement between public and private hours and wages leads to a significant
underestimation of the welfare effect of fiscal regime changes.
Chapter 2 characterizes optimal fiscal policy and evaluates it relative to the exogenous (ob-
served) one. Motivated by the high public employment, and the public wage premia observed
in the major European economies, a Real-Business-Cycle model, calibrated to German data
(1970-2007), is set up with a richer government spending side, and an endogenous private-
public sector labor choice. To illustrate the effects of fiscal policy on sectoral allocation of
hours, public wage rate determination and the provision of labor-intensive public services,
two regimes are compared and contrasted to one another - exogenous vs. optimal (Ramsey)
policy case. The main findings from the computational experiments performed in Chapter 2
are: (i) The optimal steady-state capital tax rate is zero, as it is the most distortionary tax
to use; (ii) A higher labor tax rate is needed in the Ramsey case to compensate for the loss
in capital tax revenue; (iii) Under the optimal policy regime, public sector employment is
lower, but government employees receive higher wages; (iv) The benevolent Ramsey planner
provides the optimal amount of the public good, and substitutes labor for capital in the
input mix for public services and private output; (v) The government wage bill is smaller,
while public investment is three times higher than in the exogenous policy case.
Lastly, the thesis tries to delve into the hierarchical structure of public employment service
and addresses the problem of rent-seeking in the public sector by government bureaucrats.
Chapter 3 studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link
between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill,
which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public officials are modeled as
individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The theoretical model used
is calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007. The analysis then extends to the
other major EU economies as well. To illustrate the effects of fiscal policy on rent-seeking,
the exogenous and the optimal (Ramsey) policy cases are compared and contrasted to one
another. The main findings of Chapter 3 are: (i) Due to the existence of a significant public
sector wage premium and the large public sector employment, a substantial amount of work-
ing time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses measured in terms
of aggregate output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model
for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii)
Under the optimal fiscal policy regime, steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the
exogenous policy case. The benevolent government invests more in public capital, sets a
higher public wage premium, but chooses much lower public employment, thus achieving a
decrease in rent-seeking.
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predicted to result from these policies.”
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Edward C. Prescott
”...[G]iven that all models are false, how true are they?”
Patrick Minford
”All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
G. E. Box
xii
”That’s all well and good in practice, but how does it work in theory?”
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”No assumptions about economic behavior are absolutely right and no
theoretical conclusions are valid for all times and places, but would anyone
seriously deny that in the matter of techniques and analytical constructs there
has been progress in economics?”
Mark Blaug
”... Meticulous attention should be paid to the special relationships and
obligations of public servants to the public itself and to the government. All
Government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining,
as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its
distinct and insurmountable limitations ... The very nature and purposes of
Government make it impossible for ... officials ... to bind the employer ... The
employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their
representatives ...
”Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no
place in the functions of any organization of government employees. Upon
employees in the federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole people ...
This obligation is paramount ... A strike of public employees manifests nothing
less than an intent ... to prevent or obstruct ... Government ... Such action,
looking toward the paralysis of Government ... is unthinkable and intolerable.”
F.D.Roosevelt
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Chapter 0
Thesis Introduction and Motivation
This thesis is composed of three core chapters on modern dynamic macroeconomics, which
study different aspects of the public sector labor market in a large economy with significant
public employment share and a non-trivial public sector wage premium over the private sec-
tor labor compensation. In addition, the behavior of the labor input is very important for
aggregate economic fluctuations, as Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Kydland (1995) have
pointed out. Despite this, real business cycle (RBC) theory so far has been predominantly
focused on the private sector and has largely ignored the dynamic general-equilibrium ef-
fects of public sector labor choice. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by studying government
employment- and wage determination, and argues that the presence of a sizeable public sec-
tor labor market in European economies generates significant interaction with the private
sector labor and capital markets. If public sector labor choice is ignored, then important
effects on cyclical fluctuations, as well as on welfare, due to fiscal regime changes, will be
missed. This work also characterizes optimal government spending policy across consump-
tion and investment categories. Lastly, this thesis presents a first attempt to examine the
relevance of bureaucracy for the macroeconomy by examining the cost of rent-seeking by
government bureaucrats in a general equilibrium setup, and by comparing it to the optimal
time spent on wasteful activities.
The study uses the RBC framework to study the cyclical properties of European public
1
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sector labor markets and to provide normative statements about fiscal policy, thus suggest-
ing important reforms in the public sector. The RBC paradigm has established itself in the
modern macroeconomic literature as a useful environment for studying aggregate fluctuations
in developed economies, and an indispensable tool in the toolkit of the macroeconomist con-
ducting quantitative research. In addition, the baseline RBC model performance improves
significantly when extended to capture specific features of the economy of interest. Some
examples include: distortionary taxation (McGrattan 1994), government spending (Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum 1992), and productive public investment (Baxter and King 1993).
The main focus of the computational experiments performed in those papers, however, was
on the effect of government purchases, public investment and taxes. In addition, most of the
extensions to the benchmark RBC model, which allow for public employment model public
sector labor market variables predominantly as exogenous, e.g. Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005),
and Linnemann (2009). Those models feature a representative household and two sectors -
public and private - where labor hours can be supplied.
However, a shortcoming in all these models is that wage rates in the economy are identical,
with public hours approximated by a stationary stochastic process. Therefore, these models,
despite being an improvement over earlier vintages of RBC models, produce a good match
vis-a-vis data along the public sector labor market dimension, e.g. public hours volatility,
mostly by construction. The absence of an internal propagation mechanism for public em-
ployment is another limitation in this class of models, particularly when the research focus
falls on the interactions between the two labor markets and their relation to business cycle
fluctuations and optimal fiscal policy issues. With the exception of Ardagna (2007) and
Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012), no previous studies had pursued a systematic
study of government spending behavior in RBC models with endogenously-determined pub-
lic employment and wages, as well as labor-intensive government services.1 Nonetheless, the
1A discussion on how the work in this thesis differs in important ways from Ardagna (2007) and Fernandez-
de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) is provided on pp. 4 and 13.
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greater part of government consumption in a country’s national accounts consists of wage
consumption, and the smaller part corresponds to government purchases of commodities.
(OECD 2012).
The models presented in this thesis build on a very small number of existing Real-Business-
Cycle (RBC) models with public employment, e.g. Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005), and Lin-
nemann (2009). The extensions discussed in each of the three core chapters are consistent
with an important feature in data, namely the high unionization rate in the public sector,
the inherent difference between working in the public and private sectors, the bureaucracy
in the government sector and the (anecdotal) evidence of rent-seeking by public officials in
government administration. After all, central governments in EU countries are the biggest
employers at a national level, with a high public share in total employment. In addition,
government sectors in the major European Union (EU) member states are highly unionized,
coordinated and centralized, and significantly more so than the respective private sectors.
Therefore, the presence of well-organized interest groups operating in the public sector, as
well as the existence of other labor market frictions, often imposes a significant constraint on
the use of fiscal policy in Europe as a tool for economic stabilization, and thus accentuates
cyclical fluctuations.
In addition, unlike other studies (Gomes 2012), this thesis also analyses the optimal fis-
cal policy setup in a framework with a competitive private labor market and endogenously-
determined public sector hours and wages, both in the steady-state and in terms of responses
in the face of unexpected technology shocks. Lastly, the thesis tries to delve into the inter-
nal competition within the public employment service and tries to address the problem of
rent-seeking in the public sector by government bureaucrats. The focus is on government
spending on wages and its potential to produce rent-seeking behavior. Importantly, this
bloating process in the administration and the subsequent expansion of the public sector
wage bill should raise concerns in policy makers, since larger governments tend to lose effi-
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ciency progressively with size and when the cost of labor largely exceeds its marginal revenue
product. After all, labor productivity in the public sector is difficult to measure as a quantity
corresponding to government production is hard to define.
Research Questions and Contributions
The thesis opens the discussion by asking whether the benchmark Real-Business-Cycle
(RBC) model, augmented with a public sector union, can match labor market fluctuations
observed in a representative European economy (Germany) better than earlier/alternative
models, and whether a strong union presence in the public sector is relevant for the welfare
effect of fiscal regime changes. Answering these questions requires a careful calibration and
simulation of an RBC model augmented with a public sector union optimization problem.
This is pursued in Chapter 1 of the thesis. The setup in that chapter combines two elements
used in earlier research to address new aspects of the economy and produce new results:
it adopts the public sector union maximization problem from Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al.
(2009, 2012) and incorporates it into a RBC model with richer tax structure and fiscal policy
instruments, i.e. Finn (1998). Thus, the individual quantitative effect of union optimization
can be assessed relative to Finn’s (1998) setup with exogenous public hours and a single,
competitive wage rate.
The study in Chapter 1 also takes a much wider scope than does Finn (1998) and at the same
time is complementary to Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012). It includes a complete
evaluation of an RBC model with an optimizing public sector union, following the widely-
accepted methodology in the RBC literature. The model used in Chapter 1 successfully
matches the cyclical fluctuations in the public and private sector labor markets. Addition-
ally, it also compares well to the empirical autocorrelation and cross-correlation functions
generated from an unrestricted Vector Auto Regression (VAR) estimation. While all these
features are important for understanding the aggregate fluctuations, these aspects were not
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addressed in the earlier studies on the dynamic general equilibrium effects of public sector
unions. Lastly, endogenously-determined public wages and hours will be shown to add to the
distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms and produce significantly higher welfare
losses. The union model requires larger changes in tax rates to achieve a pre-specified in-
crease in tax revenue, compared to Finn’s (1998) model with exogenous public sector hours.
Thus, endogenous public hours are quantitatively important for fiscal policy evaluation. Ig-
noring the interaction between hours and wages leads to a significant underestimation of the
welfare effect of tax regime changes.
However, Chapter 1 leaves outside its research scope interesting issues such as optimal tax-
rate determination, public sector wage- and employment-setting possibilities. Thus, it does
not adequately address either the household’s choice at the margin between entering the
public or the private sector, or the optimal policy framework, in which a benevolent gov-
ernment chooses all spending components (in addition to setting the two tax rates on labor
and capital, respectively). All these structural/labor-market aspects of public finance and
public policy represent a gap in the literature, which the research in Chapter 2 aims to fill.
An important limitation of the analysis in Chapter 1, and the thesis as a whole, is that
in order to focus on the bargaining between the public sector union and the government,
it abstracts away from issues such as public debt. If debt is included as a residually-
determined fiscal instrument, and government wage and employment determined through
(Nash-)bargaining, that would complicate the problem substantially. Depending on the ini-
tial condition on debt-to-GDP ratio, model dynamics would change in a substantial way.
Initial conditions for debt would then matter, as they would affect the process of debt repay-
ment, and/or possible default decisions. In addition, since there is no zero-profit constraint
in the government sector, there is a priori no counteracting force in the model to oppose the
upward pressure on wages and employment by public sector unions. Following the model
logic, if debt is then included as a residually-determined fiscal instrument, new debt will
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be always issued to satisfy the wage and employment demands of unions, thus leading the
economy to collapse.2 Thus, the presence debt in the model leads to a discussion of sovereign
default issues.3 These all interesting venues of research would be left for future work, as the
focus of this thesis are models that feature a unique steady state under a realistic model
calibration.
Chapter 2 of the thesis shifts gears to address new effects of labor markets for government
spending and fiscal policy in general. In particular, it discusses the optimal size and compo-
sition of the public wage bill, the efficient level of government investment, and the optimal
provision of a labor-intensive public good. To this end, optimal fiscal policy is characterized
and evaluated against the exogenous (observed) fiscal stance. Addressing these research
questions requires a general-equilibrium model with a richer and more realistic government
spending side, and an endogenous private-public labor choice in particular. However, the
presence of a public employment decision margin, as a separate labor market choice made by
the household, has not been sufficiently investigated in the literature. Hence, an otherwise
standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model will be augmented with a
convex cost of working in the government sector to reflect the fact that wages in the private
and the public sectors were determined within different institutional settings (thus linking
the analysis with the study undertaken in Chapter 1). Chapter 2 argues that if public sector
labor choice is ignored, then important effects on allocations and welfare, driven by govern-
ment wage-setting and household’s decisions on hours, will be missed.
2Forni and Giordano (2003) show that for the case of Greece, public sector wage bill and debt series are
positively co-moving over time.
3Alternatively, the model may need to incorporate some credible fiscal rules on the budget deficit and
public debt, so that such constraint would become binding at a certain level. However, the introduction of
such rules, despite necessary, might not be sufficient to guarantee a stable solution. Simulations might need
to be performed to endogenously-determine the debt threshold corresponding to certain initial conditions,
after which the model dynamics becomes unstable, or the model could feature multiple equilibria, and/or
indeterminacies. However, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) argue that casting a government policy rule that
leads to indeterminacy is ”not a good idea.”
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The second novelty in the framework presented in Chapter 2, which adds value to ear-
lier studies, is the more interesting and meaningful role attributed to government employees.
In particular, the study constructs in greater detail the mechanism of public good provi-
sion. The setup modeled the government as an employer, needing labor hours to provide
public goods. In contrast to Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009), labor is combined with
government capital (instead of government purchases) to produce valuable government ser-
vices. Therefore, government investment is a productive government spending category in
the setup, and public sector wage consumption is not entirely wasteful. Importantly, when
hiring workers, the government is able to set the public sector wage rate, an assumption
which is consistent with data, e.g. Perez and Schucknecht (2003). Overall, the interaction
between the two types of labor and capital stocks will be the driving force behind some of
the new results obtained in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 then proceeds to study public employment, wage rate and government invest-
ment determination, as well as the level of public services provision, are optimally chosen
by a benevolent government. In particular, under the optimal (Ramsey) policy regime, the
benevolent government will choose the socially optimal levels of both private allocations
and the public good. The main findings from the computational experiments performed in
Chapter 2 are consistent with earlier findings in the literature. First, as in Judd (1985),
Chamley (1986) and Zhu (1992), the optimal steady-state capital tax rate is zero, as this is
the most distortionary tax to use. Next, a higher labor tax rate is needed to compensate for
the loss in capital tax revenue. The new result regarding optimal government spending is
that under the optimal policy regime, public sector employment is lower. As a result, gov-
ernment employees are more valuable, and receive higher wages. Under the optimal policy
regime, the benevolent Ramsey planner substitutes labor for capital in the production of
both public services and private output. Furthermore, the government wage bill is smaller,
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while public investment is three times higher than in the exogenous policy case.4
Given the overall reasonable performance of the model in Chapter 2, the effect of the orga-
nizational structure of the public sector labor market for the macroeconomy is investigated
in a separate chapter, Chapter 3 in this thesis. Von Mises (1944), Parkinson (1957) and
Tullock (1974) are one of the first to suggest that bureaucracy itself has been one of the
most important factors affecting economic activity, mainly through the development and
implementations of different legislative procedures, rules and regulations. In particular, civil
servants are usually insulated from market forces in both the input and output markets:
many government positions do not have a close equivalent in the private sector, and there is
no direct way to measure performance. A closer analysis of bureaucrats’ behavior, and their
effect on aggregate fluctuations in European economies would be a logical extension to the
work in Chapter 2, and is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 aims to contribute to the body of both macroeconomic and political economy
literature by focusing on the rent-seeking behavior of bureaucrats in the public sector within
a general equilibrium setup. By incorporating an auctioning mechanism from game theory
into the model framework utilized in Chapter 2, the augmented setup in Chapter 3 attempts
to quantify the cost of rent-seeking that is produced as a result of the non-productive be-
havior of government bureaucrats competing for a larger share of a contestable transfer.
In particular, the amount of the rent in Chapter 3 is assumed to be the wage bill. After
all, public administration consists of a system of bureaus, and this type of organization in
the government sector is shown to produce significant losses for the economy through the
rent-seeking mechanism. The research argues that each bureau head could be perceived as a
4Regarding the limitations of the analysis resulting from the absence of debt in the Ramsey framework
discussed in Ch. 2 (and later in Ch.3), Stockman (2001), Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2002), and
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) show that the absence of debt and thus the inability of the government to
run surpluses and deficits has no dramatic effect (numerically) on the optimal policies in the full commitment
case. Of course, the exact allocations will differ across cases, but the difference in magnitudes is tiny.
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rational income-maximizing individual, who wants to attract more public funds for his/her
agency. The contribution of this chapter is that very few economists, with the notable ex-
ception of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tullock (1965), and Niskanen (1971), have focused
on the presence of a large bureaucracy and provided evidence of its importance for the econ-
omy, but only in a partial-equilibrium context. In addition, Chapter 3 in this thesis aims to
fill this gap in the literature by motivating and presenting a more intricate channel used by
bureaucrats to rent-seek and lobby for government funds.
To illustrate the processes taking place within public administration, the model setup in
Chapter 3 describes a symmetric non-cooperative game that is played among government
bureaucrats themselves to increase individual income at the expense of the other public
officials earnings. The interaction between agents in the public sector generated strategic
complementarities, as individual rent-seeking is positively related to opponents’ choice of
rent-seeking. Another novelty in Chapter 3 is that rent-seeking occurs in a non-competitive
labor market, the public sector one, where the wage rate is set above private sector pay.
This stimulates the entry of labor to the sector, and as a result, public employment eventu-
ally becomes too high. In particular, the high public wage and employment both stimulate
rent-seeking by generating a positive benefit of engaging in wasteful activities.
In the model presented in Chapter 3, the positive amount of time dedicated to opportunistic
activities in the steady-state is an efficient outcome from an individual worker’s point of
view, as all agents are fully rational and maximize their utility levels. Thus, in equilibrium,
individual bureaucratic rent-seeking efforts adjust to the point where the value of additional
resources spent per bureaucrat equals the benefit that accrues to that individual. In turn,
a higher wage bill requires higher tax rates to finance government spending. In the private
sector, high taxes reduce incentives to supply labor and accumulate capital, and decrease
consumption and output. Thus rent-seeking has a negative impact on the economy, and
Chapter 3 attempts to quantify the loss for the economy in a general-equilibrium frame-
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work. In addition, the mechanism described in this chapter finds a strong empirical support
in the face of different indices of institutional quality.
Finally, Chapter 3 characterizes the optimal fiscal policy regime, where steady-state rent-
seeking is significantly smaller relative to the exogenous policy case. In addition to the zero
capital tax rate, and the higher labor tax rate, the benevolent government planner produces
the efficient level of the public good by substituting labor for capital in the production of
government services, and relocating hours to the private sector. The government invests
more in public capital, chooses a higher public wage premium and sets much lower public
employment, thus achieving an overall decrease in the level of rent-seeking.
Chapter 1
Cyclical and welfare effects of the
presence of strong public sector
unions in a Real-Business-Cycle
model
1.1 Introduction
The behavior of the labor input is very important for aggregate economic fluctuations, as
Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Kydland (1995) have pointed out. In particular, changes
in hours account for two-thirds of the movement in US output per person over the business
cycle. Despite this, real business cycle (RBC) theory has been predominantly focused on the
private sector and largely ignored the dynamic general-equilibrium effects of public sector
labor choice. This chapter adds to earlier research by distinguishing between the two types of
hours and argues that the presence of the public sector labor market in European economies
generates significant interaction with the private sector labor and capital markets. If public
sector labor choice is ignored, then important effects on cyclical fluctuations, as well as on
welfare, due to fiscal regime changes, will be missed.
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Furthermore, several stylized facts suggest that this labor market is driven by non-competitive
arrangements: As reported in table 1.1 below, the public sectors in the major European
Union (EU) member states are highly unionized, and significantly more so than the respec-
tive private sectors. Although the unionization rates for the EU countries in each sector were
calculated and documented in Visser (2003) for only one year, the wide gap in union density
indicates that the two labor markets operate in different settings. High unionization rates
alone do not necessarily translate into strong unions, but the significance of unions in Europe
can be inferred from the generally high coordination, centralization and in particular, the
extensive coverage rate. Therefore, collective bargaining agreements are often used to set
public wage rates and employment levels in European economies.
Table 1.1: Labor market facts 1970-2007
Private Public Coverage Average Average
Country sector union sector union rate (%) publ./priv. publ./priv.
density (%) density (%) (2000) compensation employment
Euro Area (2001) 26 N/A 78 1.22 0.22
France (1993) 4 25 95 1.00 0.32
Germany (1997) 22 56 73 1.20 0.17
Italy (1997) 36 43 82 1.30 0.26
Spain (1997) 15 32 80 1.60 0.16
UK (2003) 18 59 36 1.08 0.27
US (2010) 7 35 15 1.08 0.16
Sources: BLS (2011), OECD (2011), Visser (2003)
Central governments in EU countries are the biggest employers at a national level, with
a high public share in total employment, as documented in table 1.1, for the largest EU
economies. The high share of public employees in total employment could in itself constitute
a source of union power, and could explain the positive public sector wage premia over the
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private wages, which are observed in most post-WWII European economies over the period
1970-2007. The Wage Dynamics Network’s (WDN) 2010 Final Report1 also emphasizes that
wage bargaining institutions are an important determinant of the wage dynamics and wage
structure in the EU countries, and the major reason for the existence of the public wage
premia.2
Additionally, Forni et al. (2003) and Gomes (2010) reported that the compensation of
public employees in OECD countries takes 60% of total government expenditure. Further-
more, Lane (2003) shows that the public wage bill in OECD countries is pro-cyclical, as
opposed to government purchases, which are acyclical. Further empirical work from Lamo,
Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008) concludes that pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy
can have important effects on the economy through the unions. In particular, public sector
unions act as organized groups that constantly press for an expansion in the government
wage bill. Therefore, the presence of interest groups in the public sector imposes a signifi-
cant constraint on the use of fiscal policy in Europe as a tool for economic stabilization, and
thus accentuates cyclical fluctuations.
This chapter uses the RBC framework to study the cyclical properties of European public
sector labor markets. The benchmark RBC model has established itself as a useful environ-
ment for studying aggregate fluctuations in developed economies. In addition, the baseline
RBC model performance improves significantly when extended to capture specific features of
the economy of interest. Some examples include: distortionary taxation (McGrattan 1994),
government spending (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992), and productive public investment
1”WDN is a research network consisting of economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national central banks (NCBs) of the EU countries, which aims at studying in depth the features and sources
of wage and labor cost dynamics and their implications for monetary policy in the euro area.”(ECB 2011)
2Other reasons for the existence of a public sector wage premia, as documented in Ehrenberg and Schwartz
(1986) can be due to skill and experience differences: on average, public employees are older and have
higher qualification. In addition, females and employees belonging to a minority group receive higher labor
compensation compared to the remuneration package for similar duties in the private sector.
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(Baxter and King 1993). Most of the extensions to the benchmark RBC model, which allow
for public employment, however, model public sector labor market variables predominantly
as being exogenously-determined, e.g. Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005), and Linnemann (2009).
Those models feature a representative household and two sectors - public and private - where
labor hours can be supplied. A serious shortcoming in these models is that wage rates in the
economy are identical, with public hours approximated by a stationary stochastic process.
These models, despite being an improvement over earlier vintages of RBC models, produce
a good match vis-a-vis data along the public sector labor market dimension, e.g. public
hours volatility, mostly by construction. The absence of an internal propagation mechanism
for public employment is a serious limitation in this class of models, particularly when the
research focus falls on the interactions between the two labor markets and their relation to
the business cycle.
There are few RBC models with endogenous public sector wages and employment. Ardagna
(2007), for example, departs from the representative-agent assumption. Total population is
split into capitalists and workers, with workers being either employed in the private or public
sector, or unemployed. In addition, both sectors are unionized, and public sector wage is
different from the private sector wage rate. Public wage and employment are obtained from
the government’s maximization problem, where the government profit function is augmented
with an ad hoc quadratic term capturing equity considerations. However, a major limita-
tion of Ardagna’s (2007) setup is that it assigns each household to a sector and by default
excludes further labor reallocation, which is the focus in this chapter.
Additionally, there are even fewer RBC models that incorporate endogenously-determined
wage and hours in the public sector, and also reflect the importance of public sector unioniza-
tion for the business cycles in EU countries: Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) were
the first to develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with public
and private wages being determined in different environments. The private sector wage is de-
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termined within a competitive market framework, while the public sector wage is an optimal
solution to the government sector union’s optimization problem. In addition, the impulse
response analysis in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) generates pro-cyclical public
wage and hours. Another important finding is the positive, but only moderate, co-movement
between the two wage rates, and public and private hours. These are all robust patterns
that have been observed previously in the empirical work of Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht
(2007, 2008) and Perez and Sanchez (2010).
The model in this chapter combines two ingredients used in earlier research to address
new aspects of the economy and produce new results: it adopts the public sector union
maximization problem from Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) and incorporates it
into a RBC model with richer tax structure and fiscal policy instruments, i.e. Finn (1998).
Thus, the individual quantitative effect of union optimization can be assessed relative to
Finn’s (1998) setup with exogenous public hours and a single, competitive wage rate. In
addition, the fiscal policy instruments will be the shares of government consumption and
investment in output, which allows the government to react to output. The presence of a
union in the public sector will crowd out the other types of the government spending at
the expense of the public sector wage bill, an effect not present in Fernandez-de-Cordoba
et al. (2009, 2012). Additionally, in contrast to Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012),
who model public employment as output-enhancing, public employment in this chapter is a
wasteful expenditure from a productive point of view. This modeling choice is used to reflect
the view that the public sector bureaucracy’s direct contribution to the national product in
the economy is somewhat small. Moreover, the setup is consistent with Blanchflower (1991),
who suggests that some governments use public sector jobs as a tool to fight unemployment
and generate votes for re-election. Lastly, a government’s completely wasteful public wage
bill spending is expected to amplify fluctuations in hours, as there will be no direct substi-
tutability/complementarity between private and public hours. In other words, the allocative
efficiency will decrease significantly, as a wasteful hour spent working in the public sector
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receives a higher return relative to a productive hour of work in the private sector.
The analysis in this chapter, as well as in the subsequent parts of the thesis, is done at
the country level, as taxation and government spending decisions are still to a great extent
country-specific for individual EU member states. Furthermore, based on their extensive
compilation of case studies, Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Visser (2003) conclude that
international unionism is weak, i.e. the influence of labor unions in Europe tends to be
constrained to the respective countries’ borders. This approach differs from Fernandez-de-
Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012), who analyze the Euro Area as a whole. Germany is the preferred
choice for calibration in this chapter (and throughout the thesis), as it is the classical ex-
ample of a large EU economy. Some of the features of the German economy include strong
public sector unions, and a large and growing gap between public and private sector union-
ization, as reported in The Economist (2011). Additionally, Germany has a public sector
wage premium and public/private employment ratio similar to the EU averages.
The study in this chapter takes a much wider scope relative to Finn (1998) and at the
same time is complementary to Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012). It includes a
complete evaluation of an RBC model with optimizing public sector union, following the
widely-accepted methodology in the RBC literature. The model here matches the cyclical
fluctuations in the public and private sector labor markets. Additionally, it also compares
well against the empirical autocorrelation and cross-correlation functions generated from an
unrestricted Vector Auto Regression (VAR). While all these features are important for un-
derstanding the aggregate fluctuations, these aspects were not addressed in the earlier studies
on the dynamic general equilibrium effects of public sector unions. Lastly, endogenously-
determined public wage and hours will be shown to add to the distortionary effect of con-
tractionary tax reforms and produce significantly higher welfare losses. The government
sector union model requires larger changes in tax rates to achieve a pre-specified increase
in tax revenue, as compared to Finn’s model with exogenous public sector hours. Thus,
Chapter 1: Cyclical and welfare effects of public sector unions in a RBC model 17
endogenous public hours are quantitatively important for fiscal policy evaluation. Ignoring
the interaction between hours and wages leads to a significant underestimation of the welfare
effect of tax regime changes.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the model setup in the context
of the relevant literature. Section 1.3 explains the data used and model calibration. Section
1.4 solves for the steady-state. Section 1.5 presents the model solution procedure, discusses
the effects of different shocks and the impulse responses of variables across model. Section
1.6 simulates the competing models and evaluates their properties for the calibrations per-
formed for Germany; it also computes the long-run welfare costs of exogenous tax regime
changes, both across models and across countries. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model setup
1.2.1 Description of the model:
The model builds upon Finn (1998). There is a representative household, as well as a
representative firm. The household owns the private physical capital and labor, which it
supplies to the firm. Hours supplied in the public sector are decided via a collective agreement
between a public sector union and the government. The perfectly-competitive firm produces
output using labor, private and public capital. The government uses tax revenues from
consumption expenditure, labor and capital income to finance: (1) government consumption
(which is valued by the representative household), (2) government investment (public capital
generates mild increasing returns to scale in the aggregate output production function), (3)
government transfers, and (4) the public wage bill. The wage rate and hours supplied in the
public sector are determined by a utility-maximizing public sector union, as in Fernandez-
de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012), subject to a balanced government period budget constraint.
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1.2.2 Households
There is an infinitely-lived representative household in the model economy, and no population
growth. The household maximizes the following expected utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cht , G
c
t , N
h
t ), (1.2.2.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator as of period 0; C
h
t , G
c
t and N
h
t are household’s con-
sumption, per household consumption of government services, and hours worked by the
household at time t, respectively. The parameter β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The
instantaneous utility function U(., ., .) is increasing in each argument and satisfies the Inada
conditions. Following Finn (1998), the CRRA form for the instantaneous utility is:
U(Cht , Gt, N
h
t ) =
[(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α , (1.2.2.2)
where (α > 1). The parameter ψ is the weight of consumption in utility, 0 < ψ < 1, and
0 < 1 − ψ < 1 is the weight in the utility function that the household attaches to leisure.
Government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, and the degree of substi-
tutability is measured by ω, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1.
The household has an endowment of one unit of time in each period t, which is split between
work, Nht and leisure, L
h
t , so that
Nht + L
h
t = 1. (1.2.2.3)
The household can supply hours of work in the public sector, N ght , or in the private one,
Npht , with N
h
t = N
ph
t + N
gh
t . The wage rates per hour of work in private and public sector
are denoted by wpt and w
g
t , respectively. The household chooses N
ph
t only; public hours will
be endogenously chosen jointly by the public sector union and government, so N ght will be
taken by the household as given, as in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2012). 3,4
3This modeling choice also helps to keep the representation close to Finn (1998), where public employment
is determined as a realization of a stochastic process, and thus taken as given by the household.
4An alternative way to think about the household’s labor decision is that it chooses total hours worked
(which is always positive because of the monotonicity of the household’s utility function), and the split
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The representative household saves by investing in private capital Iht . As an owner of capital,
the household receives interest income rtK
ph
t from renting the capital to the firms; rt is the
return to private capital, and Kpht denotes private capital stock in the beginning of period
t. As in Finn (1998), the household receives capital depreciation allowance in the amount of
τ kδpKpht , where τ
k is the capital income tax rate and 0 < δp < 1 is the depreciation rate of
private physical capital. In other words, capital income taxes are levied net of depreciation
as in Prescott (2002, 2004) and in line with the methodology used in Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994).
Finally, the household owns all firms in the economy, and receives all profit (Πht ) in the
form of dividends. The household’s budget constraint is
(1 + τ c)Cht + I
h
t ≤ (1− τ l)[wptNpht +wgtN ght ] + (1− τ k)rtKpht + τ kδpKpht +GTt + Πht , (1.2.2.4)
where τ c, τ l are the proportional tax rates on consumption and labor income, respectively,
and Gtt is the per household transfer from the government.
Household’s private physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kpht+1 = I
h
t + (1− δp)Kpht . (1.2.2.5)
between private sector and public sector work are determined by the firm and the union, respectively.
Monotonicity of the utility function, the Cobb-Douglas specification of the firm’s production function, and
union objective function will guarantee that in equilibrium both Npht , N
gh
t > 0. Furthermore, in the model
calibration, consumption utility weight parameter ψ would be set to correspond to the average share of time
endowment spent working. In the private sector, the equilibrium private sector wage and interest rate will
such that optimal Npht < N
h
t . Next, government transfers share and the relative weight on wages in the
union maximization problem will be set to match the average public-to-private employment and wage ratios
in data. Furthermore, the way the transfers share and the relative weight on public wages in the union’s
objective are fixed will achieve Nght < N
h
t . This is because out of the steady state, the hours ratio will
fluctuate only in a small neighborhood around its steady state value. (This could be seen later from the
impulse responses documented in Table 1.1 - 1.3.)
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The representative household acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0, tax rates
{τ c, τ l, τ k}, policy variables {wgt , N ght , Gct , Git, GTt }∞t=0 as given, (where Git denotes govern-
ment investment) and chooses allocations {Cht , Npht , Iht , Kpht+1}∞t=0 to maximize Eq. (1.2.2.1)
subject to Eqs. (1.2.2.2)-(1.2.2.5), and initial condition for private physical capital, Khp0 .
The optimality conditions from the household’s problem, together with the transversality
condition (TVC) for private physical capital, are as follows5
Cht :
[
(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nht )(1−ψ) = Λt(1 + τ c)
(1.2.2.6)
Npht :
[
(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)
[
Cht + ωG
c
t
1−Nht
]ψ
= Λt(1− τ l)wpt
(1.2.2.7)
Kpht+1: βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (1.2.2.8)
TVC: lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
ph
t+1 = 0, (1.2.2.9)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The household
equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
Private hours are chosen so that the disutility of an hour work in the private sector at the
margin equals the after-tax return to labor. Next, the Euler equation describes the optimal
capital accumulation rule, and implicitly characterizes the optimal consumption allocations
chosen in any two contiguous periods. The last expression is the TVC, imposed to ensure that
the value of the private physical capital that remains at the end of the optimization horizon
is zero. This boundary condition guarantees that the model equilibrium is well-defined by
ruling out explosive solution paths.
5Detailed derivation of the household’s optimality conditions is provided in Appendix 1.8.1.
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1.2.3 Firms
Following Finn (1998), there is also a representative private firm in the model economy. It
produces a homogeneous final product using a production function that requires private and
public physical capital, Kpt , K
g
t respectively, and labor hours N
p
t . The production function
is as follows
Yt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ(Kgt )
ν , (1.2.3.1)
where At measures the total factor productivity in period t; 0 < θ, (1 − θ) < 1 are the
productivity of labor and private physical capital, respectively. Parameter ν ≥ 0 measures
the degree of increasing returns to scale (IRS) that public capital has on output.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and policy variables
{τ c, τ k, τ l, wgt , N gt , Gct , Git, GTt , Kgt+1}∞t=0 as given. Accordingly, Kpt , and Npt are chosen every
period to maximize firm’s static aggregate profit,
Πt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ(Kgt )
ν − rtKpt − wptNpt . (1.2.3.2)
In equilibrium, profit is zero. In addition, labor and capital receive their marginal products,
i.e6
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
, (1.2.3.3)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
. (1.2.3.4)
1.2.4 Government budget constraint
The government purchases goods, Gct , invests in public capital G
i
t, distributes transfers G
T
t ,
hires labor N gt and sets the public sector wage rate w
g
t . Public capital evolves according to
the following law of motion:
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (1.2.4.1)
6Detailed derivation of the firm’s optimality conditions is provided in Appendix 1.8.1.
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where 0 < δg < 1 is the linear depreciation rate on government physical capital.
Total government expenditure, Gct + G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t + G
T
t , is financed by levying proportional
taxes on consumption, capital and labor income. Thus, the government budget constraint is
Gct +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t +G
T
t = τ
cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKpt + τ l
[
wptN
p
t + w
g
tN
g
t
]
. (1.2.4.2)
Government takes market prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and allocations {Npt , Kpt }∞t=0 as given.
The following six policy instruments, {τ c, τ k, τ l, Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
,
GTt
Yt
}, will be exogenously set for all
t. In particular, shares of government consumption and investment in output, rather than
the levels of the fiscal variables, will follow stochastic processes. Thus, public consumption
and investment will respond to both exogenous shocks and output. (Kgt+1 will be exoge-
nously determined as well, subject to the initial condition Kg0 and the law of motion for
Git.) Government transfers-to-output ratio G
Ty ≡ GTt
Yt
will be fixed,7 but the level of public
transfers will vary with output (i.e. GTt = G
TyYt). All three tax rates {τ c, τ k, τ l} will be
kept constant. Finally, the pair {N gt , wgt }∞t=0 will be determined as an optimal solution from
a collective bargaining problem between the government and a public sector union, which is
described in the next subsection.
1.2.5 Government sector union objective function
In contrast to Finn’s (1998) model, which features a single wage rate wt and exogenous
public employment, modeled as an AR(1) process, in this chapter the two variables will be
obtained as optimal choices from an explicit objective function maximization, similar to the
7The fixed government transfers/output ratio is to be interpreted as an ”implied” one, as it will be set
so that the model matches the long-run wage and employment ratios, as it will be shown in the following
sections. In this sense, it bears little correspondence to the average ratio in data.
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one used in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et. al (2009, 2012):8
max
wgt ,N
g
t
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
, (1.2.5.1)
where η > 0 is the relative weight put on wages, and ρ is the parameter determining the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between wages and hours, 1
1−ρ . Hence, the pair
{N gt , wgt } solves Eq. (1.2.5.1) s.t. Eqs. (1.2.4.1)-(1.2.4.2) and the processes for the other
policy instruments.9,10
In the union literature, Doiron (1992) uses an equivalent representation to model union
preferences over wages and employment between a private sector union and a firm.11 Fur-
thermore, the functional form of the objective function used in this chapter can be traced
back to Oswald et al. (1984) and Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988). Recent studies by
Demekas and Kontolemis (2000), and Forni and Giordano (2003) also use social welfare
8The difference in this chapter is that instead of having two separate weights, φ on wages, and (1 − φ)
on employment, only one relative weight will be used, mainly due to the large difference in the magnitudes
of public sector hours and the wage rate.
9The public sector union should be taken as an aggregation of smaller unions who operate on federal and
state/local levels, who maximize the same objective function over local government period budget constraint.
The coalition of workers is large at a regional level, and thus able to influence the public sector wage rate.
Sill, local unions are small relative to the size of the economy, hence wp is taken as given. Nonetheless, both
wage rates will be determined within the system, so there will be some feedback effect from public to private
wage.
10In the model, the assumption that the government cannot influence private sector prices was used to
make the government sector union constraint optimization problem well-defined, i.e., that the public sector
union can determine the public sector wage rate, but cannot affect the private sector wage rate. It is also
a technical condition that allows for the DCE to be solved. Also, empirical evidence (WDN 2010) suggests
that private sector is a wage leader, sets wages first, and then government follows to determine compensation
in the public sector. The same effect is observed in the CCFs in Table 1.7 in Appendix 1.8.5. Regarding the
point that the government should be treated as a ”Stackelberg leader,” this is indeed an important aspect
of reality. Pursuing an extension of the model along that venue is left for future research, as the problem
becomes computationally very intensive, since the whole history of the economy becomes a state variable,
which makes the state space a complicated object to handle, and interferes with the model tractability.
11The equivalence is shown in Appendix 1.8.1.
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functions where public sector wage and employment appear as separate arguments. Indeed,
all those studies ignore the process of bargaining, and thus the objective function used here
is not micro-founded as well.12 Alternatively, deriving the reduced-form utility function
using union aggregation over individual worker preferences is still an open question in the
literature. Oswald (1982) shows in a simple static framework that if the union is utilitarian,
i.e., the union maximizes the expected utility of a representative worker, and if members are
risk-averse, then there exists a well-behaved union utility function defined over both wage
rate and employment. Since those conditions are assumed to hold in this chapter, Oswald’s
(1982) result is one way to at least partially rationalize the ad hoc union utility function used
here. Additionally, a CES union utility function, which is concave and increasing in wage
and employment, has proven to be a successful modeling choice in econometric studies.13
In contrast, simple models such as wage bill maximization (wgtN
g
t ) and rent maximization (
[wgt − wat ]N g, where wat denotes the alternative wage at time t) have been rejected in many
studies.14 In what is to follow, it will be shown that the CES union maximization function is
empirically relevant, and thus is a useful modeling device, similar to the household’s utility
function and the aggregate production function, which could help generate several new and
more importantly, interesting, results.
The interaction between the public sector union and the government is as follows: the
wage bill in the public sector, modeled as a residual spending item that balances the bud-
get constraint in every period, is distributed between wages and hours according to the
12Despite researchers’ claims that this representation is consistent with Nash bargaining, such statements
are incorrect. The author is not aware of any studies that explicitly show how the union objective function
can be obtained from a Nash bargaining procedure.
13Papers applying this approach are Akerlof (1969), Atherton (1973), Calmfors (1981), Carruth and Oswald
(1981), Cartter (1959), Corden (1981), Hersoug (1978), Fellner (1949), Mulvey (1978), Oswald (1979), Rees
(1977), and Warren-Boulton (1977), among others.
14A partial list of such studies is Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Card (1986), Carruth and Oswald (1983),
Eberts and Stone (1986), Farber (1978), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), and Martinello (1989).
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union utility function (1.2.5.1) specified above.15 Additionally, government period budget
constraint serves the role of a labor demand function, which will be subject to shocks, re-
sulting from innovations to total factor productivity and the fiscal shares. The balanced
budget assumption is thus an important assumption in the model setup. Since the wage
bill is a residual, if the wage rate is increased, then hours need to be decreased. Now the
problem in the public sector is transformed into the standard representation used in union
literature, where a labor union maximizes utility, constrained by a stochastic labor demand
curve. However, in addition to producing endogenous public wage and public hours, this
optimization problem generates a public sector wage that features a positive premium over
the private sector one. Therefore, at least part of this premium can be justified by the
gains from unionization in the public sector. In equilibrium, a positive linear relation exists
between the public wage rate and public sector hours, which is obtained from the marginal
rate of substitution between the two:16
N gt = η
1
ρwgt . (1.2.5.2)
There are several interpretations for Eq. (1.2.5.2): first, it can be recognized as a standard
neoclassical labor supply curve. Hence, this model can be viewed as one emphasizing the
relative importance of supply-side factors, i.e. unions, in the economy. Second, and more
importantly, such a relationship is called a ”contract curve” in the union literature, e.g.,
Blanchard (1991). In particular, this curve defines the set of allocations {wgt , N gt }, generated
as an outcome of the collective bargaining between the government and the union. Since
the union optimizes over both the public wage and hours, the outcome is efficient. The
solution pair is at the intersection point of the contract curve, and the labor demand curve
(government budget constraint).
15The modeling choice is also consistent with Tullock’s (1974) hypothesis, which states that bureaucrats
first exert an effort to increase their number, and once staff has expanded, the bureaucrats will then use
their newly-increased power to negotiate higher wages.
16Detailed derivation of the union’s optimality conditions is provided in Appendix 1.8.1.
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Next, Eq. (1.2.5.2) is plugged back into (1.2.4.2) to obtain a solution for the public sec-
tor wage:
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −GTt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
. (1.2.5.3)
Optimal public hours are obtained by substituting (1.2.5.3) into (1.2.5.2) to obtain
N gt = η
1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −GTt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
. (1.2.5.4)
Both public sector wage and hours will be negatively related to government consumption
and investment, and positively related to tax revenue from consumption, capital income and
private sector labor income. Public hours and the wage rate are directly affected by fiscal
policy variables: a decrease in government consumption, for example, will have a direct
positive effect on both public hours and wages, and thus on the household’s income. Such
effect are empirically observed in Lano, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008). In the model, the
crowding out effect of government spending will generate important differences from earlier
literature. This makes it relevant for the analysis of the impulse responses to fiscal shares
shocks and for the long-run welfare effects of fiscal policy. These effects will be discussed at
length in the following sections.
1.2.6 Stochastic processes for the policy variables
The exogenous stochastic variables are the total factor productivity At, and the policy instru-
ments
Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
, where
Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
denote the shares of government consumption (purchases) and
government investment in output, respectively. Then assume that At,
Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
follow AR(1)
processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + at+1, (1.2.6.1)
where A0 = A > 0 is steady-state level of the total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 1 is
the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and at ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are random shocks
to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations at represent unexpected
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changes in the total factor productivity process.
The stochastic process for the government consumption/output share {Gct
Yt
} is
ln
(
Gct+1
Yt+1
)
= (1− ρc) ln
(
Gc0
Y0
)
+ ρc ln
(
Gct
Yt
)
+ ct+1, (1.2.6.2)
or
lnGcyt+1 = (1− ρc) lnGcy0 + ρc lnGcyt + ct+1, (1.2.6.3)
where Gcyt+1 =
Gct+1
Yt+1
, and
Gc0
Y0
= G
c
Y
> 0 is the steady-state public consumption/output ratio,
0 < ρc < 1 is the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and ct ∼ iidN(0, σ2c ) are
random shocks to government consumption/output share. Hence, the innovations ct repre-
sent unexpected changes in government consumption/output share.
The stochastic process followed by the government investment/output share {Git
Yt
} is
ln
(
Git+1
Yt+1
)
= (1− ρi) ln
(
Gi0
Y0
)
+ ρi ln
(
Git
Yt
)
+ it+1, (1.2.6.4)
or
lnGiyt+1 = (1− ρi) lnGiy0 + ρi lnGiyt + it+1, (1.2.6.5)
where Giyt+1 =
Git+1
Yt+1
, and
Gi0
Y0
= G
i
Y
> 0 is the steady-state public investment/output ratio,
0 < ρi < 1 is the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and it ∼ iidN(0, σ2i ) are
random shocks to government investment/output share. Hence, the innovations it represent
unexpected changes in government investment/output share.
Additionally, in Finn (1998), public hours will also follow an AR(1) process:
lnN gt+1 = (1− ρn) lnN g0 + ρn lnN gt + nt+1, (1.2.6.6)
where N g0 = N
g > 0 is the steady-state public employment, 0 < ρn < 1 is the first-order
autoregressive persistence parameter and nt ∼ iidN(0, σ2n) are random shocks to govern-
ment employment. Hence, the innovations nt represent unexpected changes in government
employment.
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1.2.7 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the fixed value of government transfers/output ratio Gty, the exogenous processes fol-
lowed by {At, Gcyt , Giyt }∞t=0 and initial conditions for the state variables {A0, Gcy0 , Giy0 , Kph0 , Kg0},
a decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a sequence of allocations
{Cht , Npht , N ght , Ipht , Kpht+1, Kgt+1} ∀h, prices {rt, wpt , wgt }∞t=0 and the tax rates {τ c, τ l, τ k} such
that (i) the representative household maximizes utility; (ii) the stand-in firm maximizes
profit every period; (iii) government sector union objective function is maximized s.t the
government budget constraint being satisfied in each time period; (iv) all markets clear.17
1.3 Data and model calibration
Both the model in this chapter and Finn (1998) are calibrated for German data at annual
frequency to correspond to the collective bargaining frequency. The chapter follows the
methodology used in Kydland and Prescott (1982), as it is the standard approach in the
literature. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships of the models will be used
to set the parameter values, in order to replicate certain features of the reference economy.
1.3.1 Model-consistent German data
Due to data limitations, the model calibrated for Germany will be for the period 1970-2007,
while the sub-period 1970-91 covers West Germany only. For Germany, data on real output
per capita, household consumption per capita, gross fixed capital formation per capita, as
well as government consumption and population were taken from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database. The OECD statistical database was used to extract the long-
term interest rate on 10-year generic bonds, CPI inflation, average annual earnings in the
private and public sector, average hours, private, public and total employment in Germany.
Public transfers ratio were calculated from the CES-Ifo DICE Database (2011). Public and
private investment and capital stock series were obtained from EU Klems database (2009).
17The system of equations that characterizes the DCE is provided in Appendix 1.8.2.
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German average annual real public compensation per employee was estimated by dividing
the real government wage bill (OECD 2011) by the number of public employees. Due to
data limitations on the average hours worked in each sector, employment statistics were
used instead. To make empirical variables comparable with model variables, employment
series in Germany were normalized by total population (obtained from WDI).
1.3.2 Calibrating model parameters to German data
In German data, the average public/private employment ratio over the period 1970-2007 is
0.17, and the average wage ratio in data equals 1.20. The relative weight attached to public
wages, η, as well as government transfers/output ratio gty, will be set so that the steady-
state wage and employment ratios in the model match the corresponding data averages.
The curvature parameter of the union’s CES maximization function, was set to a standard
value, ρ = −1, as in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2012).18 The average effective tax rates
in EU countries were obtained from McDaniel’s (2009) dataset. McDaniel’s approach was
preferred to the one used by Mendoza et al. (1984) and the subsequent updates due to
the more careful treatment of property and import taxes. Over the period studied, German
economy is characterized by a low average capital income tax rate, τ k = 0.16, and a relatively
high labor income tax rate, τ l = 0.409. The labor share, θ = 0.71, was computed as the
average ratio of compensation of employees in total output.19 Private and public capital
depreciation rates, δp = 0.082 and δg = 0.037, respectively, were approximated from the
EU Klems Database as the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation in constant 1995
prices and and the corresponding value of fixed capital stock in constant 1995 prices over the
period 1970-2007.20 The discount rate β = 0.973 was calibrated from the steady-state Euler
18A robustness check on the curvature parameter was performed with ρ = [−5,−4,−3,−2,−0.5], which
did not produce any significant difference in the results obtained, as parameter η adjusted accordingly.
19Alternatively, capital share, 1−θ, can be obtained as the mean ratio of gross private capital compensation
in output from EU Klems.
20To impute public sector capital stocks and investment, the series for education, public administration,
social security and health sectors were used.
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equation (Eq. 1.8.2.18 in Appendix 1.8.2.). The parameter describing the curvature of the
household’s utility function was set to α = 2, which is a typical value of relative risk aversion
in the literature. As in Kydland (1995), the weight on consumption, ψ = 0.296, was set equal
to the average steady-state total hours of work in data as a share of total hours available.
The weight put on government consumption in the utility function, ω = 0.099, was calibrated
using the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equation (Eq. 1.8.2.19 in Appendix 1.8.2.)
and data averages. The implied substitutability between private and public consumption is
therefore quite low. The public capital share in the production function, ν = 0.0233, equals
the average public investment/output ratio in German data. Persistence and innovation
volatility of the stochastic processes, as well as the AR(1) process for public employment in
Finn (1998), were estimated using OLS. Total factor productivity parameters, ρa = 0.943
and σa = 0.013, were estimated using the logged and linearly detrended Solow residual series,
obtained from the model’s aggregate production function and data. Table 1.2 on the next
page summarizes the model parameters for Germany.
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Table 1.2: Model Parameters
Param. Value Definition Source
β 0.973 Discount factor Calibrated
θ 0.710 Labor income share Data average
δp 0.082 Depreciation rate on private capital Data average
δg 0.037 Depreciation rate on government capital Data average
α 2.000 Curvature parameter of the utility function Set
ψ 0.296 Weight on consumption in utility Set
ν 0.023 Degree of increasing returns to scale of public capital Set
ρ -1.000 Curvature parameter of the union’s maximization function Set
ω 0.099 Weight on government services in household’s consumption Calibrated
τ c 0.148 Effective tax rate on consumption Data average
τ k 0.160 Effective tax rate on capital income Data average
τ l 0.409 Effective tax rate on labor income Data average
gcy 0.189 Steady-state government consumption as a share of output Data average
giy 0.023 Steady-state government investment as a share of output Data average
gT/y 0.047 Steady-state government transfers as a share of output Set
A 1.000 Steady-state level of total factor productivity Set
ρa 0.943 AR(1) parameter total factor productivity Estimated
ρc 0.976 AR(1) parameter government consumption/output ratio Estimated
ρi 0.853 AR(1) parameter government investment/output ratio Estimated
ρn 0.915 AR(1) parameter government employment (Finn’s model) Estimated
σa 0.013 SD of total factor productivity innovation Estimated
σc 0.016 SD of government consumption/output share innovation Estimated
σi 0.023 SD of government investment/output share innovation Estimated
σn 0.016 SD of government employment innovation (Finn’s model) Estimated
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1.4 Solving for the steady-state
Once model parameters were obtained, the unique steady-state of the system was computed
numerically for the Germany-calibrated model. Results are reported in Table 1.3 below.
Table 1.3: Data averages and long-run solution
Description GE Data Finn GE Union GE
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.576 0.576
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.212 0.212
gc/y Gov’t consumption-to-output ratio 0.189 0.189 0.189
gi/y Gov’t investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
gT/y Gov’t transfers-to-output ratio 0.170 0.047 0.047
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.350 2.350
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
wpnp/y Priv. labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill-to-output ratio 0.130 0.146 0.145
rkp/y Capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
ng/np Public-private employment ratio 0.170 0.205 0.170
wg/wp Public-private employment ratio 1.200 1.000 1.200
n Total employment 0.296 0.253 0.247
np Private sector employment 0.253 0.210 0.211
ng Public sector employment 0.043 0.043 0.036
η Relative weight on public wage rate - N/A 31.63
r˜ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.028 0.028
Note that the public transfers share, gTy, and the relative weight attached to public wages,
η, are set so that the wage and hours ratios match the corresponding data averages.21 In
21In this model, the implied η cannot be interpreted directly, but should rather be regarded as containing
a scaling factor, as ng and wg differ in magnitude (due to the normalization of the time endowment to unity).
Therefore, once this is accounted for, i.e. when η is normalized by wg/ng, the ”corrected” parameter, η¯,
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addition, the steady-state values for hours in data are approximated by splitting the average
hours, expressed as a share of total available hours of work, according to the average hours
ratio.22 In Finn (1998), public hours are set to match the corresponding data average.
Overall, the long-run solutions of both models are good approximations to the data av-
erages. The steady-state real after-tax real interest rate, net of depreciation, delivered by
the two models, i.e. r˜ = (1− τ k)(r− δp), is close to the average real interest rate on 10-year
bonds, which is taken as a proxy for the return to private physical capital in the model.
Both models capture the public wage bill share of GDP in Germany. Furthermore, public
sector labor income is also a significant share relative to capital in Germany as well.
Across models, several important differences can be noted: in steady-state, Finn (1998)
produces a slightly higher level of total hours and lower public sector wages, compared to
the model with the public sector union. This is due to the additional constraints imposed in
the union model on the steady-state public-private hours and wages ratio. Model dynamics
out of the steady-state is investigated in the following section.
1.5 Model solution and impulse responses
Since there is no closed-form general solution for the model in this chapter, a typical approach
followed in the RBC literature is to log-linearize the stationary DCE equations around the
steady state, where xˆt = ln xt − lnx, and then solve the linearized version of the model.
The linearized DCE system23 can be represented in the form of first-order linear stochastic
difference equations as in King, Plosser and Rebello (1988):
AEtxˆt+1 = Bxˆt + CEtt+1 (1.5.0.1)
equals 0.998 for Germany. In other words, wage rate and hours are equally-weighted in the generalized
Stone-Geary union utility function, as typically assumed in the trade union literature.
22In this way hours/employment data averages are made comparable in magnitude with the corresponding
theoretical variables in the union model.
23Detailed derivations in Appendix 1.8.3-1.8.4.
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where A,B,C are coefficient matrices, t is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked vec-
tor of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt gˆ
cy
t gˆ
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. Klein’s
(2000) generalized eigenvalue decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model.
Using the model solution, the impulse response functions (IRFs) were computed to analyze
the transitional dynamics of model variables to a surprise innovation to either productivity,
or government consumption. The effects of total factor productivity (TFP) and fiscal shocks
to the government consumption and investment shares in a model with public sector union
differ from Finn (1998), particularly when the behavior of labor market variables and the
labor reallocation is given close scrutiny.
1.5.1 The effect of a positive productivity shock
Figure 1.1 shows the impact of a 1% surprise TFP innovation on the economy with public
sector union and Finn’s setup. The impulse responses are expressed in log-deviation from the
variables’ original steady-states in the model economy calibrated to annual German data.
There are two main channels through which the TFP shock affects the model economy. A
higher TFP increases output directly upon impact. This constitutes a positive wealth effect,
as there is a higher availability of final goods, which could be used for private and public
consumption, as well as investment. From the rules for the government spending, investment
and transfers in levels, a higher output translates into higher level of expenditure in each
of the three categories. In turn, there is also a feedback effect from government investment
to output through public capital, which comes with a one-period lag. This indirect effect is
quite small. Meanwhile, the positive TFP shock increases both the marginal product of cap-
ital and labor, hence the real interest rate (not pictured) and the private wage rate increase.
The household responds to the price signals and supplies more hours in the private sector,
as well as increasing investment. This increase is also driven from both the intertemporal
consumption smoothing and the intra-temporal substitution between private consumption
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and leisure. In terms of the labor-leisure trade-off, the income effect (”work more”) produced
by the increase in the private wage dominates the substitution effect (”work less”). Further-
more, the increase of private hours expands output even further, and thus both output and
government spending categories increase more than the amount of the shock upon impact.
Over time, as private physical capital stock accumulates, marginal product of capital falls,
which decreases the incentive to invest. In the long-run, all variables return to their old
steady-state values. Due to the highly-persistent TFP process, the effect of the shock is still
present after 50 periods.
An observational equivalence is noted in the responses of most of the model variables across
the two models. Public sector labor dynamics, however, is quite distinct: In Finn (1998),
public hours stay fixed at their steady-state, and public wage transition is identical to the
private wage one. In the model with public sector union, however, there is the additional
effect of an increase in productivity leading to an increase in income and consumption. For
example, higher income and consumption lead to larger tax revenue. In addition, the growth
in government revenue exceeds the increase in the fiscal spending instruments, hence the ad-
ditional funds available for the wage bill, which leads to an expansion in both public sector
wage and hours. In turn, this expansion has a feedback effect on the household’s income and
consumption. The effect on total hours through the increase in public hours is quite small,
though.24 The model with public sector union in this chapter also generates an interesting
dynamics in the wage and hours ratio, which is not present in Finn (1998). In particular, the
two wage rates, as well as the two types of hours move together, making the model consistent
with the empirical evidence presented in Lamo et al. (2007, 2008).
24Nonetheless, the increase in hours is much greater in magnitude than the responses reported in
Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012).
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock in Germany
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Overall, the endogenous public sector hours model shows an important difference in the com-
position of household’s labor income with the public sector share increasing at the expense of
private sector labor income. At aggregate level, however, this distributional effect disperses,
as output and consumption dynamics are identical across models. Another important ob-
servation to make is that the TFP shocks, being the main driving force in the union model,
induce pro-cyclical behavior in public wage and hours. In both model economies, the shock
effects are smaller and variables reach their peak response much more rapidly. This means
the impulse effect dies out much faster but the transition period can still take up to 100
years. This illustrates the important long-run effects of TFP shocks in the labor markets,
and particularly on the wage- and hours ratios.
1.5.2 The effect of a negative government consumption share shock
The second scenario is an exogenous restrictive fiscal policy, which is an unexpected decrease
in the government consumption/output ratio. The impulse response functions for this sce-
nario are reported in Figure 1.2 on the next page. The results are similar to those obtained
from a standard RBC model. The plots show that a negative government consumption shock
partially crowds-in private consumption, as public consumption is only an imperfect substi-
tute for private consumption from the household’s point of view. This creates a significant
positive welfare effect in the model economy as the decrease in the government consumption
ratio frees additional resources that could be directed to private use. The increase in con-
sumption at the expense of a drop in investment triggers a decrease in private sector hours
through the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In other words,
the increase in consumption, resulting from the positive wealth effect, decreases the need to
supply labor, so the household enjoys more leisure. The decrease in labor input leads to a
fall in output, and an increase in the private wage. Since government expenditure categories
follow output, public consumption, investment, and government transfers (not presented)
also fall. Over time, all variables return to their old-steady states.
Chapter 1: Cyclical and welfare effects of public sector unions in a RBC model 38
Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses to a negative 1% government consumption/output share
shock in Germany
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Even though those common responses are typical in the RBC literature but in the presence
of a union in the public sector, the fall in labor supply leads to a lower tax revenue, while
the increase in consumption increases the tax revenue. The other spending categories also
decrease, thus leaving more funds available for the public sector wage bill. The effect on
public hours is very pronounced, when total hours responses are compared across models.
Furthermore, the model with public sector union generates a realistic labor reallocation from
private to public sector meaning that in times of fiscal restraint, government jobs become
more attractive. In a model with exogenous public employment, public sector hours stay fixed
at their steady-state value and do not respond to fiscal shocks. The effect of a decrease in the
government consumption/output ratio in Finn (1998) leads to a significant underestimation
in total hours. Additionally, the model with public sector union could again address the
relative labor income share evolution, which is the product of the public-private wage and
employment ratios. The results in this subsection differ from those in Fernandez-de-Cordoba
et al. (2009, 2012) in important ways: The negative shock to the fiscal instruments creates
a new substitution effect and leads to the crowding-in of the public wage bill. In other
words, even under a regime of fiscal tightening, public employment and the public wage are
increased, i.e. shocks to the government consumption share make public wage and hours
behave counter-cyclically.
1.5.3 The effect of a negative government investment share shock
This experiment simulates the effect of a surprise negative innovation in the government
investment/output ratio. The impulse response functions are reported in Figure 1.3. This
scenario is very relevant in times of crisis, as public investment projects are small relative to
the GDP, thus usually the first ones to be cut. The decrease in the government investment
share has a direct negative effect due to the decrease in the public physical capital input
in the aggregate production function. The magnitude of the shock effect depends on the
degree of IRS, captured by the parameter ν. Public investment falls both because of the fall
in the public investment/output ratio, and the fall of output itself. Following the output
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fall, public consumption and government transfers also fall. On aggregate level, there is a
positive welfare effect: output falls less compared to the fall in government consumption
and investment. Therefore, the extra resources available now in the economy are used for
private consumption and investment. Private physical capital increases, but the effect is
short-lived as the marginal product of capital decreases fast, and capital even falls below
the steady-state level along the transition path. At the same time, the positive wealth effect
leads to a fall in the private sector hours supplied by the household, meaning that private
wage increases; The subsequent transition behavior of the private sector wage is determined
by the private physical capital dynamics. In the long run, all variables return to their old
steady-state values.
The model with public sector union generates the expected additional positive effect on
the public wage bill. As total tax revenue increases, and other spending items decrease, the
additional revenue is allocated to raise private sector wages and hours. The total contempo-
raneous effect on hours changes from negative in Finn (1998) to slightly positive, with the
overall impact on model variables being very small and short-lived. The model with public
sector union, however, produces important transition in the wage and hours ratio and is
present for almost 20 periods. In addition, the shocks to public investment share add to the
counter-cyclical behavior of public hours and wage rate.
To investigate fully the forces that operate within the model and to study in detail the dy-
namic interaction among model variables, a complete simulation of the model is performed
in the next subsection.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to a negative 1% government investment/output share shock
in Germany
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1.6 Model simulation, goodness-of-fit, and the welfare
effect of tax reforms
Using the model solutions, shock series were fed to the stochastic processes to produce
simulated data series. The length of the draws for the series of innovations was 138, and the
simulation was replicated 1000 times. Natural logarithms were taken from all series, and then
the resulting logged series were run through the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter equal to 100. The first 100 observations were then excluded to decrease any
dependence on the initial realizations of the innovations. Average standard deviation of
each variable and its correlation with output were estimated across the 1000 replications.25
The large number of replications were implemented to average out sampling error across
simulations, before comparing model moments to the ones obtained from data.
1.6.1 Relative second moments evaluation
This section compares the theoretical second moments of the simulated data series with their
empirical counterparts, with special attention paid to the behavior of public sector hours
and wages. Table 1.4 on the next page summarizes the empirical and simulated business
cycle statistics for the two models calibrated for Germany.
In the German data, relative consumption volatility exceeds one, as the available series does
not provide a breakdown into consumption of non-durables and consumption of durables.26
Durable products behave like investment, and vary much more than non-durables, while
model consumption corresponds to non-durable consumption. Since a major force in both
models is consumption smoothing, as dictated by the Euler equation, both models under-
predict consumption volatility and investment variability. Across models, private sector
25As an additional model check, the autocorrelation (ACFs) and the cross-correlation functions (CCFs)
were also generated, and compared it to those computed from German data. The results of this computational
experiment are presented in Appendix 1.8.5.
26Another possible reason could be the presence of strong habits in consumption.
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Table 1.4: Business Cycle Statistics Germany, 1970-2007
GE Data Finn (1998) Public Sector Union
σ(y) 0.0154 0.0165 0.0165
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 0.56 [0.49,0.62] 0.56 [0.49,0.62]
σ(i)/σ(y) 3.57 2.30 [2.24,2.36] 2.30 [2.24,2.36]
σ(np)/σ(y) 1.05 0.45 [0.40,0.50] 0.45 [0.40,0.49]
σ(ng)/σ(y) 1.06 0.91 [0.69,1.13] 1.27 [0.98,1.56]
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.73 0.38 [0.33,0.43] 0.39 [0.38,0.40]
σ(wp)/σ(y) 1.16 0.63 [0.59,0.68] 0.63 [0.59,0.68]
σ(wg)/σ(y) 3.50 0.63 [0.59,0.68] 1.19 [0.92,1.47]
corr(c, y) 0.80 0.85 [0.79,0.92] 0.85 [0.79,0.92]
corr(i, y) 0.85 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.98,0.99]
corr(np, y) 0.60 0.89 [0.84,0.93] 0.89 [0.85,0.94]
corr(ng, y) 0.11 -0.05 [-0.29,0.20] 0.19 [0.04,0.43]
corr(n, y) 0.60 0.84 [0.78,0.91] 0.97 [0.97,0.98]
corr(wp, y) 0.60 0.95 [0.92,0.97] 0.94 [0.93,0.97]
corr(wg, y) 0.35 0.95 [0.92,0.97] 0.19 [0.04,0.43]
corr(n, np) 0.92 0.90 [0.86,0.95] 0.88 [0.79,0.92]
corr(n, ng) 0.43 0.28 [0.06, 0.51] 0.27 [0.05,0.49]
corr(np, ng) 0.12 -0.15 [-0.38,0.08] -0.21 [-0.44,0.02]
corr(np, wp) 0.21 0.70 [0.59,0.81] 0.71 [0.61,0.81]
corr(ng, wg) -0.38 0.03 [-0.22,0.28] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(ng, wp) 0.20 0.03 [-0.22,0.28] 0.45 [0.26,0.64]
corr(np, wg) 0.34 0.70 [0.59,0.81] -0.21 [-0.44,0.02]
corr(wp, wg) 0.48 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 0.45 [0.26,0.65]
employment and private wage also vary less compared to data. Total employment in Ger-
man data varies less than either private or public employment due to smaller variation in
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the number of self-employed individuals. It is evident from Table 1.4 that the model with
public sector union underestimates public wage volatility (but still significantly better than
Finn (1998) along that dimension), but matches public employment quite well. Finn’s model
captures the volatility of public employment due to the fact that it is modeled as an exoge-
nous stochastic process to mimic public hours time series behavior.
Both models capture the high contemporaneous correlations of main variables with out-
put relatively well. Moreover, public sector variables are also pro-cyclical, but not as much
as the models predict: Finn (1998) even predicts that public employment is countercyclical.
Nevertheless, the model with the public union captures the co-movement between labor mar-
ket variables, as well as their contemporaneous correlations with output quite well, compared
to the alternative. The German data, as well as the model with public sector union, provide
some support to the ”private sector wage-leader” hypothesis. In other words, there is some
evidence that public sector wages follows those in the private sector but only moderately so.
The dimension where the union model fails, however, is the correlation between public sector
hours and wages: in the German data, it is negative, while the public sector union model
predicts a perfect positive linear relationship. The reason is that the empirical correlation
can be interpreted as showing the net effect of supply and demand factors, while the model
models concentrates exclusively on the supply-side forces. It is plausible to assume that
due to the population aging, demand for public employees will also be high, particularly
in healthcare, social security and senior care. The empirical correlation between wages is
also well-captured by the model with public sector unions. In other words, empirical public
sector wage follows the private sector wage to a much lesser degree. A failure of the model
with public sector union is the predicted negative correlation between the two types of hours.
To a certain extent, this is an artifact of the way fiscal instruments were specified. The pre-
diction of the model along this dimension greatly improves if government consumption and
investment follow AR(1) processes in levels, and thus do not react to output. Furthermore,
it is a well-known fact (e.g. Prescott 1986, Hansen 1992) that the RBC model does not
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capture private sector labor market dynamics very well.
Overall, the model with the public sector union captures the labor market dynamics in
Germany, addressing dimensions that were ignored in earlier RBC models. Thus, an opti-
mizing union in the public sector proves to be an important ingredient in RBC models when
studying European labor markets with strong public sector unions. To assess the welfare
cost of fiscal policy in the presence of public sector union, several fiscal experiments were
performed and reported in the following subsection.
1.6.2 Welfare evaluation of fiscal regime changes
The goal of this section is to quantify the importance of endogenously-determined public
sector hours for fiscal policy, relative to Finn’s setup with exogenously-fixed public hours.
Additionally, the explicit welfare analysis complements earlier studies in Finn (1998) and
Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012). To understand the adjustment mechanisms after
an exogenous change in fiscal policy, each tax rate in the two models is varied over the
[0, 1] interval. Since all three tax rates were exogenously-specified, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(1997) show that for a wide class of RBC models, and plausible values for model parameters,
a unique long-run solution exists. When tax rates are plotted against tax revenues, Laffer
curves (Laffer 1974, Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe 1997) appear: in both Finn (1998) and the
public sector union model, presented in this chapter, an inverted U-shape relationship is
observed between labor and capital income tax rates and total tax revenues. Thus, there are
pairs of tax rates that generate the same level of tax revenue.27 In general, increasing tax
rates could lead to either an increase or a decrease in total tax revenue, depending on which
side of the Laffer curve the economy is situated. For the German model economy, however,
both setups place Germany on the left side of the labor and capital tax Laffer curve, as seen
in Figs. 1.4-1.5. Furthermore, a change in a tax rate affects the tax receipts from other
27Sensitivity analysis of the effect of model parameters on the shape of the Laffer curves is performed in
Appendix 1.8.6.
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tax bases as well, by influencing steady-state allocations and prices. Therefore, to gain an
additional insight of the effect of fiscal policy in the steady state, total tax revenue is broken
down into individual tax revenues corresponding to the tax bases, and plotted as a function
of each individual tax rate in Figs. 1.4-1.6, for both the public union model and Finn.
The shape of the capital tax Laffer curve, for example, presents an interesting case: an
increase in τ k leads to a negligible marginal increase in total tax revenue, since total tax
revenue is essentially flat in the τ k ∈ [0, 0.5] range, and for τ k ∈ [0.5, 1] total revenue is
negatively related to capital income tax rate.28 The German economy features a low rate
of capital income taxation, τ k = 0.16, thus the economy is situated safely away from the
downward sloping segment of the Laffer curve. The reason for the flat Laffer curve is clearly
seen from the breakdown in individual tax revenues as a function of capital income tax rate;
all increases in capital income tax revenue are offset by corresponding decreases in labor
income and consumption tax revenue. Since τ c and τ l are held fixed while τ k is varied,
the fall in labor income and consumption tax revenue is entirely driven by the shrinking
tax bases. Across models, union framework features only slightly higher capital income and
consumption revenue, and lower labor income tax revenue for each τ k, as compared to Finn’s
setup.
On the other hand, labor income tax rate places Germany much closer to the peak of the
labor tax Laffer curve, but still far away from the downward-sloping segment. Thus, the
government could increase tax revenue by increasing τ l. The computed total tax revenue-
maximizing τ l is approximately 50% in the union model, and 55% in Finn. As demonstrated
in Fig. 1.5, the difference in computed total tax revenue with respect to labor income tax
in the union model and Finn is due to the difference in the steady-state public and private
hours, as well as the wage rates in the two models: Finn’s model, featuring a single wage
28Uhlig and Trabandt (2010) find a similarly-shaped capital tax Laffer curve in an RBC model without
public employment, calibrated to the EU-15 data.
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rate and fixed public employment, generates both a higher total tax revenue and a higher
labor income tax revenue Laffer curve, as compared to the union model.
Lastly, for the consumption tax rate, no Laffer curve is observed: within a realistic range,
Fig. 1.6 shows no negative relationship between τ c and tax revenue. The reason for this is as
follows: In the model parameterizations the risk aversion value α > 1, thus the income effect
dominates the substitution effect: when τ c increases, labor supply and capital stock increase
while consumption falls.29 As argued in Trabandt and Uhlig (2010), a consumption tax
Laffer curve arises if α < 1, so that after an increase in τ c, the substitution effect dominates
the income effect and hours and capital stock fall together with consumption. In the union
model, public employment also falls, driven by the fall in tax revenue. In the borderline
case, when α = 1 (log-utility), the two effects offset one another. Again, no consumption
tax Laffer curve occurs.
29Note that the increase in private hours and capital, driven by the increase in consumption tax rate does
not translate into an increase in the corresponding tax revenue category. In addition, a higher τ c leads to
lower steady-state consumption, but a higher consumption revenue.
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Figure 1.4: Capital tax Laffer curve
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Figure 1.5: Labor tax Laffer curve
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Figure 1.6: Consumption tax Laffer curve
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Across models, the exogenous public hours in Finn (1998) produce a slightly flatter total tax
revenue curve as a function of τ c. In particular, the important difference across the setups is
a steeper labor income tax revenue curve in the union model vs. a flatter labor income tax
revenue curve in Finn’s (1998) model. The slope of the labor tax revenue curve is determined
by the elasticity of hours with respect to changes in the tax rate. In both models, a higher
τ c decreases the labor wedge, (1− τ l)/(1 + τ c). However, the response in hours is larger in
the case of the union model, which features endogenous public sector hours, as compared to
Finn’s setup, where ng is held fixed.
After characterizing and comparing the shapes of the Laffer curves in both models, this
section proceeds to welfare-evaluate the effects of different tax regimes. This is achieved
through several normalized fiscal policy experiments. In all of the experiments a combina-
tion of tax rate changes will be specified so that total tax revenue is kept constant.30 The
general usefulness of this approach is that it separates tax and spending issues. In the frame-
work considered in this chapter, however, public sector labor income appears on both sides
of the government budget constraint. In addition, the substitutability/complementarity of
the capital and labor input in the Cobb-Douglas production function, the substitutability
between consumption and labor, as well as the substitutability between consumption and
investment implies that changes in a single tax rate will affect the tax revenue generated
from the other two tax bases.
Following Lucas (1987), the approach taken is to compute the compensatory variation in
consumption.31 In other words, this section calculates the percentage of compensating con-
sumption, ζ, that is to be given to the household to make it indifferent between the two
regimes. The initial regime for Germany is as described in Section 1.2, with the calibration
and steady state solution presented in Section 1.4. The value of ζ is calculated for all restric-
tive fiscal policy scenarios, where a positive (negative) value indicates a welfare gain (loss).
30As it will be seen in the next section, not all such combinations will be feasible.
31Detailed derivations are shown in Appendix 1.8.7.
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Three different policies will be examined: a 1% increase in capital income, labor income
and consumption tax rate will be considered. In order to keep total tax revenue constant,
whenever a tax rate increases, one of the other two tax rates will be allowed to adjust,
holding all other model parameters fixed.32
Revenue-neutral increase in capital income tax rate
This subsection discusses the steady-state effect of a 1% increase in τ k, with results presented
in Table 1.5 below.
Table 1.5: Welfare gains/costs of 1 % increase in τ k in Germany
Model τ l fixed, τ c adjusts τ c fixed, τ l adjusts
τ c = 0.4033 ↑ (25.52%) τ c = 0.1481
τ l = 0.4085 τ l = 0.5535 ↑ (14.50%)
Union ζ = −0.2093 ζ = −0.2425
τ c = 0.3657 ↑ (21.76%) τ c = 0.1481
τ l = 0.3596 τ l = 0.5415 ↑ (13.30%)
Finn ζ = −0.1430 ζ = −0.1745
Higher capital income tax rate enters the Euler equation and thus decreases the steady state
private capital-to-output ratio. Since total revenue with respect to τ k is relatively flat in
both models, the increase in capital income tax essentially does not change total revenue.
Variations in labor income tax rate, or consumption tax rate, however, are very distortionary,
as they operate through the marginal rate of substitution. A higher labor, or a higher con-
sumption tax rate, lower private hours. From the complementarity of hours and capital in
the production function, capital stock also falls. Lower levels of labor and capital inputs
shrink output, which in turn decreases consumption. This change in steady-state allocation
32For example, η and gTy in the union model, and gTy in Finn, are held fixed at the values obtained in
the original steady-state computation.
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requires additional adjustment in the varying tax rate (τ l or τ c) to preserve revenue neutral-
ity. The computational experiment performed shows that in either case, the adjusting tax
rate has to change significantly to satisfy the revenue neutrality restriction. Across models,
consumption tax is the less distortive instrument. Additionally, the computed welfare cost
is higher in the union model by 6.63% (6.8% when τ l varies) due to the endogenous response
of public hours, which requires significantly larger tax rate increases in the union model.
Revenue-neutral increase in labor income tax rate
In this case, an increase in τ l affects the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between steady-
state hours and consumption. As in the previous subsection, the analysis is split into two
sub-cases, with results summarized in Table 1.6 below.
Table 1.6: Welfare gains/costs of 1% increase in τ l in Germany
Model τ k fixed, τ c adjusts τ c fixed, τ k adjusts
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ c = 0.3862 ↑ (23.81%) τ c = 0.1481
Union ζ = −0.2105 ζ = N/A
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ c = 0.35 ↑ (20.19%) τ c = 0.1481
Finn ζ = −0.1444 ζ = N/A
When the consumption tax rate is the adjusting rate, a 23.81% increase in τ c is required in
the union model. Again, Finn’s setup generates much smaller welfare cost as compared to
the union model, as the setup with exogenous public sector hours requires consumption tax
rate to increase by 20.19% to preserve the initial level of tax revenues.33 In both models, the
increase in the consumption tax rate relative to the increase in the labor income tax rate is
larger. Therefore, the labor wedge, (1 − τ l)/(1 + τ c), decreases in both cases, which leads
to an increase in private hours. Since hours and private physical capital are complements in
33Note that the higher fall in a tax rate results in a lower level of distortions in the economy.
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the production function, the increase in labor input raises the marginal product of private
capital, hence real interest rate will increase as well. The higher return to capital encourages
investment, and thus steady-state private capital stock expands. Following the expansion in
capital input, output increases as well. In turn, higher output leads to higher consumption.
The increase in consumption, however, is dominated by the increase in hours, so long-run
welfare decreases relative to the one obtained in the initial steady-state. In addition, in
the union model, there is an important feedback effect, which further increases welfare cost.
This effect works to increase public hours, as a result of the higher tax revenue. In effect,
endogenously-determined public hours add to the allocative distortions in the union model.
Public hours enter the MRS condition, and thus necessitate a much larger adjustment in the
union economy, as compared to Finn’s framework. The presence of endogenously-determined
public hours and wages adds 6.6% to the computed welfare loss.
In the second sub-case, when capital income tax rate varies in response to the increase
in labor income tax, no reasonable level of τ k (i.e. τ k ∈ [−1, 1]) exists that satisfies the
revenue neutrality restriction. This is a straightforward consequence of the relatively flat
Laffer curve with respect to the capital income tax rate, as demonstrated in the section
on capital tax Laffer curve. Additionally, in both models the share of capital income tax
revenue is less than 3% (note the model features depreciation allowance), which is very small
when compared to consumption tax revenue share (22%) and labor income tax revenue share
(75%). Thus, capital income tax rate is not a suitable instrument for fiscal adjustment, due
to its limited ability to affect total tax revenue, while at the same time greatly distorting
capital and labor decisions.
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Revenue-neutral increase in consumption tax rate
The increase in τ c affects the marginal rate of substitution between steady-state hours and
consumption; hence, the effect on allocations is qualitatively similar to the one described
in the previous section. In the first sub-case of this scenario (Table 1.7 below), when labor
income tax rate changes to preserve the tax revenue, the labor income tax rate needs to
increase by 12.73% and 16.96% in Finn and the union model, respectively.
Table 1.7: Welfare gains/costs of 1% increase in τ c in Germany
Model τ k fixed, τ l adjusts τ l fixed, τ k adjusts
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ l = 0.5781 ↑ (16.96%) τ l = 0.4085
Union ζ = −0.2404 ζ = N/A
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ l = 0.5358 ↑ (12.73%) τ l = 0.4085
Finn ζ = −0.1724 ζ = N/A
This upward change in the labor income tax rate is significantly larger than the increase in
consumption tax rate. The resulting decrease in the effective labor wedge, (1− τ l)/(1 + τ c),
affects labor supply and consumption decisions: the household responds to the dominating
income effect and supplies more hours in the private sector. Next, the higher level of labor
input in the production function raises both output and the interest rate. The higher return
to private physical capital leads to an increase in investment, which adds to the capital
stock and expands output. The positive wealth effect then translates into an increase in
consumption. However, the higher consumption is offset by the increase in hours, so welfare
decreases. Additionally, the increase in hours is higher in the union model, driven by the
endogenously-determined public hours, which positively co-move with private hours. Thus
the required increases in labor income tax rates produce nearly 6.8% larger welfare losses
in the union model, a result attributed to the endogenously-determined public hours. The
case when τ k is the adjusting tax rate unravels exactly as the case when τ l increased by 1%
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and τ k was the adjusting tax rate. Intuitively, both an increase in τ c and τ l decrease the
effective labor wedge, thus the resulting adjustments through τ k are qualitatively smilar.
Again, there is no feasible capital income tax rate that preserves revenue neutrality.
Overall, the experiments performed in this section uncovered some important limitations
of Finn’s model with exogenous public hours. The presence of endogenously-determined
public sector hours and wage rate was shown to generate important interactions, which add
to the distortionary effect of taxes. If ignored, the long-run welfare cost of revenue-neutral
tax increase policies could be significantly underestimated. To strengthen the results ob-
tained so far, a robustness check in the next subsection will consider tax reform scenarios
that depart from the revenue neutrality restriction.
Non-revenue-neutral tax rate increases
In contrast to revenue-neutral policy experiments, this section quantifies the welfare effect of
a contractionary fiscal regime, when the increases in one tax rate are not offset by a change in
another tax rate. The exogenously-specified common objective in both models is to increase
total tax revenue by 10% and 5%, respectively, by allowing a single tax rate to vary, while
keeping all other parameters fixed at their initial steady-state values.
Table 1.8: Welfare effect of 10%-tax-revenue increase
Model τ k τ l τ c
Union N/A 0.6405 ↑(+23.20%) 0.5033 ↑(+35.52%)
ζ N/A -0.3432 -0.2406
Finn N/A 0.6032 ↑(+19.47%) 0.4090 ↑(+25.09%)
ζ N/A -0.2332 -0.1787
As in the revenue neutral experiments, it is evident from Table 1.8 above that there is no
feasible capital tax rate, which can satisfy the objective, a result which follows directly from
the flatter Laffer curve with respect to τ k. Next, if labor taxes are the instrument used to
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achieve the targeted revenue revenue, the required increase in τ l in Finn, is almost 4.3%
smaller compared to the union model. This outcome is due to the exogenously-fixed public
sector hours in Finn: the distortions caused by an increase in τ l, and thus in the effective
labor wedge, which appears in the MRS condition are smaller. In addition, in both models,
the new level of τ l places the German economy on the downward-sloping segment of the
labor tax Laffer curve.34
As shown in Table 1.8 on the previous page, across both models, changing τ c is the cheaper
option to raise additional tax revenue, measured in terms of the welfare cost incurred. Ad-
ditionally, the required change in consumption tax rates to achieve 10% increase in total
revenue, is approximately 10% larger in the union model. The two models produce signif-
icant differences in terms of the magnitude of the tax rate changes required to achieve a
pre-specified tax revenue increase. When public hours are considered to be endogenously-
determined in the model, the tax rates increase by a significantly larger amount. This is a
new result in the literature, with important policy implications.
For the 5% tax-revenue-increase objective scenario, the results reported in Table 1.9 be-
low are qualitatively very similar to the outcomes in the 10% revenue increase scenario.
Table 1.9: Welfare effect of 5%-tax-revenue increase
Model τ k τ l τ c
Union N/A 0.6065 ↑(+19.80%) 0.5033 ↑(+35.52%)
ζ N/A -0.2988 -0.2406
Finn N/A 0.5728 ↑(+16.43%) 0.4300 ↑(+28.19%)
ζ N/A -0.2026 -0.1600
Again, there is no feasible capital income tax rate to achieve the new objective. However,
when τ l is the instrument used to increase total tax revenue, the two models generate differ-
34The computed revenue-maximizing τ l is 50% in the union model, and 55% in Finn.
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ent predictions: after the resulting increase in labor tax rate, the German economy is again
situated on the slippery slope of the respective Laffer curve in the union model, while Finn
(1998) places the economy on its upward segment. In terms of welfare loss, consumption tax
rate is again the preferred instrument to achieve the 5% total tax revenue increase. Finally,
the new tax rate levels, as well as the welfare costs are higher in the public sector union
model, due to the additional allocative distortion caused by the endogenous adjustment of
public hours.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employ-
ment, and public sector wage premia observed in most post-WWII European economies,
this chapter examined the role of public sector unions in a DSGE framework. A strong
union, operating in a largely non-market sector was shown to be relevant for business cycle
fluctuations, and when evaluating the welfare effects of fiscal policy. Following Fernandez-de-
Cordoba et al. (2009), an optimizing public sector union was incorporated in a real business
cycle model with valuable government consumption and productive public investment. The
RBC model generated cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data
behavior in an economy with highly-unionized public sector, Germany during the period
1970-2007. The main findings are: (i) the model with collective bargaining performs reason-
ably well vis-a-vis data; (ii) overall, the model with collective bargaining in the public sector
is an improvement over a similar model with exogenous public employment, namely Finn
(1998); (iii) endogenously-determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect
of contractionary tax reforms and produce significantly higher welfare losses. In addition,
the endogeneity of public hours in the union model generates greater changes in tax rates to
achieve a pre-specified increase in tax revenue and produce significantly higher welfare losses
compared to Finn’s (1998) model with exogenous public sector hours. Thus, endogenous
public hours are quantitatively important model ingredient when evaluating fiscal policy. In
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particular, ignoring the positive co-movement between public and private wage and hours
leads to a significant underestimation of the welfare effect of tax regime changes. Therefore,
a model with endogenous public sector labor market choice made by the household is con-
sidered in Ch.2.
There are some limitations of the model setup: the dynamics of public hours and wages
in the model is identical, which constraints the ability of the model to match well the be-
havior in the two variables simultaneously. Furthermore, the theoretical framework ignores
household’s increased demand for labor-intensive programs such as healthcare, education
and social security, which would require additional employment in the public sector. This
is quickly remedied in Chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis, where those issues are addressed and
thoroughly investigated. Next, in reality public sector unions and government usually bar-
gain over nominal wage increases, and against redundancies. They do not negotiate hours
and the level of the real wage directly. Before engaging in negotiations, unions also take
into consideration many macroeconomic indicators. Labor productivity in the private sec-
tor and the private wage, are often used as a leverage in the negotiations over the public
wage. The simple public sector union objective used in this chapter ignores other possible
demands by unions, such as job security, work conditions, health and safety considerations,
government pensions, other non-monetary benefits, etc. Indeed, some of these factors can
be incorporated in the union utility function and thus extend the basic model. Nevertheless,
the importance of public sector unions is evident even from the reduced-form representation
used in this chapter. In addition, this chapter suggests that the model with public sector
unions could produce potentially useful insights regarding optimal taxation. The potentially
interesting issue of public sector union power in the context of a Ramsey problem of setting
tax rates in an optimal way is left for future research.
Given the overall reasonable performance of the model with public sector union, the organi-
zational structure of public sector labor market deserves further and deeper investigation as
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well. Von Mises (1944), Parkinson (1957) and Tullock (1974) are among the first to suggest
that bureaucracy itself has been one of the most important factors affecting economic activ-
ity, mainly through the development and implementations of different legislative procedures,
rules and regulations. In particular, civil servants are usually insulated from market forces in
both the input and output markets: many government positions do not have a close equiv-
alent in the private sector, and there is usually no direct way to measure performance. A
closer analysis of bureaucrats’ behavior, and their effect on aggregate fluctuations in Euro-
pean economies would be a logical extension to the work in this chapter, and thus discussed
at length in Chapter 3.
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1.8 Technical Appendix
1.8.1 Optimality conditions
Firm’s problem
The profit function is maximized when the derivatives of that function are set to zero.
Therefore, the optimal amount of capital - holding the level of technology At and labor input
Npt constant - is determined by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to
Kpt equal to zero. This derivative is
(1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν − rt = 0 (1.8.1.1)
where (1 − θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν is the marginal product of capital because it expresses
how much output will increase if capital increases by one unit. The economic interpretation
of this First-Order Condition (FOC) is that in equilibrium, firms will rent capital up to
the point where the benefit of renting an additional unit of capital, which is the marginal
product of capital, equals the rental cost, i.e the interest rate.
rt = (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν (1.8.1.2)
Now, multiply by Kpt and rearrange terms. This gives the following relationship:
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = rtKpt or (1− θ)Yt = rtKpt (1.8.1.3)
because
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = At(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = (1− θ)Yt
To derive firms’ optimal labor demand, set the derivative of the profit function with respect
to the labor input equal to zero, holding technology and capital constant:
θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1(Kgt )
ν − wpt = 0 or wpt = θAt(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ−1(Kgt )ν (1.8.1.4)
In equilibrium, firms will hire labor up to the point where the benefit of hiring an additional
hour of labor services, which is the marginal product of labor, equals the cost, i.e the hourly
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wage rate.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Npt and rearrange terms to yield
Npt θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1(Kgt )
ν = wptN
p
t or θYt = w
p
tN
p
t (1.8.1.5)
Next, it will be shown that in equilibrium, economic profits are zero. Using the results above
one can obtain
Πt = Yt − rtKpt − wptNpt = Yt − (1− θ)Yt − θYt = 0 (1.8.1.6)
Indeed, in equilibrium, economic profits are zero.
Consumer problem
Set up the Lagrangian
L(Ct, Kpt+1, Npt ; Λt) = E0
∞∑
t=0
{[(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)]1−α − 1
1− α +
+Λt
[
(1− τ l)(wptNpt + wgtN gt ) + (1− τ k)rtKpt +
+τ kδpKpt − (1 + τ c)Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δ)Kpt +GTt
]}
(1.8.1.7)
This is a concave programming problem, so the FOCs, together with the additional, bound-
ary (”transversality”) conditions for private physical capital and government bonds are both
necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
To derive the FOCs, first take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Ct (holding all other
variables unchanged) and set it to 0, i.e. LCt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
1− α
1− α
[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
×
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nht )(1−ψ) − Λt(1 + τ c)
}
= 0 (1.8.1.8)
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Cancel the βt and the 1− α terms to obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nt)(1−ψ) − Λt(1 + τ c) = 0 (1.8.1.9)
Move Λt to the right so that[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nt)(1−ψ) = Λt(1 + τ c) (1.8.1.10)
This optimality condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of
wealth.
Now take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Kpt+1 (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LKpt+1 = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− Λt + EtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]}
= 0 (1.8.1.11)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
−Λt + βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= 0 (1.8.1.12)
Move Λt to the right so that
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (1.8.1.13)
Using the expression for the real interest rate shifted one period forward one can obtain
rt+1 = (1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
+ τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (1.8.1.14)
This is the Euler equation, which determines how consumption is allocated across periods.
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Npt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNpt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
1− α
1− α
[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
×
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ(−1) + Λt(1− τ l)wpt
}
= 0 (1.8.1.15)
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Cancel the βt and the 1− α terms to obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)
[
Ct + ωG
c
t
1−Nt
]ψ
(−1) + Λt(1− τ l)wpt = 0 (1.8.1.16)
Rearranging, one can obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ = Λt(1− τ l)wpt (1.8.1.17)
Plug in the expression for wht , that is,
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(1.8.1.18)
into the equation above. Rearranging, one can obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ = Λt(1− τ l)θ
Yt
Npt
(1.8.1.19)
Transversality conditions need to be imposed to prevent Ponzi schemes, i.e borrowing bigger
and bigger amounts every subsequent period and never paying it off.
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0 (1.8.1.20)
The Objective Function of a Public Sector Union: Derivation
This subsection shows that the objective function in the government sector is a generalized
version of Stone-Geary monopoly union utility function used in Dertouzos and Pencavel
(1981) and Brown and Ashenfelter (1986). The utility function is
V (wg, N g) = (wg − w¯g)φ(N g − N¯ g)(1−φ), (1.8.1.21)
where φ and 1− φ are the weights attached to public wage and hours, respectively, and w¯g
and N¯ g denote subsistence wage rate and hours. Since there is no minimum wage in the
model, w¯g = 0. Additionally, as public hours are assumed to be unproductive, it follows
that N¯ g = 0 as well. Therefore, the utility function simplifies to
V (wg, N g) = (wg)φ(N g)(1−φ). (1.8.1.22)
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Doiron (1992) uses a generalized representation, which encompasses (1.11.1.22) as a special
case when ρ→ 0. [
φ(N g)−ρ + (1− φ)(wg − w¯)−ρ
]−1/ρ
, (1.8.1.23)
when w¯ = 0, the function simplifies to[
φ(N g)−ρ + (1− φ)(wg)−ρ
]−1/ρ
, (1.8.1.24)
Union objective function used in the chapter is very similar to Doiron’s (1992) simplified
version: [
(N g)ρ + η(wg)ρ
]1/ρ
, (1.8.1.25)
can be transformed to [
(N g)ρ +
φ
(1− φ)(w
g)ρ
]1/ρ
, (1.8.1.26)
Collecting terms under common denominator[
(1− φ)
(1− φ)(N
g)ρ +
φ
(1− φ)(w
g)ρ
]1/ρ
, (1.8.1.27)
Factoring out the common term[
1
1− φ
]1/ρ[
(1− φ)(N g)ρ + φ(wg)ρ
]1/ρ
, (1.8.1.28)
Note that the constant term
[
1
1−φ
]1/ρ
> 0 can be ignored, as utility functions are invariant
to positive affine transformations. After rearranging terms, the equivalent function
V˜ =
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]1/ρ
. (1.8.1.29)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln V˜ =
1
ρ
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
. (1.8.1.30)
Take the limit ρ→ 0
lim
ρ→0
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
ρ
(1.8.1.31)
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Apply L’Hopital’s Rule on the right-hand-side (R.H.S.) to obtain
lim
ρ→0
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
∂ρ
∂ρ
(1.8.1.32)
Thus
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
[
φ(wgt )
ρ lnwg + (1− φ)(N g)ρ lnN g
]
/
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
1
(1.8.1.33)
Simplify to obtain
ln V˜ =
limρ→0
[
φ(wgt )
ρ lnwg + (1− φ)(N g)ρ lnN g
]
limρ→0
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
] = φ lnwg + (1− φ) lnN g
φ+ (1− φ)
(1.8.1.34)
Therefore,
ln V˜ = φ lnwg + (1− φ) lnN g. (1.8.1.35)
Exponentiate both sides of the equation to obtain
eln V˜ = eφ lnw
g+(1−φ) lnNg . (1.8.1.36)
Thus
V˜ = eln(w
g)φ+ln(Ng)(1−φ) . (1.8.1.37)
or
V˜ = eln(w
g)φ(Ng)(1−φ) . (1.8.1.38)
Finally,
V˜ = (wg)φ(N g)(1−φ) (1.8.1.39)
Furthermore, government period budget constraint indeed could be regarded as serving the
role of a labor demand function. Additionally, the public sector demand curve will be subject
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to shocks, resulting from innovations to the fiscal shares. The balanced budget assumption
is thus important in the model setup to guarantee easy model tractability. Since public
sector wage bill is a residual, if the government sector wage rate is increased, then public
sector hours need to be decreased. Additionally, government period budget constraint can
be expressed in the form N g = N g(wg) as
N g =
τ lwpNp + τ k(r − δp)Kp + τ cC −Gc −Gi −GT
(1− τ l)wg (1.8.1.40)
Therefore, the problem in the government sector is reshaped in the standard formulation in
the union literature:
max
wg ,Ng
V (wg, N g) s.t. N g = N g(wg) (1.8.1.41)
Since the public sector union optimizes over both the public wage and hours, the outcome
is efficient. The solution pair is on the contract curve (obtained from the FOCs), at the
intersection point with the labor demand curve (government budget constraint).
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Public sector union optimization problem
The union solves the following problem:
max
wgt ,N
g
t
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
(1.8.1.42)
s.t
Gct +G
T
t +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t = τ
cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ l[wptNpt + wgtN gt ] (1.8.1.43)
Setup the Lagrangian
V(wgt , N gt ; νt) = max
wgt ,N
g
t
{[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
−νt
[
Gct +G
T
t +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t − τ cCt − τ krtKpt + τ kδpKt − τ l[wptNpt + wgtN gt ]
]}
(1.8.1.44)
Optimal public employment is obtained, when the derivative of the government Lagrangian
is set to zero, i.e VNgt = 0
(1/ρ)
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
ρ(N gt )
ρ−1 − (1− τ l)νtwgt = 0 (1.8.1.45)
or, when ρ is canceled out and (1− τ l)νtwgt put to the right[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
(N gt )
ρ−1 = (1− τ l)νtwgt (1.8.1.46)
Optimal public wage is obtained, when the derivative of the government Lagrandean is set
to zero, i.e Vwgt = 0
(1/ρ)
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
ηρ(wgt )
ρ−1 − (1− τ l)νtN gt = 0 (1.8.1.47)
or, when ρ is canceled out and(1− τ l)νtN gt term put to the right[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1 = (1− τ l)νtN gt (1.8.1.48)
Divide (1.8.1.46) and (1.8.1.48) side by side to obtain[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
(N gt )
ρ−1
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1
=
(1− τ l)νtwgt
(1− τ l)νtN gt
(1.8.1.49)
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Cancel out the common terms
(N gt )
ρ−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1 =
wgt
N gt
(1.8.1.50)
Now cross-multiply to obtain
(N gt )
ρ
η
= (wgt )
ρ (1.8.1.51)
Hence
wgt =
(
1
η
)1/ρ
N gt (1.8.1.52)
The wage bill expression, which is obtained after simple rearrangement of the government
budget constraint, is as follows
wgtN
g
t =
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −GTt −Git
1− τ l (1.8.1.53)
Use the wage bill equation and the relationship between public wage and employment in
order to obtain
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −GTt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(1.8.1.54)
and
N gt = η
1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −GTt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(1.8.1.55)
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1.8.2 Per capita stationary DCE
Since the model in stationary and per capita terms by definition, there is no need to transform
the optimality conditions, i.e Zht = Zt = zt. The system of equations that describes the DCE
is as follows:
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ(kgt )
ν (1.8.2.1)
yt = ct + g
c
t + g
i
t + k
p
t+1 − (1− δp)kpt (1.8.2.2)
ψ(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ(1−α)−1(1− npt − ngt )(1−α)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λt (1.8.2.3)
λt = βEtλt+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp
]
(1.8.2.4)
(1− ψ)(ct + ωgct ) = ψ(1− npt − ngt )
(1− τ l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
yt
npt
(1.8.2.5)
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (1.8.2.6)
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (1.8.2.7)
git = g
iy
t yt (1.8.2.8)
gct = g
cy
t yt (1.8.2.9)
gTt = g
Tyyt (1.8.2.10)
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(1.8.2.11)
rt = (1− θ) yt
kpt
(1.8.2.12)
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wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gtt − git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(1.8.2.13)
ngt = η
1
ρwgt . (1.8.2.14)
Therefore, the DCE is summarized by Equations (1.8.2.1)-(1.8.2.14) in the paths of the fol-
lowing 14 variables {yt, ct, it, gct , git, gTt , kpt , kgt , npt , ngt , λt, wgt , wpt , rt}∞t=0 given the paths of tech-
nology {at}, the fixed level of implied government transfers/output ratio {gTy}, ∀t, and the
exogenously set stationary government spending/output and government investment/output
ratio processes, {gcyt , giyt }∞t=0, whose motion was determined in the previous subsection.35
35Note that Eqs. (1.3.0.13)-(1.3.0.14) imply the government budget constraint.
Chapter 1: Cyclical and welfare effects of public sector unions in a RBC model 72
Steady-state system
In steady-state, there is no uncertainty, and zt+1 = zt = z. Thus, expectations operators
and time subscripts can be removed to obtain
y = a(kp)1−θ(np)θ(kg)ν (1.8.2.15)
y = c+ gc + gi + δpkp (1.8.2.16)
ψ(c+ ωgc)ψ(1−α)−1(1− np − ng)(1−α)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λ (1.8.2.17)
1 = β
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ τ kδp
]
(1.8.2.18)
(1− ψ)(c+ ωgc) = ψ(1− np − ng) (1− τ
l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
y
np
(1.8.2.19)
i = δpkp (1.8.2.20)
gi = δgkg (1.8.2.21)
gi = giyy (1.8.2.22)
gc = gcyy (1.8.2.23)
gT = gTyy (1.8.2.24)
wp = θ
y
np
(1.8.2.25)
r = (1− θ) y
kp
(1.8.2.26)
ng = η
1
ρwg (1.8.2.27)
wg = η−
1
2ρ
[
τ cc+ τ k(r − δp)kp + τ lwpnp − gc − gT − gi
1− τ l
] 1
2
(1.8.2.28)
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1.8.3 Log-linearized model equations
Linearized market clearing
ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt = yt (1.8.3.1)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
ln[ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt ] = ln(yt) (1.8.3.2)
Totally differentiate with respect to time
d ln[ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt ]
dt
= d ln(yt) (1.8.3.3)
[
1
c+ gc + gi + δpkp
][
dct
dt
c
c
+
dgct
dt
g
g
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
− (1− δp)dk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
] =
dyt
dt
1
y
(1.8.3.4)
Define zˆ = dzt
dt
1
z
. Thus passing to log-deviations
1
y
[cˆtc+ gˆ
c
tg
c + gˆitg
i + kˆpt+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp] = yˆt (1.8.3.5)
cˆtc+ gˆ
c
tg
c + gˆitg
i + kˆpt+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp = yyˆt (1.8.3.6)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt − gcgˆct − gigˆit + (1− δp)kpkˆpt (1.8.3.7)
Linearized production function
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ(kgt )
ν (1.8.3.8)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln yt = ln at + (1− θ) ln kpt + θ lnnpt + ν ln kgt (1.8.3.9)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln yt
dt
=
d ln at
dt
+ (1− θ)d ln k
p
t
dt
+ θ
d lnnpt
dt
+ ν
d ln kgt
dt
(1.8.3.10)
1
y
dyt
dt
=
1
a
dat
dt
+
1− θ
kp
dkpt
dt
+
θ
np
dnpt
dt
+
ν
kg
dkgt
dt
(1.8.3.11)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt + νkˆgt (1.8.3.12)
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Linearized FOC consumption
[(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ(1− nt)(1−ψ)]−αψ(ct + ωgct )ψ−1(1− nt)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λt (1.8.3.13)
Simplify to obtain
ψ(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λt (1.8.3.14)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
lnψ(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt (1.8.3.15)
ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt (1.8.3.16)
(ψ − 1− αψ) ln(ct + ωgct ) + (1− α)(1− ψ) ln(1− nt) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt
(1.8.3.17)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
(ψ − 1− αψ)d ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
dt
+ (1− α)(1− ψ)d ln(1− nt)
dt
=
=
d ln(1 + τ c)
dt
+
d lnλt
dt
(1.8.3.18)
(ψ − 1− αψ) 1
c+ ωgc
(
dct
dt
+ ω
dgct
dt
) + (1− α)(1− ψ) −1
1− n
dnt
dt
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(1.8.3.19)
(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
c
c
+
ω(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
gc
gc
+
−(1− α)(1− ψ) 1
1− n
dnt
dt
n
n
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(1.8.3.20)
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
n
1− nnˆ = λˆt (1.8.3.21)
Since
nˆ =
np
np + ng
nˆp +
ng
np + ng
nˆg =
np
n
nˆp +
ng
n
nˆg, (1.8.3.22)
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and consumers choose np only, pass to log-deviations to obtain
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
cc + ωg
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp = λˆt
(1.8.3.23)
Since n = np + ng, it follows that
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
np
1− nnˆ
p = 0 (1.8.3.24)
Linearized no-arbitrage condition for capital
λt = βEtλt+1[(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)] (1.8.3.25)
Substitute out rt+1 on the right hand side of the equation to obtain
λt = βEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)] (1.8.3.26)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnλt = lnEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)] (1.8.3.27)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnλt
dt
=
d lnEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1kpt+1 + τ
kδp + 1− δp)]
dt
(1.8.3.28)
1
λ
dλt
dt
= Et
{
1
λ((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp + τ kδp ×[
((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)dλt+1
dt
λ
λ
+
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)
kp
dyt+1
dt
y
y
−
[
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
(kp)2
]
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
]}
(1.8.3.29)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
λˆt = Et
{
λˆt+1 +
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)kp yˆt+1
− (1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
((1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)kp kˆ
p
t+1
]}
(1.8.3.30)
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Observe that
(1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp = 1/β (1.8.3.31)
Plug it into the equation to obtain
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
yˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
kˆpt+1
]
(1.8.3.32)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (1.8.3.33)
Linearized MRS
(1− ψ)(ct + ωgct ) = ψ(1− nt)
(1− τ l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
yt
npt
(1.8.3.34)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln(1− ψ)(ct + ωgct ) = lnψ(1− nt)
(1− τ l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
yt
npt
(1.8.3.35)
ln(ct + ωg
c
t ) = ln(1− nt) + ln yt − lnnpt (1.8.3.36)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
dt
=
d ln(1− nt)
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(1.8.3.37)
1
c+ ωgc
(
dct
dt
+ ω
dgct
dt
) = − 1
1− n
dnt
dt
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(1.8.3.38)
1
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
c
c
+
ω
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
gc
gc
= − 1
1− n
dnt
dt
n
n
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(1.8.3.39)
c
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
1
c
+
ωgc
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
1
gc
= − n
1− n
dnt
dt
1
n
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(1.8.3.40)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωg
gˆct = −
n
1− nnˆ+ yˆt − nˆ
p
t (1.8.3.41)
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Since
nˆ =
np
np + ng
nˆp +
ng
np + ng
nˆg, (1.8.3.42)
and noting that consumers are only choosing np, then
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp + yˆt − nˆpt (1.8.3.43)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp + yˆt − nˆpt (1.8.3.44)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
(
1 +
n
1− n
np
np + ng
)
nˆp + yˆt (1.8.3.45)
Since n = np + ng, it follows that
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
(
1 +
np
1− n
)
nˆp + yˆt (1.8.3.46)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct +
(
1 +
np
1− n
)
nˆp − yˆt = 0 (1.8.3.47)
Linearized private capital accumulation
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (1.8.3.48)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kpt+1 = ln(it + (1− δp)kpt ) (1.8.3.49)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kpt+1
dt
=
1
i+ (1− δp)kp
d(it + (1− δp)kpt )
dt
(1.8.3.50)
Observe that since
i = δpkp, it follows that i+ (1− δp)kp = δpkp + (1− δp)kp = kp. (1.8.3.51)
Then
dkpt+1
dt
1
kp
=
1
kp
dit
dt
i
i
+
kp
i+ (1− δp)kpt
dkpt
dt
kp
kp
(1.8.3.52)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆpt+1 =
δpkp
kp
iˆt +
(1− δp)kp
kp
kˆpt (1.8.3.53)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (1.8.3.54)
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Linearized government capital accumulation
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (1.8.3.55)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln kgt+1 = ln(g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt ) (1.8.3.56)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kgt+1
dt
=
1
gi + (1− δg)kg
d(git + (1− δg)kgt )
dt
(1.8.3.57)
Observe that since
gi = δgkg, (1.8.3.58)
it follows that
gi + (1− δg)kg = δgkg + (1− δg)kg = kg. (1.8.3.59)
Hence,
dkgt+1
dt
1
kg
=
1
kg
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
kg
x+ (1− δg)
dkgt
dt
kg
kg
(1.8.3.60)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆgt+1 =
δgkg
kg
gˆit +
(1− δg)kg
kg
kˆgt (1.8.3.61)
Cancel out the kg terms to obtain
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (1.8.3.62)
Public wage rate rule
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gTt − git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(1.8.3.63)
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Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnwgt = −
1
2ρ
ln η − 1
2
ln(1− τ l) +
1
2
ln
{
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gTt − git
}
(1.8.3.64)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwgt
dt
=
1
2
d
dt
ln
{
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gTt − git
}
(1.8.3.65)
Observe that
τ krtk
p
t − τ kδpkt + τ lwptnpt = τ k(1− θ)yt + τ lθyt − τ kδpkpt =
=
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
yt − τ kδpkpt (1.8.3.66)
Also
(1− τ l)wgng = τ cc+ [τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ]y − τ kδpkp − gc − gi − gTt (1.8.3.67)
Thus
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
1
2
1
(1− τ l)wgng
{
τ c
dct
dt
+ [τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ]dyt
dt
− τ kδpdk
p
t
dt
− dg
c
t
dt
− dg
i
t
dt
− dg
T
t
dt
}
(1.8.3.68)
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
1
2
1
(1− τ l)wgng ×{
τ c
dct
dt
c
c
+
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
dyt
dt
y
y
− τ kδpdk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
− dg
c
t
dt
gc
gc
− dg
i
t
dt
gi
gi
− dg
T
t
dt
gT
gT
}
(1.8.3.69)
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
(1/2)τ cc
(1− τ l)wgng
dct
dt
1
c
+
(1/2)
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
y
(1− τ l)wgng
dyt
dt
1
y
− (1/2)τ
kδpkp
(1− τ l)wgng
dkpt
dt
1
kp
− (1/2)g
c
(1− τ l)wgng
dgct
dt
1
gc
− (1/2)g
i
(1− τ l)wgng
dgit
dt
1
gi
− (1/2)g
T
(1− τ l)wgng
dgTt
dt
1
gT
(1.8.3.70)
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Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆgt =
(1/2)τ cc
(1− τ l)wgng cˆt +
(1/2)
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
y
(1− τ l)wgng yˆt
− (1/2)τ
kδpkp
(1− τ l)wgng kˆt −
(1/2)gc
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
c
t −
(1/2)gi
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
i
t −
(1/2)gt
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
T
t (1.8.3.71)
Public hours/employment rule
ngt = η
1
ρwgt (1.8.3.72)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnngt =
1
ρ
ln η + lnwgt (1.8.3.73)
Totally differentiate both sides to obtain
d lnngt
dt
=
d lnwgt
dt
(1.8.3.74)
dngt
dt
1
ng
=
dwgt
dt
1
wg
(1.8.3.75)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆgt = wˆ
g
t (1.8.3.76)
Total hours/employment
nt = n
g
t + n
p
t (1.8.3.77)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnnt = ln(n
g
t + n
p
t ) (1.8.3.78)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d lnnt
dt
=
d ln(ngt + n
p
t )
dt
(1.8.3.79)
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dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
+
dnpt
dt
)
1
n
(1.8.3.80)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
ng
ng
+
dnpt
dt
np
np
)
1
n
(1.8.3.81)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
ng
n
+
dnpt
dt
1
np
np
n
(1.8.3.82)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆt =
ng
n
nˆgt +
np
n
nˆpt (1.8.3.83)
Linearized private wage rate
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(1.8.3.84)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnwpt = ln θ + ln yt − lnnpt (1.8.3.85)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwpt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(1.8.3.86)
Simplify to obtain
dwpt
dt
1
wp
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(1.8.3.87)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (1.8.3.88)
Linearized real interest rate
rt = θ
yt
kpt
(1.8.3.89)
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Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rt = ln θ + ln yt − ln kpt (1.8.3.90)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d ln k
p
t
dt
(1.8.3.91)
Simplify to obtain
dr
dt
1
r
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dk
p
t
dt
1
kp
(1.8.3.92)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (1.8.3.93)
Public/private wage ratio
rwt = w
g
t /w
p
t (1.8.3.94)
Take logs from both sides of the equation
ln rwt = lnw
g
t − lnwpt (1.8.3.95)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d ln rwt
dt
=
d lnwgt
dt
− d lnw
p
t
dt
(1.8.3.96)
drwt
dt
1
rw
=
dwgt
dt
1
wg
− dw
p
t
dt
1
wp
(1.8.3.97)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆwt = wˆ
g
t − wˆpt (1.8.3.98)
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Public/private hours/employment ratio
rlt = n
g
t/n
p
t (1.8.3.99)
Take logs from both sides of the equation
ln rlt = lnn
g
t − lnnpt (1.8.3.100)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d ln rlt
dt
=
d lnngt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(1.8.3.101)
drlt
dt
1
rl
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(1.8.3.102)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆlt = nˆ
g
t − nˆpt (1.8.3.103)
Linearized technology shock process
ln at+1 = ρa ln at + 
a
t+1 (1.8.3.104)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln at+1
dt
= ρa
d ln at
dt
+
dat+1
dt
(1.8.3.105)
dat+1
dt
= ρa
dat
dt
+ at+1 (1.8.3.106)
where for t = 1
dat+1
dt
≈ ln(eat+1/ea) = at+1 − a = at+1 since a = 0. Pass to log-deviations
to obtain
aˆt+1 = ρaaˆt + 
a
t+1 (1.8.3.107)
Chapter 1: Cyclical and welfare effects of public sector unions in a RBC model 84
Linearized stochastic process for government consumption/output share
ln gcyt+1 = (1− ρg) ln gcy + ρg ln gcyt + ct+1 (1.8.3.108)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gcyt+1
dt
= (1− ρg)d ln g
cy
dt
+ ρg
d ln gcyt
dt
+
dct+1
dt
(1.8.3.109)
dgcyt+1
dt
= ρg
dgcyt
dt
+ ct+1 (1.8.3.110)
where for t = 1
dct+1
dt
≈ ln(ect+1/ec) = ct+1− c = ct+1 since c = 0. Pass to log-deviations to
obtain
gˆcyt+1 = ρggˆ
cy
t + 
c
t+1 (1.8.3.111)
Linearized level of government consumption
gct = g
cy
t yt (1.8.3.112)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln gct = ln g
cy
t + ln yt (1.8.3.113)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gct
dt
=
d ln gcyt
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(1.8.3.114)
dgct
dt
1
gc
=
dgcyt
dt
1
gc
+
dyt
dt
1
y
(1.8.3.115)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆct = gˆ
cy
t + yˆt (1.8.3.116)
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Linearized stochastic process for the government investment/output ratio
ln giyt+1 = (1− ρi) ln giy + ρi ln giyt + it+1 (1.8.3.117)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln giyt+1
dt
= (1− ρi)d ln g
iy
dt
+ ρi
d ln giyt
dt
+
dit+1
dt
(1.8.3.118)
dgiyt+1
dt
= ρg
dgiyt
dt
+ it+1 (1.8.3.119)
where for t = 1
dit+1
dt
≈ ln(eit+1/ei) = it+1 − i = it+1 since i = 0. Pass to log-deviations to
obtain
gˆiyt+1 = ρigˆ
iy
t + 
i
t+1 (1.8.3.120)
Linearized level of government investment
git = g
iy
t yt (1.8.3.121)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln git = ln g
iy
t + ln yt (1.8.3.122)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln git
dt
=
d ln giyt
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(1.8.3.123)
dgit
dt
1
gi
=
dgiyt
dt
1
gi
+
dyt
dt
1
y
(1.8.3.124)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆit = gˆ
iy
t + yˆt (1.8.3.125)
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Linearized level of government transfers
gTt = g
Tyyt (1.8.3.126)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln gTt = ln g
Ty + ln yt (1.8.3.127)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gTt
dt
=
d ln gTy
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(1.8.3.128)
dgTt
dt
1
gt
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(1.8.3.129)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆTt = yˆt (1.8.3.130)
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1.8.4 The log-linearized system of equations
The log-linearized system of model equations is as below36 (rˆwt and rˆlt denote the log-
deviations in the wage and hours ratios, respectively):
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt − gcgˆct − gigˆit + (1− δp)kpkˆpt (1.8.4.1)
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt + νkˆgt (1.8.4.2)
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωg
cˆt +
ωg(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωg
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
np
1− nnˆ
p − λˆt = 0 (1.8.4.3)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (1.8.4.4)
c
c+ ωg
cˆt +
ωg
c+ ωg
gˆt + (1 +
np
1− n)nˆ
p − yˆt = 0 (1.8.4.5)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (1.8.4.6)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (1.8.4.7)
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (1.8.4.8)
gˆcyt+1 = ρcgˆ
cy
t + 
c
t+1 (1.8.4.9)
gˆiyt+1 = ρigˆ
iy
t + 
i
t+1 (1.8.4.10)
gˆct = gˆ
cy
t + yˆt (1.8.4.11)
gˆit = gˆ
iy
t + yˆt (1.8.4.12)
36Detailed derivations in Appendix 11.2.1-12.2.19
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wˆgt =
(1/2)τ cc
(1− τ l)wgng cˆt +
(1/2)[τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ]y
(1− τ l)wgng yˆt
− (1/2)τ
kδpkp
(1− τ l)wgng kˆt −
(1/2)gc
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
c
t −
(1/2)gi
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
i
t −
(1/2)gT
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
T
t (1.8.4.13)
nˆgt = wˆ
g
t (1.8.4.14)
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (1.8.4.15)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (1.8.4.16)
nˆt =
np
(np + ng)
nˆpt +
ng
(np + ng)
nˆgt (1.8.4.17)
rˆwt = wˆ
g
t − wˆpt (1.8.4.18)
rˆlt = nˆ
g
t − nˆpt (1.8.4.19)
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1.8.5 Auto- and cross-correlation functions
As an additional test of model fit, this appendix compares auto- and cross-correlation func-
tions generated from the model with collective bargaining and Finn (1998) calibrated for
Germany, with their empirical counterparts. The main emphasis in this subsection is on the
ACFs and CCFs of labor market variables. In particular, close attention is paid to cyclical
properties of public and private wage rates and hours. To establish 95% confidence intervals
for the theoretical ACFs and CCFs, as in Gregory and Smith (1991), the simulated time
series are used to obtain 1000 ACFs and CCFs. The mean ACFs and CCFs are computed by
averaging across simulations, as well as the corresponding standard error across simulations.
Those moments allow for the lower and upper bounds for the ACFs confidence intervals to
be estimated. The empirical ACFs and CCFs are then plotted, together with the theoretical
ones. If empirical ACFs lie within the confidence region, this means that the calibrated
model fits data well.
Empirical ACFs and CCFs were generated from a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) process of
order 1. Since ACFs and CCFs are robust to identifying restrictions (Canova (2007, Ch.7)),
the VAR(1) was left unrestricted. The figures on the following pages display empirical ACFs
(solid line), together with the simulated average ACFs (dashed line) and the corresponding
stochastic error bounds (dotted lines). This is done for the public sector union model first,
and then for the calibration using Finn’s (1998) framework.
The model with the public sector union Germany outperforms Finn (1998), especially in
the prediction of the dynamic behavior of labor market variables. In terms of capturing
the autocorrelation structure of the variables, the union model fits data quite well. One
exception is the public sector wage: in data, it is highly autocorrelated, while the model
generates low persistence.37
37A possible explanation could be that the public union puts weight also on last year’s public sector wage
level, i.e. the union bargains over the public wage increase rate, and not just the wage level.
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Figure 1.7: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 1.8: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 1.9: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 1.10: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
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Figure 1.11: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
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Figure 1.12: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
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Public and total hours are also borderline cases, as employment rates in data were used
instead. In addition, the public sector union model predicts perfect positive contemporaneous
correlation between public wages and hours, while in data, it is negative. Overall, the model
with public sector union calibrated for Germany captures the dynamic co-movement of hours
and wages with output, consumption and investment. In addition, the public sector union
model is able to address and match some new dimensions such as the dynamic correlation
of the two wage rates and the pair of hours worked.
1.8.6 Sensitivity analysis
To evaluate the effect of structural parameters on the shape of the Laffer curves, this sec-
tion performs sensitivity analysis for different values of model parameters and how those
affect tax revenues. The two parameters of interest are the curvature parameter of house-
hold’s Cobb-Douglas utility function α, as well as the weight on composite consumption,
ψ. Interestingly, as α is allowed to vary, steady-state revenues are essentially unchanged.
Even an implausibly high value, α = 50, does not produce any difference in steady state
tax revenues. In both models considered in this chapter, the preference parameter is not
important for steady-state fiscal policy effect. This result is not surprising in the literature,
as Trabandt and Uhlig (2010) obtain a very similar finding in their paper.38
In contrast, changes in the second parameter, ψ, yield significant differences. Both the
capital and labor tax Laffer curves, and the responses of the other tax bases to capital and
labor income tax rate are affected when ψ is allowed to vary.39 Higher values of ψ shift up
the Laffer curve and make it steeper, without significant change in its peak. The difference
between Finn and the model with endogenous public employment becomes significant for
implausibly high values of ψ, i.e. ψ > 0.5. (As explained in the calibration section, parame-
38Parameter α is important for model dynamics, though.
39Consumption tax Laffer curve proves to be very sensitive to ψ parameter. In the majority of the cases
it breaks down for values outside the benchmark value. This is also a typical result in the literature, e.g.
Trabandt and Uhlig (2010).
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ter ψ = 0.296, describing household’s preference was calculated as the ratio of hours of work
out of total potential hours in the model.) Intuitively, a higher ψ corresponds to a lower
weight to leisure, (1 − ψ), in the household’s utility function. In other words, a higher ψ
decreases the elasticity of private labor supply. Intuitively, when labor tax rate increases, or
equivalently, after tax private wage falls, private hours respond less, thus increasing labor
income tax revenue, as well as total tax revenue.
The effect of higher ψ on capital tax Laffer curve is similar to ψ’s effect on the labor tax
Laffer curve above. When τ k is allowed to vary, a higher weight attached to consumption in
household’s utility function, together with the optimality condition for the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and hours require private higher capital stock to finance
private consumption. Therefore, a higher ψ shifts the capital tax Laffer curve upward as
well.
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Figure 1.13: Sensitivity analysis: capital income tax Laffer curve (Union)
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Figure 1.14: Sensitivity analysis: labor income tax Laffer curve (Union)
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Figure 1.15: Sensitivity analysis: capital income tax Laffer curve (Finn)
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Figure 1.16: Sensitivity analysis: labor income tax Laffer curve (Finn)
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1.8.7 Measuring conditional welfare
In steady state
u(c, gc, 1− n) = [(c+ ωg
c)ψ(1− n)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α (1.8.7.1)
Let A and B denote two different regimes. The welfare gain, ζ, is the fraction of consumption
that is needed to complement household’s steady-state consumption in regime B so that the
household is indifferent between the two regimes. Thus
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α =
[((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α
(1.8.7.2)
Multiply both sides by (1− α) to obtain
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1 = [((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
(1.8.7.3)
Cancel −1 terms at both sides to obtain
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) = [((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) (1.8.7.4)
Raise both sides to the power 1
1−α to obtain
(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ) = ((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ) (1.8.7.5)
Divide throughout by (1− nB)(1−ψ) to obtain
((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ = (cA + ωgc,A)ψ
(
1− nA
1− nB
)(1−ψ)
Raise both sides to the power 1/ψ to obtain
(1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B = (cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
(1.8.7.6)
Move ωgc,B term to the right to obtain
(1 + ζ)cB = (cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B (1.8.7.7)
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Divide both sides by cB to obtain
1 + ζ =
1
cB
{
(cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B
}
(1.8.7.8)
Thus
ζ =
1
cB
{
(cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B
}
− 1 (1.8.7.9)
Note that if ζ > 0(< 0), there is a welfare gain (loss) of moving from B to A. In this chapter
B is the initial scenario, while A will be the fiscal regime change.
Chapter 2
Fiscal policy in a Real-Business-Cycle
model with labor-intensive
government services and endogenous
public sector wages and hours
2.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, many macroeconomic studies have investigated the effects of fiscal
policy in general equilibrium setups, e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and
King (1993), MacGrattan (1994), Mendoza and Tesar (1998), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe
(1994, 1999), and Kocherlakota (2010).1 The main focus of the computational experiments
performed, however, has been predominantly on the effects of government purchases, public
investment and taxes. With the exception of Ardagna (2007) and Fernandez-de-Cordoba et
al. (2009, 2012), no previous studies had pursued a systematic study of government spending
behavior in RBC models with endogenously-determined public employment and wages, as
1This chapter abstracts away from nominal rigidities. Readers interested in studying the effects of fiscal
policy in frameworks with price stickiness should consult Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2004), Gali et al.
(2007), and the references therein.
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well as labor-intensive government services. Nonetheless, most of government consumption
in national accounts consists of wage consumption, and only a small part actually corre-
sponds to government purchases. (OECD 2012).2
This chapter characterizes optimal fiscal policy and then evaluates it relative to the ex-
ogenous (observed) one. To this end, a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model will be set up with a richer government spending side, and an endogenous private-
public sector labor choice in particular. The presence of a public employment decision
margin, as a separate labor market choice made by the household, has not been sufficiently
investigated in such setups properly. In addition, very few books on labor economics, with
the exception of Bellante and Jackson (1979), adequately discuss public sector labor mar-
kets. This is regrettable, as governments, as the largest employers in Europe, usually have
control over wages, at least those in the public sector. In periods of fiscal contraction, wage
and employment cuts are often used as instruments to control wage bill spending. When
incorporated in an RBC model, such wage-setting powers of the government could produce
additional interactions between model variables. Thus, the chapter argues that if public
sector labor choice is ignored, then important effects on allocations and welfare, driven by
government wage-setting and household’s decisions on hours, will be missed. In addition,
it will be also shown that aggregate labor market policies are important for public finance
management. The interplay between those two is the niche in the fiscal policy literature
where this chapter aims to position itself.
This chapter goes on to propose optimal public/private employment- and wage ratios. These
labor market dimensions are relevant for policy-makers because many economists since the
2Rogoff (2010) also asserts that ”it has to matter greatly what the government is spending money on.” Reis
(2010) adds to that that ”the mechanism by which government policy stimulates the economy in standard
models is a caricature of reality at best... Thinking harder about how is it that government consumption
affects decisions to invest and work will require a transformation in these models, but the toolkits that
macroeconomists use leave much room for creativity.”
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1970s have claimed that public administration is bloated, and have argued that government
wages in continental Europe are too generous relative to measured productivity in the pri-
vate sector. Since there are no other studies that address these labor aspects of fiscal policy,
the work in this chapter aims to contribute to the considerable debate on the effects of
fiscal policy on aggregate variables. This is followed by a close study of the interactions
generated by the presence of a public labor market in a general-equilibrium setup. In par-
ticular, the question of the real effects of exogenous and optimal fiscal policy is addressed
using a representative-agent framework, where the household chooses hours worked in both
sectors. To this end, an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) model is augmented
with a convex cost of working in the government sector. This new component is a useful
device in the model, as it produces endogenously-determined public employment and wage
rates. The quantitative importance of this transaction cost for the values of allocations in
steady-state and their cyclical fluctuations is then studied thoroughly. In addition, the chap-
ter investigates how fiscal policy instruments should optimally react to technology shocks,
and how the responses differ between the exogenous and Ramsey (optimal) policy framework.
The novelty in the otherwise standard setup, the introduction of this government hours
friction, is a plausible assumption. Mechanically, the cost representation helps the model
to incorporate an important stylized fact: Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) and Gregory and
Borland (1999) show that in the major EU countries, public sector wages feature a signifi-
cant positive net mark-up above private sector wages. Furthermore, the convex cost function
for varying public hours is broadly consistent with the view that the nature of work in the
public sector is inherently different from supplying labor services in the private sector. As a
result, the modeling approach generates a different disutility of an hour of work across the
two sectors.
The inclusion of such a cost in the otherwise standard RBC model with (exogenous) public
employment, e.g. Finn (1998) has not been used in the literature before. Nevertheless, it can
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be justified on many different grounds. For practical purposes, the friction can be interpreted
here as a transaction (resource) cost that arises from working in the government sector. This
real rigidity is due to the fact that for a worker in the public administration, the employ-
ment process and the general organization of work in the public sector are different from job
seeking-strategy and the nature of working in the private sector. For an aspiring govern-
ment bureaucrat, a strict pre-specified sequence of career steps should be taken in order to
guarantee advance in the service by achieving regular promotions in the hierarchy. This may
involve preparing for a civil service entry exam, which is costly in terms of both time and
effort, as it may not be directly related to one’s university degree. Another negative effect is
that this process often leads to employing overqualified personnel. Additionally, in the public
administration there is an over-emphasis on status and hierarchy (OECD 1993), as well as
anonymity of the individual bureaucrat, who is merely an instrument of the public adminis-
tration. Furthermore, once employed in the service, the newly-appointed civil servant starts
at the lowest pay grade. Promotion in public administration is usually a wait-in-line pro-
cess, or is automatically triggered with seniority, and thus not directly based on performance.
Furthermore, employees in strategic sectors such as law and order, and security (police offi-
cers, fire fighters), do not enjoy certain civil liberties, i.e. soldiers and police officers are not
allowed to be members of a political party and/or go on strike. In addition, those employees
have to be always prepared to act on call in emergency situations outside normal working
hours. Moreover, magistrates, such as prosecutors and judges could be exposed to threats
and attacks from the criminal underworld. Those professionals are often exposed to higher
levels of stress, and face life-threatening situations, especially in countries where the crime
rate is high. Furthermore, Donahue (2008) points out that the private sector counterparts
of the aforementioned professions, e.g. private detectives, security consultants, and notaries,
generally enjoy a much more peaceful life, at the expense of a significantly lower wage rate
(pp. 55-56).
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In contrast, in the private sector, there is strong emphasis on personal contribution and
performance; In terms of working patters, statutory working hours for government employ-
ees are usually a fixed full 8-hour shift as compared to flexible working time in the private
sector. Additionally, private sector also offers more part-time employment opportunities,
which can be the preferred option for female workers and single mothers, who want to spend
more time with their children. Importantly, tasks in the civil service are to follow regulations
and legislation in an impartial and strict manner. Furthermore, the span of power and job
boundaries are clearly defined. This way of organizing work, however, is different from the
approach adopted in the private sector, where involvement with a problem, customer-based
individual approach, initiative-taking and originality in problem-solving are highly-valued.3
In effect, the aforementioned aspects of government work could be viewed as generating
hidden per-period resource- or transaction costs. However, the welfare effect of these costs
is difficult to measure directly. Thus, the chapter will adopt Balestrino’s (2007) modeling
approach, who includes such costs as a term that directly decreases household’s utility. In
particular, in the model framework, utility costs of working in the public sector will decrease
the amount of leisure enjoyed by the household, in a manner reminiscent to Kydland and
Prescott (1982).4,5 Given the case-study evidence in Box (2004) on the hidden costs of work-
ing in the public sector in the US, the difference in wages across sectors could be justified, at
3Independently from the arguments presented above, the time cost introduced in this chapter is remi-
niscent of the psychic cost interpretation discussed in Tinbergen (1985). He argues that there is a strong
negative non-monetary benefit of working in the public sector. In particular, job satisfaction experienced
by government workers is usually low. Therefore, the modeling choice in this chapter could be regarded as
incorporating the psychic cost theory, e.g. as in Corbi et al. (2008), into the RBC framework, and applying
it to the public sector labor choice context.
4In contrast to Kydland and Prescott (1982), transaction cost will be modeled as a quadratic function of
current-period hours, and not as a polynomial function of lagged hours, as is the case in the original article.
5An alternative specification, e.g. modeling the transaction cost as a consumption/output cost is also
possible. In that case, however, the disutility of an hour worked in the model would have been the same
across sectors. Since this assumption is in contrast with the evidence provided above, this approach was not
pursued further.
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least partially, as a compensation for the additional transaction cost incurred from govern-
ment work. However, in contrast to earlier literature, e.g. Alesina et al. (2002), Algan et al.
(2002), Demekas and Kontolemis (2000), Forni and Giordano (2003) and Ardagna (2007), in
this chapter the wage rate difference will persist despite the free mobility of labor between
sectors.6
Additionally, the specific focus on government spending categories in this chapter, and public
hours choice in particular, provides a new explanation for the macroeconomic importance
of government employment, as a rational supply decision made by the household in a clear-
ing labor market. After all, the strong positive trend in public employment is a common
stylized pattern observed in the post-WWII data series in the major European countries
(OECD 2011). Earlier studies by Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009), how-
ever, circumvent the problem of optimal choice of hours between private and public sector
by modeling public employment as a stochastic process that approximates data behavior.
The recent study by Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) takes an alternative approach:
Their model endogeneizes public hours using political-economy arguments as a major fac-
tor behind public employment dynamics. In their setup, employment in the government
sector is an optimal decision made by a monopolistic public sector union, and not by the
household, though. The union, being a special-interests group, is assumed to optimize over
a weighted average of the public wage rate and public employment. In addition, the union’s
objective function is maximized subject to the government budget constraint, where gov-
ernment budget is balanced in every period. In their model, spending on government wages
is productive, as public employment produces a positive externality on aggregate output.
However, Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) consider exogenous income tax rate
shocks only, and leave outside the scope of their study interesting issues such as optimal
6There are other modeling approaches, e.g. setups that emphasize directed jobs search mechanisms, which
are not going to be covered in this chapter. Interested readers should consult Quadrini and Trigari (2007),
Gomes (2009, 2012) and the references therein.
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tax-rate determination, public-wage- and employment-setting possibilities. Thus, previous
literature has not adequately addressed either the household’s choice at the margin between
entering the public or the private sector, or the optimal policy framework, in which a benev-
olent government chooses all spending components in addition to the tax rates.7 All these
structural aspects of public sector labor markets and their relevance for public finance and
public policy represent a gap in the literature, which the research in this chapter aims to fill.
The second novelty in the framework, which adds value to earlier studies, is the more in-
teresting and meaningful role attributed to government employees. In particular, the study
models in greater detail the mechanism of public good provision. The setup models the gov-
ernment as an employer, needing labor hours to provide public goods. In contrast to Cavallo
(2005) and Linnemann (2009), labor here is combined with government capital (instead of
government purchases) to produce valuable government services. Therefore, government in-
vestment is a productive government spending category in the setup, and public sector wage
consumption is not entirely wasteful. Importantly, when hiring workers, the government will
be able to set the public sector wage rate, an assumption which is consistent with data, e.g.
Perez and Schucknecht (2003).
As pointed out in Ross (1985), many government programs are indeed labor-intensive, such
as law and order, public administration, education, and health- and social care.8 Moreover,
public administration, which is in charge of enforcing various rules and regulations, repre-
sents the biggest category of public employees in data that provides labor-intensive services.
The other input in the public good production, government capital, will be an aggregate
category that includes hospitals, schools, administrative buildings, infrastructure and equip-
7The model in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) does not satisfy Hagedorn’s (2010) conditions
for the existence of a ”sensible” Ramsey equilibrium, i.e. one that satisfies the non-negativity conditions
(and the one for public employment in particular). Strictly speaking, no direct mapping exists between the
exogenous policy case and the optimal policy framework in their model.
8In addition, as pointed out in Downs (1967), a big part of government services is non-market output.
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ment, etc. Thus, the chapter expands on earlier research by endogeneizing public goods
provision, as well as the determination of the wage rate and employment in the public sec-
tor. Furthermore, the presence of both public hours and government investment as inputs in
the production of government services will have important external effects on the economy:
In competitive equilibrium, the household will ignore the utility-enhancing effect of more
public hours supplied, which increases the level of public good provided. The same outcome
occurs with public investment, which is taken by households as being set exogenously.
After presenting and discussing the benchmark exogenous policy case, Chapter 2 proceeds
to study public employment, wage rate and government investment determination, as well
as the level of public services provision, when all policy variables are optimally chosen by a
benevolent government. In particular, under the optimal (Ramsey) policy regime, the benev-
olent government will choose the socially optimal levels of both private allocations and the
public good. However, in a second-best world, the benevolent government will still finance its
expenditure using proportional taxation, and remedy the existing distortions at the cost of
introducing new ones. The comparison across the two regimes focuses on both the long-run
behavior of government spending and the transitional dynamics of fiscal policy instruments
and the other allocations in the economy. The model is calibrated to German data, which
feature both a significant public wage rate premium, and a large public employment share,
and thus are a good testing ground for the theory.
Similar to earlier literature, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004), and Kocherlakota (2010), allowing for fiscal interventions in an RBC
framework creates interesting trade-offs. On the one hand, public wage bill tends to in-
crease welfare by providing higher consumption. In addition, higher public employment,
government investment and public capital increase the level of utility-enhancing productive
government services. On the other hand, more hours spent in the public sector, together
with the transaction costs associated with government work, decrease household’s utility
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from leisure. Furthermore, the proportional taxes on labor and capital are known to distort
incentives to supply labor in the private and public sectors, and to accumulate physical
capital. Therefore, higher taxes reduce consumption, which in turn lowers welfare. Lastly,
despite the presence of public employment and government services in the model, the public
finance problem is still to choose labor and capital tax rates to finance total government
expenditure, while at the same time minimizing the allocative distortions created in the
economy, as a result of the presence of proportional taxation.
The main findings from the computational experiments performed in this chapter are: (i)
as in Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Zhu (1992), the optimal steady-state capital tax
rate is zero, as it is the most distortionary tax to use; (ii) A higher labor tax rate is needed
to compensate for the loss in capital tax revenue; (iii) Under the optimal policy regime,
public sector employment is lower. As a result, government employees are more valuable,
and receive higher wages. (iv) The government wage bill is smaller, while public investment
is three times higher than in the exogenous policy case. In other words, the model pre-
dicts that on average, public employment in Germany is too high, government employees
are underpaid, and too little is invested in public capital; (v) The benevolent Ramsey plan-
ner substitutes labor for capital in the production of both public services and private output.
The rest of Chapter 2 is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model framework, Sec-
tion 2.3 lays out the equilibrium system, Section 2.4 present the calibration, the steady-state
model solution and some comparative statics. Sections 2.5 provides the model solution and
discusses transitional dynamics of the model variables in response to technological innova-
tions. Sections 2.6 proceeds with the optimal taxation (Ramsey) policy problem. Section 2.7
evaluates both the transitional dynamics and the long-run effects on the economy. Section
2.8 acknowledges the limitations of the study, and section 2.9 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Model setup
The model features a representative household, as well as a representative firm. The house-
hold owns the capital, which it supplies to the firm. Next, the household’s unit endowment
of time can be supplied to the private sector (firm), public sector, or enjoyed in the form of
leisure. Due to the presence of additional transaction costs associated with government work,
hours supplied in the public sector impose an additional utility cost on the household. The
perfectly-competitive firm produces output using labor and capital, while the government
hires labor and combines it with public capital to produce valuable government services.
To finance the public wage bill, government investment and transfers, tax revenues from
labor and capital income are collected, and the wage rate in the public sector is determined
residually to balance the government budget in every period.
2.2.1 Households
There is an infinitely-lived representative household in the model economy, and no population
growth. The household maximizes an expected utility function, as in Klein et al. (2008):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cht , L
h
t , S
g
t ), (2.2.1.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator as of period 0; C
h
t , L
h
t and S
g
t are household’s con-
sumption, leisure and per household consumption of government services enjoyed at time
t, respectively. The parameter β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The instantaneous
utility function U(., ., .) is increasing in each argument and satisfies the Inada conditions.
The particular form chosen for utility is:
U(Cht , L
h
t , S
g
t ) = ψ1 lnC
h
t + ψ2 lnL
h
t + ψ3 lnS
g
t (2.2.1.2)
where the parameters ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3 ≡ 1−ψ1−ψ2 denote the weights attached to the utility
of consumption, leisure and government services (public good consumption), respectively,
0 < ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 < 1. The level of government services is taken as given by the household.
9
9The logarithmic specification for consumption can be interpreted as households pooling resources from
public and private sector together, as in Merz (1995). The logarithmic form for leisure is in line with the
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The household has an endowment of one unit of time in each period t, which is split between
work, Nht and leisure, L
h
t , so that
Nht + L
h
t = 1. (2.2.1.3)
The household can supply hours of work in the public sector, N ght , or in the private one,
Npht .
10 The wage rate per hour of work in public sector is wgt , and w
p
t in the private sector,
which will be allowed to differ from one another. In particular, when the household chooses
N ght , it incurs an additional convex transaction cost, γ(N
gh)2, measured in terms of time,
which will also depend on the level of public employment (where γ > 0).11 Thus, the effective
leisure for the household becomes
Lt = 1−Npht −N ght − γ(N ght )2. (2.2.1.4)
Observe that in the polar case, when there is no transaction cost, or γ = 0, the two wage
rates are equal wpt = w
g
t , because the disutility of an hour worked is equalized across sectors.
This special case of the model collapses to the representation used in Finn (1998), Cavallo
(2005) and Linnemann (2009). Furthermore, Tinbergen (1985) argues that public sector
employees suffer from lower job satisfaction, compared to their private sector counterparts,
and incur a per-period psychic (non-monetary) cost of working for the government (p.36).
Therefore, the usefulness of this particular modeling choice is that it generates a friction
between the marginal disutility of an hour worked in the public and private sector, which
is generally consistent with the evidence and also helps the framework to accommodate the
specification used in Cavallo (2009) and Gomes (2012).
10In this chapter, due to the normalization of total population to unity, ”hours” and ”employment” will
be used interchangeably.
11This is consistent with the evidence that labor flows from the public to the private sector are much
smaller than those from the private to the public sector.
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different wage rates in the two labor markets.12,13
In addition to the labor income generated from supplying hours in the two sectors, the
representative household saves by investing in private capital Iht . As an owner of capital,
the household receives interest income rtK
ph
t from renting the capital to the firms; rt is the
return to private capital, and Kpht denotes private capital stock in the beginning of period t.
Finally, the household owns all firms in the economy, and receives all profit (Πht ) in the
form of dividends. Household’s budget constraint is
Cht + I
h
t ≤ (1− τ lt )[wptNpht + wgtN ght ] + (1− τ kt )rtKpht +GTt + Πht , (2.2.1.5)
where τ lt , τ
k
t are the proportional tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively, and G
T
t
denotes the level of lump-sum government transfers per household.
Household’s private physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kpht+1 = I
h
t + (1− δp)Kpht , (2.2.1.6)
where 0 < δp < 1 denotes the depreciation rate on private physical capital.
The representative household acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0, tax rates
{τ lt , τ kt }∞t=0, policy variables {Kgt+1, Sgt , GTt }∞t=0 as given, and chooses allocations {Cht , Npht , N ght ,
Iht , K
ph
t+1}∞t=0 to maximize Eq. (2.2.1.1) subject to Eqs. (2.2.1.2)-(2.2.1.6), and initial condi-
tions for private and public physical capital stocks, {Kph0 , Kg0}.
The optimality conditions from the household’s problem, together with the transversality
12In addition, when both public and private hours are chosen by the households, the model will be
consistent with the findings that public employment crowds out private employment, e.g. Malley and Moutos
(1998) on Sweden, and Algan et al. (2002) on OECD countries.
13On a more abstract level, the convex cost could be interpreted as a short-cut, which substitutes for an
explicit government optimization problem. Examples of the latter are Niskanen (1971) and Ardagna (2007).
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condition (TVC) for physical capital, are as follows: 14
Cht :
ψ1
Cht
= Λt (2.2.1.7)
Npht :
ψ2
1−Npht −N ght − γ(N ght )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (2.2.1.8)
N ght :
ψ2
1−Npht −N ght − γ(N ght )2
[1 + 2γN ght ] = Λt(1− τ lt )wgt (2.2.1.9)
Kpht+1: βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (2.2.1.10)
TVC: lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
ph
t+1 = 0, (2.2.1.11)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The household
equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
Private and public hours are chosen so that the disutility of an hour of work in each sector at
the margin equals the after-tax return to labor in the corresponding sector. Next, the Euler
equation describes the optimal private capital accumulation rule, and implicitly characterizes
the optimal consumption allocations chosen in any two adjacent periods. The last expression
is the TVC, imposed to ensure that the value of the physical capital that remains at the
end of the optimization horizon is zero. This boundary condition ensures that the model
equilibrium is well-defined by ruling out explosive solution paths.
2.2.2 Firms
There is also a representative private firm in the model economy as well. It produces a
homogeneous final product using a production function that requires private physical capital,
Kpt , and labor hours N
p
t . The production function is as follows
Yt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ, (2.2.2.1)
14Detailed derivation of household’s optimality conditions is provided in Appendix 2.10.1.
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where At measures the level of total factor productivity at time t; 0 < θ, (1− θ) < 1 are the
productivity of labor and capital, respectively.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 and policy vari-
ables {τ kt , τ lt , Kgt+1, Sgt , GTt }∞t=0 as given. Accordingly, Kpt , and Npt are chosen every period to
maximize the firm’s static aggregate profit,
Πt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − rtKpt − wptNpt . (2.2.2.2)
In equilibrium, profit is zero. In addition, labor and capital receive their marginal products,
i.e 15
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(2.2.2.3)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
. (2.2.2.4)
2.2.3 Government budget constraint
The government distributes transfers GTt to the household, invests G
i
t in public capital K
g
t ,
and hires labor N gt at the public sector wage w
g
t . Public employment and government capital
are then combined to provide utility-enhancing government services, Sgt , according to the
following constant-returns-to-scale production function, as in Cavallo (2005), Linnemann
(2009), and Economides et al (2011):
Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α), (2.2.3.1)
where α and 1− α denote labor and capital share in government services, respectively, and
0 < α, 1 − α < 1. Since the household takes the level of government services as given, in
competitive equilibrium there will be an externality arising from the presence of public em-
ployment and investment in the government services production function: more hours in the
public sector generate more government services (a higher level of the public good available
15Detailed derivation of firm’s optimality conditions is provided in Appendix 2.10.1.
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for public consumption), which increase household’s utility directly. In addition, holding
all else equal, an increase in public employment raises welfare indirectly by increasing the
after-tax public sector labor income, and hence consumption. Lastly, more hours spent in
the public sector decrease the amount of leisure the household can enjoy in a certain period,
and thus lower welfare.
Next, total government expenditure, GTt + G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t , is financed by levying proportional
taxes on capital and labor income. Thus, the government budget constraint is16
GTt +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t = τ
k
t rtK
p
t + τ
l
t
[
wptN
p
t + w
g
tN
g
t
]
. (2.2.3.2)
Next, public capital accumulates according to the following law of motion:
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (2.2.3.3)
where 0 < δg < 1 denotes the depreciation rate on public capital.
The government takes market prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and allocations {Npt , N gt , Kpt }∞t=0 as given.17
It will be assumed that the government chooses the public investment and transfers shares,
where Giyt =
Git
Yt
and GTyt =
GTt
Yt
. Thus, the level of government investment Git = G
iy
t Yt, and
government transfers GTt = G
Ty
t Yt will both respond to output.
Only four of the following five policy instruments, {τ kt , τ lt , wgt , G
i
t
Yt
,
GTt
Yt
}∞t=0, will be exogenously
16Since public sector wage bill appears both as a revenue and expenditure category, the representation
above is equivalent to a setup in which the government pays public wages net-of-taxes directly.
17In the model, the assumption that the government cannot influence private sector prices in the exogenous
policy case is a technical condition that allows for the DCE to be solved. Later, in the optimal policy case,
the government will choose optimally all allocations, subjects to the constraints imposed by the DCE. First,
by choosing the tax rates on labor and capital, the government can set the after-tax returns of the factors
of production. In addition, by choosing the levels of private sector hours worked and the private physical
capital, the benevolent government implicitly determines prices, using the constraint from the decentralized
competitive equilibrium (DCE) system that in equilibrium private factors of production receive their marginal
product.
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set. First, the government transfers share will be set to match the average public/private
employment ratio in data. Next, the government investment share,
Git
Yt
, as well as capital and
labor income tax rates will be set equal to the average rates in data. Lastly, the public sector
wage rate will be determined as a residual to ensure that the government runs a balanced
budget in every period. Thus, the government still acts to a certain degree as a regulator of
the labor supplied in the public sector.18
2.2.4 Stochastic processes for the exogenous variables
The exogenous stochastic variable is total factor productivity At, which is assumed to follow
AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + at+1, (2.2.4.1)
where A0 = A > 0 is steady-state level of the total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 1 is
the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and at ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are random shocks
to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations at represent unexpected
changes in the total factor productivity process.
2.2.5 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the fixed values of capital and labor income tax rates, government transfers/output and
government investment/output ratios {τ k, τ l, GTy, Giy}, the exogenous process followed by
total factor productivity {At}∞t=0, the initial conditions for the state variables {A0, Kph0 , Kg0},
a decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a sequence of allocations
{Cht , Git, Npht , N ght , Iht , Kpht+1, Kgt+1, Sgt , GTt } for all h, and prices {rt, wpt , wgt }∞t=0 such that (i)
the representative household maximizes utility; (ii) the stand-in firm maximizes profit every
18Note that in general equilibrium, the two wage rates will be inter-related, which is in line with the
empirical study in Lamo, Perez and Schucknecht (2007, 2008). Thus, the level of government investment
will respond to output. (Kgt+1 will be exogenously determined as well, subject to the initial condition K
g
0
and the law of motion for Gi.) Note also that the public sector wage rate schedule implicitly determines
government’s endogenous demand for public labor.
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period; (iii) government budget constraint is satisfied in each time period, and (iv) all markets
clear.19
2.3 Data and model calibration
The model in this chapter is calibrated for German data at annual frequency for consistency
reasons. The choice of this particular economy was made, as in Chapter 1, based on the
large public employment share, as well as the significant public wage premium observed in
this country. Since there is no EU-wide fiscal authority, an individual country was chosen,
rather than calibrating the model for the EU Area as a whole. In addition, payment in the
public sector in the model is determined not by marginal productivity of labor, but rather
by budgetary considerations and thus most likely by non-market factors (as the price of
the public good is zero). Lastly, given the importance of government transfers in matching
average employment ratio in data by the model, the calibration for a particular country is
preferable as transfers are to a great extent driven by political considerations and are also
determined at national-, and not at EU level.
The chapter follows the methodology used in Kydland and Prescott (1982), as it is the
standard approach in the literature. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships
of the models will be used to set the parameter values, in order to replicate relevant long-run
moments of the reference economy for the question investigated in this chapter.
19The system of equations that characterizes the DCE is provided in Appendix 2.10.2.
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2.3.1 Model-consistent German data
Due to data limitations, the model calibrated for Germany will be for the period 1970-
2007 only, while the sub-period 1970-91 covers West Germany only.20,21,22 For Germany,
data on real output per capita, household consumption per capita, government transfers
and population was taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The
OECD statistical database was used to extract the long-term interest rate on 10-year generic
bonds, CPI inflation, average annual earnings in the private and public sector, average
hours, private, public and total employment in Germany. Investment and capital stock
series were obtained from the EU Klems database (2009). German average annual real
public compensation per employee was estimated by dividing the real government wage bill
(OECD 2011) by the number of public employees.
2.3.2 Calibrating model parameters to German data
In German data, the average public/private employment ratio over the period 1970-2007 is
ng/np = 0.17, and the average public/private wage ratio is wg/wp = 1.20. Next, the average
effective tax rates on labor and physical capital, obtained from McDaniel’s (2009) dataset are
τ l = 0.409 and τ k = 0.16, respectively. As in Chapter 1, McDaniel’s approach was preferred
to that used by Mendoza et al. (1984) and the subsequent updates, e.g. Martinez-Mongay
(2000), Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) and Carey and Rabesona (2002), due to the more
careful treatment of property and import taxes in the former. The labor share, θ = 0.71,
was computed as the average ratio of compensation of employees in total output. Alterna-
20The time period is particularly suitable for the study of public employment, and government wage bill
spending; Hughes (1994), for example, argues that ”[i]n the 1970s, intellectual arguments were mounted
by conservative economists that government was the economic problem restricting economic growth and
freedom.”(p. 11)
21The values of the model parameters used in the calibration do not differ significantly from those computed
for the periods 1970-91, and 1991-2007 separately.
22Despite the fact that Germany is an open economy, here the focus is on the closed-economy case, as
fiscal policy mainly serves domestic interests. Thus, the open-economy dimension is left for future research.
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tively, average capital share, 1− θ = 0.29, can be obtained as the mean ratio of gross capital
compensation in output from EU Klems Database (2009). Private capital depreciation rate
was found to be δp = 0.082, while public capital depreciation rate is δp = 0.037 over the
period.
The discount rate β = 0.979 was calibrated from the steady-state consumption Euler equa-
tion to match the average private capital-to-output ratio in data. Parameter α = 0.62,
which measures the weight on public sector hours in the public good production is obtained
as the average ratio of public sector wage bill to total government expenditure less transfers
and subsidies, as in Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009). The value is consistent with
OECD (1982) estimates for the period 1960-78 for Germany, which was obtained from a log-
linear regression estimation. Additionally, the calibrated value of public capital elasticity,
1− α = 0.38, is consistent with the government capital effect estimated in Aschauer (1989)
and Hjerppe et al. (2006). In the exogenous policy setup, parameter α does not affect alloca-
tions, since the household ignores the externality. Thus, the level of government services will
be residually determined. Nevertheless, there is a negative monotone relationship between
public hours elasticity and welfare.
Next, using the estimate obtained in Finn (1994), the weight attached to productive gov-
ernment services in utility is set equal to ψ3 = 0.16.
23 This value is consistent with the one
used in Klein et al. (2008) for the weight attached by the household to utility derived from
the consumption of the public good. The weight on private consumption in the household’s
utility function in this chapter was then set equal to ψ1 = 0.31. This produces a ratio
ψ1/ψ3 = 1.94, which is also consistent with the ratios in Bouakez and Rebel (2007), Leeper
et al. (2009) and Conesa et al. (2009), who argue that the private consumption good is
on average twice more valuable for the household, compared to the public good. Next, the
23Robustness checks with ψ3 = 0.1 and ψ3 = 0.2 to reflect the standard error of the estimation performed
in Finn (1994) do not significantly affect either steady-state results, or transitional dynamics of the model.
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weight on utility is determined residually as ψ2 = 1−ψ1−ψ3. The calibrated value for ψ2 is
also in line with earlier RBC studies, which usually attach a weight on leisure, which is twice
as large as the weight attached to private consumption in the household’s utility function.
In this model, the ratio in question is ψ2/ψ1 = 1.8. Note that in contrast to Kydland (1995),
ψ1 was set slightly higher than the average steady-state total hours of work in data as a
share of total hours available, n = 0.296, to account for the presence of transaction costs,
which decrease the effective leisure.24 Nevertheless, total employment is consistent with
the estimates of the fraction of time spent working in Ghez and Becker (1975) and Juster
and Stafford (1991). Together with the employment ratio, this yields the model-consistent
steady-state values for private and public hours, np = 0.253 and ng = 0.043, respectively.
Next, the scale parameter γ = 2.576 in the public employment convex utility cost was
set to match the average public/private wage ratio from data in steady-state. The wage
ratio was chosen as a target, as the higher average wage in the public sector is viewed to a
certain degree as a compensation for the transaction costs incurred from government work.
In line with the RBC literature, the steady-state level of technology, A, is normalized at unity.
Total factor productivity moments, ρa = 0.9427 and σa = 0.0131, were obtained in sev-
eral steps: First, using the model’s aggregate production function specification and data
series for physical capital and labor, Solow residuals (SR) were computed in the following
way:
lnSRt = ln yt − (1− θ) ln kpt − θ lnnpt . (2.3.2.1)
The logged series are then regressed on a linear trend (b > 0) to obtain
lnSRt = bt+ 
SR
t . (2.3.2.2)
24In this setup with two types of endogenously-determined hours and public hours transaction costs, it is
not possible to derive labor supply functions explicitly.
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Observe that the residuals from the regression above,
SRt = lnSRt − bt ≡ ln at, (2.3.2.3)
represent the stationary, or detrended, component of the logged TFP series.
Next, the AR(1) regression
ln at = β0 + β1 ln at−1 + at (2.3.2.4)
was run using ordinary least squares (OLS) to produce the estimates (denoted by the ”hat”
symbol) for the persistence and standard deviation parameters of the total factor produc-
tivity process to be used in the calibration of the model. In particular,
βˆ1 = ρ
a (2.3.2.5)
ˆat ∼ N(0, σ2a). (2.3.2.6)
Table 2.1 on the next page summarizes all the model parameters used in the calibration.
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters
Param. Value Definition Source
β 0.979 Discount factor Calibrated
θ 0.710 Labor income share Data average
1− θ 0.290 Capital income share Calibrated
δp 0.082 Depreciation rate on private capital Data average
δg 0.037 Depreciation rate on government capital Data average
ψ1 0.310 Weight on consumption in utility Set
ψ2 0.530 Weight on leisure in utility Calibrated
ψ3 0.160 Weight on government services in utility Set
γ 2.5762 Scale parameter for public hours transaction cost Calibrated
α 0.620 Labor share in public services production Data average
1− α 0.380 Govt. capital share in public services production Calibrated
τ k 0.160 Effective tax rate on capital income Data average
τ l 0.409 Effective tax rate on labor income Data average
Giy 0.023 Government investment-to-output ratio Data average
GTy 0.228 Government transfers-to-output ratio Set/Calibrated
A 1.000 Steady-state level of total factor productivity Set
ρa 0.943 AR(1) parameter total factor productivity Estimated
σa 0.013 SD of total factor productivity innovation Estimated
Chapter 2: Fiscal policy in a RBC model with with labor-intensive public services 126
2.4 Steady state results
Once model parameters were obtained, the unique steady-state of the system was computed
numerically25 for the Germany-calibrated model. Results are reported in Table 2.2 on the
next page. The net returns to public and private labor,
w˜p = (1− τ l)wp and (2.4.0.7)
w˜g = (1− τ l)wg, (2.4.0.8)
respectively, as well as the after-tax net of depreciation real return to capital,
r¯ = (1− τ k)(r − δp), (2.4.0.9)
are also reported. These prices will be useful for comparisons across tax regimes in the anal-
ysis that follows. Finally, social welfare U is the discounted stream of instantaneous utilities
evaluated at the steady-state allocations of consumption, hours and government services in
every period.
The model performs relatively well vis-a-vis data. It slightly overestimates average consump-
tion and underestimates the investment shares in output. This mismatch is due to the fact
that the model treats government wage bill consumption as a transfer payment, and not as
final public consumption, as is the case in the national accounts. This is not an issue here as
the main objective of the model is to replicate the stylized facts in the labor markets. How-
ever, the model accurately captures the long-run after-tax capital return, where the latter is
proxied by the average return on 10-year generic bonds net of CPI inflation. Moreover, the
imputed government services is also predicted to make a significant share of output.26
Along the labor market dimension, the average time spent working is also close to its empir-
ical counterpart over the period. By construction, the model was set to match the wage and
25Appendix 2.10.3 summarizes the steady-state DCE system.
26In addition, this figure is close to the average government consumption-to-output ratio in German data
(0.20).
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Table 2.2: Data averages and long-run solution: exogenous policy
GE Data Exogenous
c/y 0.590 0.784
i/y 0.210 0.192
gi/y 0.023 0.023
kp/y 2.350 2.346
kg/y 0.630 0.630
sg/y 0.196 0.224
gT/y 0.170 0.228
wpnp/y 0.710 0.710
wgng/y 0.130 0.145
rk/y 0.290 0.290
wg/wp 1.200 1.200
n 0.296 0.266
np 0.253 0.227
ng 0.043 0.039
ng/np 0.17 0.170
γ(ng)2/ng N/A 0.099
r¯ 0.036 0.035
U N/A -47.91
employment ratios in data. Given the focus on the labor effects of fiscal policy, exogenous
policy framework was calibrated to reproduce those stylized facts in the steady state, as this
framework will provide an important benchmark for fiscal policy experiments in the later
sections. Next, the ratio of the time cost of working in the public sector relative to public
labor supply is a non-trivial figure in steady-state, γ(n
g)2
ng
= 0.10. Thus, transaction costs in
the government sector are likely to be an important factor for a worker who is considering
whether to enter the public sector labor market or the private sector one. In other words,
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these additional transaction costs should be incorporated in a(n) (equilibrium) wage offer
accepted by a rational worker, who decides to supply labor services in the public sector.27
In the next section, the public/private wage ratio target is relaxed in order to perform
an important comparative-statics exercise. The focus of the analysis will fall on the new pa-
rameter, γ, as its properties within the otherwise standard model framework have not been
investigated so far. In particular, the computational experiments in the following section
will aim to uncover whether a systematic relationship exists between transaction cost scale
parameter γ and the steady-state values of the other model variables.
2.4.1 Comparative Statics: changes in transaction cost parameter
This section investigates the dependence of the steady-state results obtained in the previous
section on the value of γ. Making jobs between sectors more similar corresponds to a decrease
in the value of parameter γ, and thus a decrease in the level of the transaction costs of gov-
ernment work. In particular, the changes in this new parameter could be mapped to concrete
institutional reforms in the government administration. Reform measures could include, but
are not limited to, new human resource practices in the public sector that try to follow as
closely as possible the practices used in the private sector. For example, the measures could
involve the introduction of flexible hours and performance pay for government employees,
as well as a ”fast track career path” in the public sector. Other possible measures include
decentralization, job evaluation, the breakdown of old established work demarcations and
job boundaries, and greater use of public relationships (PR) and informational technology
(IT) (OECD 1993).
In the literature, this move toward market-based labor relationships in the 1990s was called
”New Public Management”(NPM) and discussed in Hughes (1991), Ferlie et al. (1996) and
27The average magnitude of the transaction cost is comparable to the size of another type of transaction
costs in labor economics literature, namely the cost of commuting, as shown in Ehrenberg and Smith (2003).
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Nolan (2001). In particular, the major Western governments were trying to apply the best
business practices used in the private sector into the public sector. The NPM approach
proposed that public managers should be put in charge of the size, evaluation and qualifica-
tion level of the workforce in their respective government agencies. The expected effect of
the NPM was to empower heads of agencies to adjust employment size and skill level and
implement best business practices, or the so-called ”market-based public administration.”
NPM were supposed to make the public sector more efficient and in line with the practices in
the private sector. Such administrative reforms would make public sector jobs more similar
to private sector ones, and rationalize a reduction in transaction costs in the model.
Therefore, in the model setup, all those measures listed above would effectively decrease
the hidden costs of working in the government for any amount of public hours chosen by
the household. The fall in the transaction cost is expected to affect consumption, private
hours, capital, and output in a positive way. In addition, a fall in γ is expected to drive
down the public wage premium, as well as the public wage bill share in output. As shown
in Fig. 2.1 on the next page, the model is consistent with the economic intuition. The
computational experiment performed shows a negative monotone relationship between the
transaction cost scale parameter γ (or equivalently, total transaction cost γ(ng)2) and the
model variables. Only public/private wage ratio and the public wage bill share in output
positively co-move with the cost parameter. Clearly, a reduction in the waste, embodied in
the government-work friction, is welfare-improving.
In the next section, model’s behavior outside of the steady-state is investigated. In par-
ticular, the transitional dynamics of the model economy and the responses of the variables
in the face of a surprise technological innovation is presented and discussed. Moreover, a
robustness check will be performed for the effect of γ on the cyclical fluctuations exhibited
by the model variables as well.
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Figure 2.1: Comparative Statics: changes in γ and its effect on the model economy
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2.5 Model solution and impulse responses
Since there is no closed-form general solution for the model in this chapter, a typical approach
followed in the RBC literature is to log-linearize the stationary DCE equations around the
steady state, where xˆt = lnxt− lnx, and then solve the linearized version of the model. The
log-linearized system of model equations is derived and summarized in Appendix 2.10.4-
2.10.5. The linearized DCE system can be represented in the form of first-order linear
stochastic difference equations as in King, Plosser and Rebello (1988):
AEtxˆt+1 = Bxˆt + CEtεt+1, (2.5.0.1)
where A,B, and C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked
vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control vari-
ables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt gˆ
T
t gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000) generalized
eigenvalue decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. Using the model solution,
the impulse response functions (IRFs) were computed to analyze the transitional dynamics
of model variables to a surprise innovation to productivity.28
2.5.1 The Effect of a positive productivity shock
Figure 2.2 shows the impact of a 1% surprise TFP innovation on the model economy. There
are two main channels through which the TFP shock affects the model economy. A higher
TFP increases output directly upon impact. This constitutes a positive wealth effect, as
there is a higher availability of final goods, which could be used for private and public
consumption, as well as investment. From the rules for the government investment and
transfers in levels, a higher output translates into higher level of expenditure in each of the
two categories (not pictured). Next, the positive TFP shock increases both the marginal
product of capital and labor, hence the real interest rate (not pictured) and the private wage
rate increase. The household responds to the price signals and supplies more hours in the
28Sensitivity of IRFs for different values of γ, and the dependence of second moments on the magnitude
of the transaction cost parameter, and utility weights are presented in Appendix 2.10.6.
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private sector, as well as increasing investment. This increase is also driven from both the
intertemporal consumption smoothing and the intra-temporal substitution between private
consumption and leisure. In terms of the labor-leisure trade-off, the income effect (”work
more”) produced by the increase in the private wage dominates the substitution effect (”work
less”). Furthermore, the increase of private hours expands output even further, thus both
output and government spending categories increase more than the amount of the shock
upon impact. Over time, as private physical capital stock accumulates, marginal product
of capital falls, which decreases the incentive to invest. In the long-run, all variables return
to their old steady-state values. Due to the highly-persistent TFP process, the effect of the
shock is still present after 50 periods.
With regard to public sector labor dynamics, however, there is the additional effect of an
increase in productivity leading to an increase in income and consumption. Higher income
and consumption lead to larger tax revenue. In particular, the growth in government rev-
enue exceeds the increase in the fiscal spending instruments. As a result, the additional
funds available are spent on government investment, transfers and the wage bill. In turn,
the increase in the latter leads to an expansion in both public sector wage and hours.29
In addition, the model in this chapter generates an interesting dynamics in the wage and
hours ratio, which is not present in models with stochastic public employment, such as Finn
(1998), Cavallo (2005) or Linnemann (2009). The two wage rates, as well as the two types
of hours move together, making the model consistent with the empirical evidence presented
in Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008).
Overall, a positive innovation to total factor productivity has a positive effect on the al-
locations and prices in the economy. The novelty is that the endogenous public sector hours
29The effect on total hours in Germany is very small. Nonetheless, the increase in hours is much larger
in magnitude than the responses reported in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) and the model with
public sector union presented in Ch. 1.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock in Germany
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model generates an important difference in the composition of household’s labor income with
the public sector share increasing at a much faster rate than the private sector labor income.
Another important observation to make is that the TFP shocks, being the main driving
force in the model, induce pro-cyclical behavior in public wage and hours. The shock effects
are smaller and variables reach their peak very quickly. This means the impulse effect dies
out relatively fast. Nonetheless, the transition period can still take up to 100 years. This
illustrates the important long-run effects of TFP shocks on the wage- and hours ratios.
However, an important limitation of the exogenous policy analysis performed so far is that
tax rates were fixed. In addition, government investment share was exogenously set, and
public wage rate was a residually-determined instrument that always adjusted accordingly
to balance the budget. In effect, by construction all interaction between the two tax rates
was precluded, by fixing each to the corresponding average effective rate in data over the
chosen period of study. These restrictions will be lifted in the next section, and the optimal
fiscal policy framework will be considered in an environment, in which the two tax rates,
government investment, public employment (and hence also government services) and public
sector wage rate, will be chosen jointly by a benevolent government, whose preferences are
perfectly aligned with the household’s utility function.
2.6 The Ramsey problem (Optimal fiscal policy under
full commitment)
In this section, the government will assume the role of a benevolent planner, who takes into
account that the representative household and the firm behave in their own best interests,
taking fiscal policy variables as given. The instruments under government’s control in this
section are labor and capital tax rates, next-period public capital (hence public investment),
public employment and public sector wage rate. Government transfers will be held fixed at
the level from the exogenous policy case. It is assumed that only linear taxes are allowed,
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and that the government can credibly commit to those. Thus, given the restriction to a
set of linear distortionary tax rates, only a second-best outcome is feasible. However, the
emphasis on the second-best theory makes the setup more realistic, and thus can be taken
as a better approximation to the environment in which policymakers decide on a particular
fiscal policy.
It is important to emphasize that each set of fiscal policy instruments implies a feasible
allocation that fully reflects the optimal behavioral responses of the household and firm.
Alternatively, each set of fiscal policy instruments can be thought of generating a different
competitive equilibrium allocation, i.e. allocations and prices are contingent on the partic-
ular values chosen for the fiscal instruments. The difference from the analysis performed so
far in the chapter, is that in Ramsey framework, the government chooses all instruments,
instead of taking them as being exogenous. At the same time, the government also optimally
chooses the allocations of agents, as dictated by the dual approach to the Ramsey problem
as in Chamley (1986).30 It is also assumed that the government discounts time at the same
rate as the representative household. The constraints which the government takes into ac-
count when maximizing the household’s welfare include the government budget constraints,
and the behavioral responses of both the household, and the firm. These are summarized
in the DCE of the exogenous fiscal policy case.31,32 In other words, in the dual approach to
the Ramsey problem, which will be utilized in this section, the choice variables for the gov-
ernment are {Ct, Npt , N gt , Kpt+1, Kgt+1, wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 plus the two tax rates {τ lt , τ kt }∞t=0.33 The
initial conditions for the state variable {A0, Kp0 , Kg0}, as well as the sequence of government
transfers {GT}∞t=0 and the process followed by total factor productivity {At}∞t=0 are taken as
30In contrast, in the primal approach all the policy variables and prices are solved as functions of the
allocations, thus the government decides only on the optimal allocation.
31The DCE system is summarized in Appendix 2.10.3.
32Stockman (2001) shows that the absence of debt and thus the inability of the government to run surpluses
and deficits has no dramatic effect on the optimal policies in the full commitment case.
33Note that by choosing next-period public capital, the planner is choosing public investment optimally.
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given.34
Following the procedure in Chamley (1986) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the Ramsey
problem will be transformed and simplified, so that the government chooses after-tax interest
rate r˜t and wage rates w˜
p
t and w˜
p
t directly, instead of setting tax rates and prices separately,
where
r˜t ≡ (1− τ kt )rt (2.6.0.1)
w˜pt ≡ (1− τ lt )wpt (2.6.0.2)
w˜gt ≡ (1− τ lt )wgt . (2.6.0.3)
Thus, the transformed government budget constraint becomes
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt . (2.6.0.4)
Once the optimal after-tax returns are solved for, the expression for the before-tax real in-
terest rate and private wage can be obtained from the DCE system. Solving for optimal
capital and labor tax rates is then trivial.
The transformed Ramsey problem then becomes:35
max
Ct,N
p
t ,N
g
t ,K
p
t+1,K
g
t+1,w˜
p
t ,w˜
g
t ,r˜t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψ1 lnCt + ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
+(1− ψ1 − ψ2) ln
[
(N gt )
α(Kgt )
1−α
]}
(2.6.0.5)
34In reality government often acts as a ”Stackelberg leader.” Such an assumption could change the results
in important ways, as it matters whether the government chooses sequentially, or whether the government
chooses once and for all. Here (and in Ch.3 of the thesis) the focus is on the latter case: it is assumed
that there is a perfect commitment device used by the government, and no (profitable) deviations from the
pre-announced plan are possible. The time-consistent case, or the political competitive equilibrium, is left for
future research: The interested reader should consult Marcet and Marimon’s (1992, 1999) work on recursive
contracts, which is closely related to such a setup.
35Detailed derivations in Appendix 2.10.8.
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s.t
1
Ct
= βEt
1
Ct+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
]
(2.6.0.6)
ψ2Ct = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wpt (2.6.0.7)
ψ2Ct[1 + 2γN
g
t ] = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wgt (2.6.0.8)
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
(1−θ) = Ct +K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Kpt+1 − (1− δp)Kpt (2.6.0.9)
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt (2.6.0.10)
Kpt+1 = It + (1− δp)Kpt (2.6.0.11)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
(2.6.0.12)
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(2.6.0.13)
Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α) (2.6.0.14)
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt (2.6.0.15)
After numerically solving for the unique steady-state,36 the full characterization of the long-
run Ramsey equilibrium is summarized in Table 2.3 on the next page, where the same values
for the parameters from the exogenous policy section (see Table 2.1) were used.
As in Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Ohanian (1997), parameter ξ is in-
troduced to measure the consumption-equivalent long-run welfare gain of moving from the
36Appendix 2.10.8-2.10.9 contains the detailed derivation of the Ramsey problem and steady-state system
representation.
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steady-state allocations in the exogenous policy case to the equilibrium values obtained under
Ramsey policy. In other words, the value of ξ measures the share of steady-state consump-
tion under the exogenous policy that the household has to be compensated with, in order to
achieve the same level of utility as the one under the Ramsey policy. A fraction ξ > 0, which
is the case reported in Table 2.3 on the next page, demonstrates that the agent is better-off
under Ramsey, while ξ < 0 would have implied that the agent is worse-off under Ramsey.37
The derivation of the analytic expression for ξ is presented in Appendix 2.10.10.
There are several additional important findings in the Ramsey equilibrium that can be seen
in Table 2.3 on the previous page. First, as expected, total discounted welfare is higher
under the Ramsey regime. Next, private consumption share is lower, while private capital-
and investment shares are higher, and thus the interest rate is lower. The model generates
a zero steady-state optimal capital tax, and a higher labor tax rate. All these results are
consistent with the findings in earlier studies, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and Kocherlakota (2010). In addition, earlier studies that use
the representative-agent setup, e.g. Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), have shown
that tax reforms which abolish capital taxation, even at the expense of higher tax burden
on labor, still produce significant welfare gains for the society.
Next, due to the presence of a second labor market, as well as an endogenous public sector
hours, sophisticated labor market interactions are generated. In the framework presented in
this chapter, the labor market structure allows for labor flows between sectors. Furthermore,
the government internalizes the public services in its choice. Thus, it selects the socially op-
timal levels of public hours and capital stock to provide the optimal level of the public
consumption good. In addition, the benevolent planner chooses a different mix between the
inputs used in the provision of government services: a higher level of government investment
is undertaken, while fewer public hours are employed than the in the DCE solution. As a
37However, a case with ξ < 0 can never occur under optimal policy.
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Table 2.3: Data averages and long-run solution: exogenous vs. optimal policy
GE Data Exogenous Ramsey
c/y 0.590 0.784 0.709
i/y 0.210 0.192 0.229
gi/y 0.023 0.023 0.062
kp/y 2.350 2.346 2.793
kg/y 0.630 0.630 1.669
sg/y 0.193 0.224 0.289
gT/y 0.170 0.228 0.221
wpnp/y 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y 0.130 0.145 0.143
rk/y 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp 1.200 1.200 1.339
wp N/A 1.006 1.079
wg N/A 1.207 1.445
w˜p N/A 0.595 0.541
w˜g N/A 0.714 0.724
n 0.296 0.266 0.251
np 0.253 0.227 0.218
ng 0.043 0.039 0.033
ng/np 0.170 0.170 0.150
γ(ng)2/ng N/A 0.099 0.085
r¯ 0.036 0.035 0.022
τ k 0.160 0.160 0.000
τ l 0.409 0.409 0.499
U N/A -47.91 -46.22
ξ N/A 0 0.123
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result, public investment (and thus public capital) share almost triples, which increases the
amount of the public good produced relative to output. The same substitution of labor for
capital is observed in the production of the private consumption good. Furthermore, the
Ramsey planner finds it optimal to produce a higher level of the private output using more
capital and fewer private hours. As a result, total employment also decreases.
In terms of the relative price of labor in the two labor markets, the after-tax private wage
decreases after the higher labor tax is levied, while the after-tax public wage slightly in-
creases. The higher public/private wage ratio, and thus the higher public wage premium in
the optimal policy case overcompensate for the increase in the labor tax. Furthermore, the
public/private hours ratio is lower, due to the substitution away from labor in the govern-
ment sector. In other words, the increase in the public wage premium is driven by budgetary
considerations, as the public wage is the residually-determined fiscal instrument that bal-
ances the per-period government budget constraint. In addition, the result is consistent with
economic logic and the scarcity argument: relatively fewer hours are employed in the public
sector, thus the steady-state public wage rate is higher. Furthermore, the optimal govern-
ment wage consumption is a little lower.38 In addition, given the substantial increase in
public investment, the fixed level of government transfers, and the loss of capital income tax
revenue, steady-state labor tax is 10% higher relative to the exogenous policy case. Overall,
these changes in the distribution of spending are new results in the optimal policy literature.
As seen from Table 2.3, if those aspects are ignored, important adjustment mechanisms are
missed.
38The result that cuts in the wage bill have an expansionary effect on the economy is not new to the
empirical macroeconomic studies, e.g. Algan et al. (2002), Alesina (1997), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina et
al. (2002), and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). However, the optimal public wage and employment aspects in
the analysis are novel in the modern macroeconomic literature, given the predominance of setups with single
wage rates, and exogenously-determined public employment. Lastly, the results are robust: changes in the
relative utility weights do not significantly affect the results obtained here.
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The value-added of the model with endogenous hours and wages in this chapter is that
it generates new predictions about the long-run effects of fiscal policy on the labor markets,
such as the wage and employment ratios, the optimal composition of the government wage
bill consumption, and the distribution of spending across government expenditure categories.
These results, generated from the incorporation of a richer government spending side, are
new and interesting for policy makers, as previous research had ignored those important
dimensions.
In the next section, the analysis is extended to the behavior of the Ramsey economy outside
of the steady-state. The transitional dynamics of model variables under optimal policy setup
is also analyzed. In particular, the optimal responses of the fiscal instrument and the other
prices and allocations to positive shocks to TFP is presented and discussed.
2.7 Optimal reaction of fiscal policy instruments to
productivity shocks
The optimal policy model is now solved using the first-order linearization procedure from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to study the dynamics of prices and allocations outside the
steady-state.39 The model solution is then used to study transitional behavior in response
to a surprise innovation in total factor productivity. Under Ramsey, endogenous variables
would generally behave differently, as compared to the responses to a positive technology
shock under the exogenous fiscal policy case. Fig. 2.3 summarizes all responses to a 1%
surprise innovation to total factor productivity. To highlight differences across regimes, Fig.
2.4 plots on the same graph both the IRFs from the exogenous policy case and the optimal
ones. The new variables in the system are the five fiscal policy instruments - capital and
labor taxes, as well as public investment (hence public capital), public wage rate and
39Given the absence of curvature in the model, the second-order approximation to the equilibrium system
of equations did not change results significantly.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under Ramsey policy
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under exogenous and
Ramsey policy
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public employment. By intervening in the public sector labor market, the benevolent govern-
ment can influence the private sector labor market, and thus affect the course of the economy.
In period 0, after the realization of the unexpected technology innovation, capital tax re-
mains unchanged.40 This result is in line with previous findings in the literature, e.g. Chari
and Kehoe (1994, 1999) who show that in a standard RBC model capital tax rate does
not respond to productivity shocks. In other words, the benevolent government would not
deviate from the optimal zero steady-state capital tax rate even in the face of uncertain
productivity shocks.41 Next, labor income tax rate increases upon the impact of the positive
surprise innovation in TFP and then slowly returns to its old steady-state; the substantial
persistence observed is in line with earlier studies (Chari and Kehoe, 1994, 1999). However,
due to the richer structure of the and endogenously-determined government spending, the
magnitude of the response in the labor tax is greater.
Furthermore, given that public spending categories are optimally chosen in this framework,
the setup generates much more interaction among the variables than does the standard RBC
model. For example, public investment increases substantially, as the government under the
Ramsey regime also chooses public capital and government services optimally. Next, as in
the exogenous policy case, public sector wages will increase more than the private sector
wage. The higher volatility in public wages, as discussed in earlier sections, is an artifact of
the presence of transaction costs from government work. The change in the public/private
wage ratio in turn triggers a reallocation of labor resources from the private to the public
sector. The net effect on labor supply, however, is negative, as the transaction cost friction
depresses the response of public hours. Next, the outflow of hours from the firm leads to
40At first glance the huge percentage deviation from the steady-state for capital tax can be misleading.
However, noting that the steady-state capital tax rate under Ramsey is τk = 2.58 × 10−12 ≈ 0, it follows
that the log-deviation from the steady-state is an extremely large number, as the denominator is close to
zero, even though the absolute value of change is tiny.
41This is also a result of the logarithmic specification of the household’s utility of consumption.
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an increase in the marginal product of capital, and hence the real interest rate increases.
However, from the complementarity between private labor and capital in the Cobb-Douglas
production function, private capital decreases. Therefore, due to the fall in the levels of the
two private inputs, output increases by less than the size of the technology shock.
In addition, given the jump in government investment, private consumption and invest-
ment fall upon the impact of the shock. Overall, the difference in the dynamics in the main
model variables under the Ramsey regime is due to the fact that the government chooses
the optimal levels of public hours and capital (and hence also public investment). Over
time, attracted by the above-steady-state real interest rate, more private investment is un-
dertaken by the government. In turn, private capital accumulation increases, and the usual
hump-shape dynamics appears. Higher capital input increases the marginal productivity
of labor, and private labor starts slowly to recover to its old steady-state. As time passes,
private consumption response also turns positive, and the shape if its response follows the
dynamic path of private capital. In general, positive innovations to TFP have a positive
effect on the economy. Additionally, there is a long-lasting internal propagation effect in
the economy. This is due to the fact that there are two labor markets featuring different
wage rates, and labor can flow between sectors in response to changes in the relative wage.
Moreover, there is complementarity between public hours and the public capital, which re-
inforces the complementarity between private and public consumption in the household’s
utility. The quantitative effect of public sector labor market, however, completely dominates
capital response in terms of the initial dynamics. Nevertheless, in the long-run, private capi-
tal accumulation effects becomes the dominant one, as dictated by the standard neoclassical
RBC model.
An interesting result is that a significant portion of the private gains are channeled to
the public sector in the form of higher public wage bill spending and public investment.
Indeed, in this model both categories are productive expenditures, as labor and capital are
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combined in the provision of the public good. Even though the household suffers a little
from the lower private consumption, this negative effect is overcompensated for through the
increase in leisure (as private hours fall by much more relative to the increase in private
hours), and a higher level of public good consumption. Overall, it takes more than 100 years
for all the model variables to return to their old steady states.
2.8 Limitations of the study
The analysis performed in this section was based on the strong assumption that the gov-
ernment budget is balanced every period and that the household can work in both sectors.
However, labor supply decision is done sequentially in the real world. A worker usually
decides on a sector first, and only then on the number of hours worked in the selected sector.
Furthermore, it is a stylized fact in labor data that most of the variations in hours worked
in data are driven by changes in employment rates rather than by changes in hours worked
per person. Thus, the model is too simple and cannot distinguish between employment and
hours per person in the two sectors. A possible extension, left for future research, is to setup
a model with heterogeneous-agents, who search for work according to a directed search pro-
cess,42 similar to that used in Gomes (2009, 2012).
Next, the model setup presented in this chapter abstracted away from debt issues, which
are important for modern economies. In models with full commitment, however, Stockman
(2001) has shown the presence of debt not to be relevant. Nevertheless, as a possible ex-
tension of the model, government bonds can be introduced, together with a long-run target
debt/GDP ratio that has to be met in the long-run. Studying the transitional dynamics of
the economic variables and the adjustment in the different of public finance categories, in the
presence of endogenous public hours and wages, is another promising avenue for future work.
42In particular, every agent searches for work only in one of the two sectors, and the sector is determined
from the realization of a stochastic process.
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Additionally, since the analysis focused on the long-run full commitment case, the setup
abstracted away from electoral uncertainty and thus ignores possible departures from the
full-commitment case. Across the political spectrum in most democratic societies, there are
different parties with diverse objectives that compete for the popularity vote at parliamen-
tary/presidential elections. In the model setup in this chapter, the benevolent government’s
utility function was assumed to coincide with that of the household. In reality, however,
a party’s utility function can be quite different when the party is in office, as compared to
the case when the party is in opposition, as suggested in Philippopoulos, Economides and
Malley (2004) and Malley, Philippopoulos and Woitek (2007). Different parties might have
different preferences for the level of public employment. In other words, jobs can be created
in the public sector to generate political support and increase the chances of re-election.
However, such considerations, as well as possible departures from the full commitment case,
and a focus on ”loose commitment” as in Debortoli and Nunes (2010), or time-consistent
policies as in Klein and Rios-Rull (2003), Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008) and Martin
(2010), will be put on the agenda for future research.
Lastly, aside from political considerations, the observed premium at macroeconomic level
is also likely to be a by-product of aggregation of microeconomic data. In the German
Socio-Economics Panel (SOEP), as well as in the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) database, for example, the age-skill profile of public employees is skewed to the left:
the average public employee is older, more skilled, more experienced, and tends to occupy
managerial positions as compared to his/her private sector counterpart. However, such dis-
tributional and occupational dimensions are outside the scope of a simple RBC model with
a representative household. Therefore, further work to endogeneize public wage premium,
perhaps within a heterogeneous-agents framework, needs to be undertaken.
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2.9 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter characterized optimal fiscal policy and evaluated it relative to the exogenous
(observed) one. The focus was on the labor market effects of fiscal policy in a model with
endogenously-determined public wages and hours, as well as labor-intensive government ser-
vices. To this end, a Real-Business-Cycle model, calibrated to German data (1970-2007),
was set up with a richer government spending side, and an endogenous private-public sector
labor choice. The latter was achieved by the inclusion of a transaction cost of government
work, generating a wedge between the marginal disutility of an hour worked in the public
and private sector, which is generally consistent with the evidence. This friction also helped
the framework to accommodate the different wage rates in the two labor markets. To illus-
trate the effects of fiscal policy, two regimes were compared and contrasted to one another
- exogenous vs. optimal (Ramsey) policy case, in terms of their long-run effects, as well as
in terms of the dynamics of the economy in response to technology shocks. The interaction
between the two labor markets was shown to be quantitatively important for both the short-
run model dynamics, as well as for the steady-state values of the allocations.
The main findings from the computational experiments performed in this chapter were:
(i) as in Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Zhu (1992), the optimal steady-state capital tax
rate is zero, as it is the most distortionary tax to use; (ii) Given a fixed level of government
transfers, a higher labor tax rate is needed to compensate for the loss in capital tax rev-
enue, despite the fact that the Ramsey planner chooses both components of the government
wage bill, as well as the level of investment optimally; (iii) Under the optimal policy regime,
public/private employment ratio is lower, while public/private wage rate is higher. In other
words, employment in the public sector should be diminished, but government employees
should receive better renumeration. (iv) The government wage bill is smaller, while public
investment is three times higher than in the exogenous policy case; (v) The government
chooses the optimal level of government services provided. Additionally, it substitutes labor
for capital in the input mix of both public good production and private output. In turn,
Chapter 2: Fiscal policy in a RBC model with with labor-intensive public services 149
this substitution makes government hours more valuable. All these result are in line with
Alesina (1997) and Alesina et al. (2002) who found that for OECD countries, fiscal adjust-
ments that rely on cuts in government wage bill produce a stimulus to the economy through
higher investment, and thus a leaner public sector creates an expansionary effect for the
economy.
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2.10 Technical Appendix
2.10.1 Optimality conditions
Firm’s problem
The profit function is maximized when the derivatives of that function are set to zero.
Therefore, the optimal amount of capital - holding the level of technology At and labor input
Npt constant - is determined by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to
Kpt equal to zero. This derivative is
(1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ − rt = 0 (2.10.1.1)
where (1 − θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ is the marginal product of capital because it expresses how
much output will increase if capital increases by one unit. The economic interpretation of
this First-Order Condition (FOC) is that in equilibrium, firms will rent capital up to the
point where the benefit of renting an additional unit of capital, which is the marginal product
of capital, equals the rental cost, i.e the interest rate.
rt = (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ (2.10.1.2)
Now, multiply by Kpt and rearrange terms. This gives the following relationship:
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ = rtKpt or (1− θ)Yt = rtKpt (2.10.1.3)
because
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ = At(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ = (1− θ)Yt
To derive firms’ optimal labor demand, set the derivative of the profit function with respect
to the labor input equal to zero, holding technology and capital constant:
θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1 − wpt = 0 or wpt = θAt(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ−1 (2.10.1.4)
In equilibrium, firms will hire labor up to the point where the benefit of hiring an additional
hour of labor services, which is the marginal product of labor, equals the cost, i.e the hourly
Chapter 2: Fiscal policy in a RBC model with with labor-intensive public services 151
wage rate.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Npt and rearrange terms to yield
Npt θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1 = wptN
p
t or θYt = w
p
tN
p
t (2.10.1.5)
Next, it will be shown that in equilibrium, economic profits are zero. Using the results above
one can obtain
Πt = Yt − rtKpt − wptNpt = Yt − (1− θ)Yt − θYt = 0 (2.10.1.6)
Indeed, in equilibrium, economic profits are zero.
Consumer problem
Set up the Lagrangian
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
{
ψ1 lnCt + ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
+ ψ3 lnS
g
t
+Λt
[
(1− τ lt )(wptNpt + wgtN gt ) + (1− τ kt )rtKpt +GTt − Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δ)Kpt
]}
(2.10.1.7)
This is a concave programming problem, so the FOCs, together with the additional, bound-
ary (”transversality”) conditions for private physical capital and government bonds are both
necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
To derive the FOCs, first take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Ct (holding all other
variables unchanged) and set it to 0, i.e. LCt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
ψ1
Ct
− Λt
}
= 0 or
ψ1
Ct
= Λt (2.10.1.8)
This optimality condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of
wealth.
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Now take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Kpt+1 (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LKpt+1 = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− Λt + EtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]}
= 0 (2.10.1.9)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
−Λt + βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= 0 (2.10.1.10)
Move Λt to the right so that
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (2.10.1.11)
Using the expression for the real interest rate shifted one period forward one can obtain
rt+1 = (1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
+ (1− δp)
]
= Λt (2.10.1.12)
This is the Euler equation, which determines how consumption is allocated across periods.
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Npt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNpt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt
}
= 0 (2.10.1.13)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt = 0 (2.10.1.14)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (2.10.1.15)
Plug in the expression for wht , that is,
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(2.10.1.16)
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into the equation above. Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )θ
Yt
Npt
(2.10.1.17)
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t N gt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNgt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2(1 + 2γN
g
t )
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
}
= 0 (2.10.1.18)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2(1 + 2γN
g
t )
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt = 0 (2.10.1.19)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2(1 + 2γN
g
t )
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt (2.10.1.20)
Transversality conditions need to be imposed to prevent Ponzi schemes, i.e borrowing bigger
and bigger amounts every subsequent period and never paying it off.
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0 (2.10.1.21)
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2.10.2 Per capita stationary DCE
Since the model in stationary and per capita terms by definition, there is no need to transform
the optimality conditions, i.e Zht = Zt = zt. The system of equations that describes the DCE
is as follows:
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ (2.10.2.1)
yt = ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δp)kpt + git (2.10.2.2)
ψ1
ct
= λt (2.10.2.3)
λt = βEtλt+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
]
(2.10.2.4)
ψ2
1− npt − ngt − γ(ngt )2
=
ψ1
ct
(1− τ l)θ yt
npt
(2.10.2.5)
ψ2
1− npt − ngt − γ(ngt )2
[1 + 2γngt ] =
ψ1
ct
(1− τ l)wgt (2.10.2.6)
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (2.10.2.7)
rt = (1− θ) yt
kpt
(2.10.2.8)
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(2.10.2.9)
gTt + g
i
t + w
g
tn
g
t = τ
krtk
p
t + τ
l
[
wptn
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t
]
. (2.10.2.10)
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (2.10.2.11)
git = g
iy
t yt (2.10.2.12)
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gTt = g
Ty
t yt (2.10.2.13)
sgt = (n
g
t )
α(kgt )
1−α (2.10.2.14)
Therefore, the DCE is summarized by Equations (2.10.2.1)-(2.10.2.14) in the paths of the
following 14 variables {yt, ct, it, kpt , kgt , git, gtt, npt , ngt , sgt , wpt , wgt , rt, λt}∞t=0 given the process fol-
lowed by total factor productivity {at}∞t=0, the values of government investment and govern-
ment transfers shares giy, gTy, and the fixed capital and labor tax rates {τ k, τ l}.
2.10.3 Steady-state
In steady-state, there is no uncertainty and variables do not change. Thus, eliminate all
stochasticity and time subscripts to obtain
y = a(kp)1−θ(np)θ (2.10.3.1)
y = c+ δpkp + gi (2.10.3.2)
ψ1
c
= λ (2.10.3.3)
1 = β
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
]
(2.10.3.4)
ψ2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 =
ψ1
c
(1− τ l)θ y
np
(2.10.3.5)
ψ2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 [1 + 2γn
g] =
ψ1
c
(1− τ l)wg (2.10.3.6)
ip = δpkp (2.10.3.7)
r = (1− θ) y
kp
(2.10.3.8)
wp = θ
y
np
(2.10.3.9)
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gT + gi + wgng = τ krkp + τ l
[
wpnp + wgng
]
. (2.10.3.10)
gi = δgkg (2.10.3.11)
gi = giyy (2.10.3.12)
gT = gTyy (2.10.3.13)
sg = (ng)α(kg)1−α (2.10.3.14)
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2.10.4 Log-linearization
Log-linearized production function
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ (2.10.4.1)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln yt = ln at + (1− θ) ln kpt + θ lnnpt (2.10.4.2)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln yt
dt
=
d ln at
dt
+ (1− θ)d ln k
p
t
dt
+ θ
d lnnpt
dt
(2.10.4.3)
1
y
dyt
dt
=
1
a
dat
dt
+
1− θ
kp
dkt
dt
+
θ
np
dnpt
dt
(2.10.4.4)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt (2.10.4.5)
Linearized market clearing
ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git = yt (2.10.4.6)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git] = ln(yt) (2.10.4.7)
Totally differentiate with respect to time
d ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git]
dt
= d ln(yt) (2.10.4.8)
1
c+ δkp + gc
[
dct
dt
c
c
+
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
− (1− δp)dk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
]
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(2.10.4.9)
Define zˆ = dzt
dt
1
z
. Thus passing to log-deviations
1
y
[
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit
]
= yˆt (2.10.4.10)
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit = yyˆt (2.10.4.11)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δ)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (2.10.4.12)
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Linearized FOC consumption
ψ1
ct
= λt (2.10.4.13)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnψ1 − ln(ct) = lnλt (2.10.4.14)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ1
dt
− d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(2.10.4.15)
or
−d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(2.10.4.16)
−dct
dt
1
c
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(2.10.4.17)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−cˆt = λˆt (2.10.4.18)
Linearized no-arbitrage condition for capital
λt = βEtλt+1[(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)] (2.10.4.19)
Substitute out rt+1 on the right hand side of the equation to obtain
λt = βEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (2.10.4.20)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnλt = lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (2.10.4.21)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnλt
dt
=
d lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ) yt+1kpt+1 + (1− δ
p)]
dt
(2.10.4.22)
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1
λ
dλt
dt
= Et
{
1
λ((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ) ykp + 1− δp
[
((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp)dλt+1
dt
λ
λ
+
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)
kp
dyt+1
dt
y
y
−
[
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
(kp)2
]
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
]}
(2.10.4.23)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
λˆt = Et
{
λˆt+1 +
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp yˆt+1
− (1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
((1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp kˆ
p
t+1
]}
(2.10.4.24)
Observe that
(1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp = 1/β (2.10.4.25)
Plug it into the equation to obtain
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
yˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
kˆpt+1
]
(2.10.4.26)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (2.10.4.27)
Linearized MRS(ct, n
p
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)θ
yt
npt
(2.10.4.28)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)θ
yt
npt
(2.10.4.29)
lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2] + ln(1− τ lt ) + ln yt − lnnpt
(2.10.4.30)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(2.10.4.31)
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1
c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + γ(nt)
2
]
dt
−dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(2.10.4.32)
dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(2.10.4.33)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt − nˆpt
(2.10.4.34)
Group terms to obtain
cˆt = − 1− n
g − γ(ng)2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt (2.10.4.35)
Linearized MRS(ct, n
g
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (2.10.4.36)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (2.10.4.37)
lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2] + ln(1− τ lt ) + lnwgt (2.10.4.38)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − γ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d lnwgt
dt
(2.10.4.39)
1
c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + γ(nt)
2
]
dt
− dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
dwgt
dt
1
wg
(2.10.4.40)
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dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
wg
dwgt
dt
(2.10.4.41)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + wˆ
g
t (2.10.4.42)
Linearized private physical capital accumulation
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (2.10.4.43)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kpt+1 = ln(it + (1− δp)kpt ) (2.10.4.44)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kpt+1
dt
=
1
i+ (1− δ)kp
d(it + (1− δp)kpt )
dt
(2.10.4.45)
Observe that since
i = δpkp, it follows that i+ (1− δp)kp = δpkp + (1− δp)kp = kp. (2.10.4.46)
Then
dkpt+1
dt
1
kp
=
1
kp
dit
dt
i
i
+
kp
i+ (1− δp)kpt
dkpt
dt
kp
kp
(2.10.4.47)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆpt+1 =
δpkp
kp
iˆt +
(1− δp)kp
kp
kˆpt (2.10.4.48)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (2.10.4.49)
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Linearized government physical capital accumulation
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (2.10.4.50)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kgt+1 = ln(g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt ) (2.10.4.51)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kgt+1
dt
=
1
gi + (1− δg)kg
d(it + (1− δg)kgt )
dt
(2.10.4.52)
Observe that since
gi = δgkg, it follows that gi + (1− δg)kg = δgkg + (1− δg)kg = kg. (2.10.4.53)
Then
dkgt+1
dt
1
kg
=
1
kg
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
kg
i + (1− δg)kgt
dkgt
dt
kg
kg
(2.10.4.54)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆgt+1 =
δgkg
kg
gˆit +
(1− δp)kg
kg
kˆgt (2.10.4.55)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (2.10.4.56)
Linearized government budget constraint
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git = τ kt rtkt + τ ltwptnpt . (2.10.4.57)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
= ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (2.10.4.58)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d
dt
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
=
d
dt
ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (2.10.4.59)
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or
1
(1− τ l)wgng + gi
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
1[
τ krk + τ lwpnp
] d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
.
(2.10.4.60)
Note that
(1− τ l)wgng + gi = τ krk + τ lwpnp (2.10.4.61)
Hence
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
. (2.10.4.62)
or
−wgng dτ
l
t
dt
τ l
τ l
+ (1− τ l)ng dw
g
t
dt
wg
wg
+ (1− τ l)wg dn
g
t
dt
ng
ng
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
= rk
dτ kt
dt
τ k
τ k
+ τ kk
drt
dt
r
r
+ τ kr
dkt
dt
k
k
+ wpnp
dτ lt
dt
+ τ lnp
dwpt
dt
wp
wp
+ τ lwp
dnpt
dt
np
np
(2.10.4.63)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (2.10.4.64)
Total hours/employment
nt = n
g
t + n
p
t (2.10.4.65)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnnt = ln(n
g
t + n
p
t ) (2.10.4.66)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d lnnt
dt
=
d ln(ngt + n
p
t )
dt
(2.10.4.67)
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dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
+
dnpt
dt
)
1
n
(2.10.4.68)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
ng
ng
+
dnpt
dt
np
np
)
1
n
(2.10.4.69)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
ng
n
+
dnpt
dt
1
np
np
n
(2.10.4.70)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆt =
ng
n
nˆgt +
np
n
nˆpt (2.10.4.71)
Linearized private wage rate
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(2.10.4.72)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnwpt = ln θ + ln yt − lnnpt (2.10.4.73)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwpt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(2.10.4.74)
Simplify to obtain
dwpt
dt
1
wp
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(2.10.4.75)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (2.10.4.76)
Linearized real interest rate
rt = θ
yt
kpt
(2.10.4.77)
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Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rt = ln θ + ln yt − ln kpt (2.10.4.78)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d ln k
p
t
dt
(2.10.4.79)
Simplify to obtain
dr
dt
1
r
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dk
p
t
dt
1
kp
(2.10.4.80)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (2.10.4.81)
Linearized government investment
git = g
iyyt (2.10.4.82)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln git = ln g
iy + ln yt (2.10.4.83)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln git
dt
=
d ln giy
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(2.10.4.84)
or
dgit
dt
1
gi
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(2.10.4.85)
Passing to log-deviations
gˆit = yˆt (2.10.4.86)
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Linearized government transfers
gTt = g
Tyyt (2.10.4.87)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln gTt = ln g
Ty + ln yt (2.10.4.88)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gTt
dt
=
d ln gTy
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(2.10.4.89)
or
dgTt
dt
1
gT
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(2.10.4.90)
Passing to log-deviations
gˆTt = yˆt (2.10.4.91)
Linearized government services
sgt = (n
g
t )
α(kgt )
(1−α) (2.10.4.92)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln sgt = α lnn
g
t + (1− α) ln kgt (2.10.4.93)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
dsgt
dt
1
sg
= α
dngt
dt
1
ng
+ (1− α)dk
g
t
dt
1
kg
(2.10.4.94)
sˆgt = αnˆ
g
t + (1− α)kˆgt (2.10.4.95)
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Linearized technology shock process
ln at+1 = ρ
a ln at + 
a
t+1 (2.10.4.96)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln at+1
dt
= ρa
d ln at
dt
+
dat+1
dt
(2.10.4.97)
dat+1
dt
= ρa
dat
dt
+ at+1 (2.10.4.98)
where for t = 1
dat+1
dt
≈ ln(eat+1/ea) = at+1 − a = at+1 since a = 0. Pass to log-deviations
to obtain
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (2.10.4.99)
2.10.5 Log-linearized DCE system
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt (2.10.5.1)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δp)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (2.10.5.2)
−cˆt = λˆt (2.10.5.3)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (2.10.5.4)
cˆt = − 1− n
g − γ(ng)2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + yˆt (2.10.5.5)
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t (2.10.5.6)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (2.10.5.7)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (2.10.5.8)
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−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (2.10.5.9)
gˆit = yˆt (2.10.5.10)
gˆtt = yˆt (2.10.5.11)
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (2.10.5.12)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (2.10.5.13)
sˆgt = αnˆ
g
t + (1− α)kˆgt (2.10.5.14)
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (2.10.5.15)
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The model can be now solved by representing it in the following matrix form
AEtxˆt+1 = Bxˆt + CEtεt+1, (2.10.5.16)
where A,B,C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked
vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control vari-
ables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt gˆ
T
t gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000) generalized
eigenvalue (”Schur”) decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. The MATLAB
function to solve the above linear system is solab.m. The inputs are matrices A,B,C defined
above and nk = 3, which is the number of state variables. The outputs are the coefficient
matrices M and Π which solve the linearized system. A solution to an RBC model is in the
form of (approximate) policy, or transition rule, which describes the evolution of each vari-
able. In particular, the predetermined and non-predetermined variables can be represented
in the following form:
Etsˆt+1 = Πsˆt (2.10.5.17)
zˆt = M sˆt (2.10.5.18)
To simulate the model, one requires a sequence of normally distributed disturbances, {t}∞t=0
for the three exogenous shocks with sample size T , the initial values of the endogenous
predetermined variables, {kp0, kg0 , a0} (a0 = 1), and the evolution of the endogenous non-
predetermined variables in model solution form
sˆt+1 = Πsˆt + Dεt+1 (2.10.5.19)
zˆt = Msˆt, (2.10.5.20)
where
D =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 (2.10.5.21)
Based on the above representation, MATLAB code was written to simulate the model. The
computation of impulse responses using the linearized model solution is straightforward.
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2.10.6 The effect of a positive TFP shock: robustness check
Given the quantitative importance of the new parameter γ for the steady-state values of
the model variables, this subsection will examine the relevance of the transaction cost scale
parameter for the transitional dynamics. The experiment in the next subsection will focus
on the effect of a change in the transaction cost parameter γ on impulse responses.43 When
the value of the transaction cost parameter is changed, public sector labor variables are
affected significantly. Other variables show no visible difference in terms of their impulse
responses, and are thus not pictured in Fig. 2.5 on the next page. A higher transaction cost
in the government sector is quantitatively important, as it affects the shape of the reaction
function of public employment (hence total employment as well) and wage rate, as well as
the level of public services provided, to unexpected technology innovation.
In particular, a higher value of γ significantly dampens public employment response in the
face of a surprise TFP shock. For example, a higher transaction cost increases the disutility
of work in the public section very quickly, which makes the household unwilling to reallocate
hours between government work and leisure, as well as between the public and private sector
work. Total employment, being a sum of private and public employment, is affected in a
similar fashion. However, given the fact that private employment drives the dynamics of
total employment, the quantitative effect of γ on the latter is rather small. Still, doubling
the value of γ relative to the benchmark case produces a notable difference in the impulse
responses that is present for more than 40 model years.
Next, through the mechanics of the public good production function, the dynamics of gov-
ernment services will be depressed as well. Since the impulse response of the public good
provision depends on public hours and public capital, and given the fact that capital does not
respond to changes in γ, the reaction in government services is proportional to the reaction
43Note that different values of γ produce different steady-states. Thus, in what follows, variables fluctuate
around different equilibria.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses: Sensitivity Analysis
Chapter 2: Fiscal policy in a RBC model with with labor-intensive public services 172
in public hours (artifact of the linearization procedure implemented to solve the model). In
particular, the coefficient of proportionality equals the labor share α in the public sector.
Finally, the increase in transaction cost parameter γ above the benchmark calibration value
strengthens the response of public wages upon the impact of the total factor productivity
shock. The quantitative effect, however, is not large. Nevertheless, by driving the scale pa-
rameter down to zero, the government could decrease public wage volatility by a factor of two.
Overall, the small experiment performed in this section suggests that changes in γ parameter
could significantly affect relative volatilities of public sector labor market variables as well.
In particular, an increase in the transaction cost is expected to increase the relative volatility
of the public wage rate, and decrease public employment variability. These conjectures are
investigated further in the simulation section that follows.
2.10.7 Model simulation and goodness-of-fit
Using the model solutions, shock series were added to produce simulated data series. The
length of the draws for the series of innovations is 138, and the simulation is replicated
1000 times. Natural logarithms are taken, and then all series are run through the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 100. The first 100 observations are then
excluded to decrease any dependence on the initial realizations of the innovations. Average
standard deviation of each variable and its correlation of output of are estimated across the
1000 replications.The large number of replications implemented is to average out sampling
error across simulations, before comparing model moments to the ones obtained from data.
Relative second moments evaluation
This section compares the theoretical second moments of the simulated data series with their
empirical counterparts, with special attention paid to the behavior of public sector hours
and wages. Table 2.4 on the next page summarizes the empirical and simulated business
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cycle statistics for the model calibrated for Germany.
Table 2.4: Business Cycle Statistics Germany, 1970-2007
GE Data Model
σ(y) 0.0154 0.0144
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 0.55 [0.52,0.58]
σ(i)/σ(y) 3.57 3.00 [2.94,3.07]
σ(np)/σ(y) 1.05 0.26 [0.25,0.28]
σ(ng)/σ(y) 1.06 2.25 [2.24,2.26]
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.73 0.54 [0.53,0.55]
σ(wp)/σ(y) 1.16 0.77 [0.76,0.79]
σ(wg)/σ(y) 3.50 1.41 [1.40,1.42]
corr(c, y) 0.80 0.96 [0.95,0.97]
corr(i, y) 0.85 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(np, y) 0.60 0.90 [0.86,0.94]
corr(ng, y) 0.11 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, y) 0.60 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(wp, y) 0.60 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
corr(wg, y) 0.35 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, np) 0.92 0.97 [0.96,0.98]
corr(n, ng) 0.43 0.99 [0.98, 0.99]
corr(np, ng) 0.12 0.92 [0.88,0.95]
corr(np, wp) 0.21 0.83 [0.76,0.89]
corr(ng, wg) -0.38 0.99 [0.99,1.00]
corr(wp, wg) 0.48 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
In the German data, relative consumption volatility exceeds one, as the available series does
not provide a breakdown into consumption of non-durables and consumption of durables.
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Another possible reason could be the presence of strong habits in consumption. Durable
products behave like investment, and vary much more than non-durables, while model con-
sumption corresponds to non-durable consumption. Since a major force in all the three mod-
els is consumption smoothing, as dictated by the Euler equation, the model under-predicts
consumption volatility and investment variability. The lower variability in the model ob-
tained is a new result in the literature. It is due to the fact that labor markets interaction
are much more important quantitatively for the short-run dynamics of the model. After all,
the simulation horizon in the annual model is only 38 periods, given the span of data.
In terms of labor market fluctuations, private sector employment and private wage in the
model also vary less compared to data. Total employment in German data varies less than
either private or public employment due to smaller variation in the number of self-employed
individuals. It is evident from Table 2.4 on the previous page that the model underestimates
public wage volatility. Still, this simple model generates public wage that varies twice as
much as the private sector wage. Therefore, the introduction of the transaction cost in this
chapter is definitely a step in the right direction. However, public employment in the model
varies too much in the model, as compared to the volatility exhibited in German data. Over-
all, the transaction cost mechanism presented in this chapter seems to have an important
quantitative effect in the German economy, especially when describing public sector labor
market fluctuations.
The model also captures relatively well the high contemporaneous correlations of main vari-
ables with output. Moreover, public sector variables are also pro-cyclical, but not as much
as the models predict. Lastly, the model captures quite well the co-movement between labor
market variables. The dimension where the model fails, however, is the correlation between
public sector hours and wages: in German data, it is negative, while the model predicts an
almost perfect positive linear relationship. A possible reason could be that the government
may have a target for the wage bill share in output, so any increase in employment has to be
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matched with a corresponding decrease in the public sector wage rate. A fiscal rule of that
sort (e.g. as in Economides et al. 2011) could generate the observed negative correlation in
data.44
Overall, the model with transaction cost captures relatively well the labor market dynamics
in Germany. Furthermore, the setup addresses dimensions that were ignored in earlier RBC
models. Thus, the existence of such frictions in the public sector proves to be an important
ingredient in RBC models when studying German labor markets.
Sensitivity Analysis
The results from the analysis performed so far are all contingent on the particular values
of the parameters in the model calibration. Even though the benchmark calibration was
justified either from previous studies, or from data averages, there might be still concerns
that the results are sensitive to particular values chosen for the parameters. First, there
are no previous studies and estimates of the scale parameter of the transaction cost. The
problem in the model in this chapter was avoided by setting γ to match the average pub-
lic/private wage ratio. It was shown that a change in the transaction cost parameter affects
impulse responses of the public sector labor variables. Thus, it will be investigate further
whether this result shows up in the relative second moments of public wage and hours as well.
Second, there might be uncertainties about the relative weights on different components
of utility. Since there are limited micro econometric studies and no reliable estimates, the
model was made consistent with the assumption used in the RBC literature that private
consumption is twice more valuable than public consumption in household’s utility, and that
the household puts twice higher weight on utility from leisure as compared to utility derived
44However, Economides et al. (2011) model government wage bill share in output as a stochastic process.
In addition, public employment is also fixed. Public sector workers choose their working hours, and public
sector wage is determined residually from the wage bill. Thus, the correlation between hours and wages is
matched by construction, and not due to any interesting mechanism in the model.
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from private consumption. Again, the empirical evidence for those assumptions is scarce.
In light of the limited empirical evidence and/or conflicting studies, those parameters will
be allowed to deviate significantly from their benchmark values. In the following, robust-
ness checks will be performed with the value of the transaction cost parameter, as well as
with the utility weights attached to leisure and public services. Relative second moments
and contemporaneous correlations with output will be compared across cases, and compared
against the benchmark calibration and data.
The simulated sample second moments generated by a lower (γ = 0) and higher (γ = 10)
transaction cost scale parameter are reported in Table 2.5 on the next page against German
data. As expected, the only significant changes are in the relative volatility of public em-
ployment and government wages. In line with the evidence from the earlier section dealing
with impulse responses, higher transaction costs lead to lower variability in public hours,
but higher volatility in government wages. In both cases, a higher γ brings simulated mo-
ments a bit closer to the moments in data. Nevertheless, no significant changes in terms of
correlation are observed.
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Table 2.5: Moments of the model and data (alternative transaction cost parameter)
GE Data γ = 0 γ = 2.5762 γ = 10
σ(y) 0.0154 0.0142 0.0144 0.0145
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 0.55 [0.52,0.57] 0.55 [0.52,0.58] 0.55 [0.52,0.58]
σ(i)/σ(y) 3.57 3.01 [2.94,3.07] 3.00 [2.94,3.07] 3.00 [2.93,3.06]
σ(np)/σ(y) 1.05 0.24 [0.24,0.25] 0.26 [0.25,0.28] 0.27 [0.26,0.27]
σ(ng)/σ(y) 1.06 3.61 [3.59,3.62] 2.25 [2.24,2.26] 1.68 [1.67,1.69]
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.73 0.72 [0.70,0.73] 0.54 [0.53,0.55] 0.46 [0.45,0.47]
σ(wp)/σ(y) 1.16 0.79 [0.77,0.81] 0.77 [0.76,0.79] 0.77 [0.75,0.79]
σ(wg)/σ(y) 3.50 0.79 [0.77,0.81] 1.41 [1.40,1.42] 1.49 [1.48,1.50]
corr(c, y) 0.80 0.96 [0.95,0.97] 0.96 [0.95,0.97] 0.96 [0.95,0.97]
corr(i, y) 0.85 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(np, y) 0.60 0.88 [0.84,0.93] 0.90 [0.86,0.94] 0.90 [0.87,0.94]
corr(ng, y) 0.11 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, y) 0.60 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.97 [0.96,0.98]
corr(wp, y) 0.60 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
corr(wg, y) 0.35 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, np) 0.92 0.95 [0.93,0.97] 0.97 [0.96,0.98] 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(n, ng) 0.43 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.98 [0.98, 0.99]
corr(np, ng) 0.12 0.90 [0.86,0.94] 0.92 [0.88,0.95] 0.92 [0.89,0.95]
corr(np, wp) 0.21 0.81 [0.74,0.87] 0.83 [0.76,0.89] 0.83 [0.77,0.89]
corr(ng, wg) -0.38 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 1.00 [0.99,1.00]
corr(wp, wg) 0.48 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
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Next, the results from simulations using higher- (ψ1/ψ3 = 3) and lower ratios (ψ1/ψ3 = 1.5)
are reported in Table 2.6 on the next page. These two alternative calibrations are compared
against the benchmark values and data. As ψ3 increases, public good consumption becomes
more valuable relative to the private consumption good. In addition, given the fixed value of
the utility weight attached to the latter (ψ1), the weight attached to leisure (ψ2) decreases.
The fall in ψ2 makes private consumption more valuable relative to leisure. Therefore, hours
will be expected to vary less, as leisure becomes a less important component of household’s
welfare. Indeed, as a result of the change in utility parameters, absolute output volatility, as
well as relative public and total hours slightly fall, while private and public wage volatility
increase a bit. However, the differences in volatilities are minute. Furthermore, there is no
change in the other variables: consumption and investment vary the same across the three
cases, and all contemporaneous correlations are virtually the same.
In summary, the sensitivity analysis performed above considered significant variations in
the values chosen for some of the model parameters, i.e., varying the scale parameter of the
transaction cost function, or changing the weights on household’s utility and thus affecting
the preference for the mix of the private and the public consumption good. It was shown that
the transaction cost scale parameter, γ, has important quantitative role in the model, as an
increase in the level of transaction costs increases the relative volatility of public, and total
hours, while depressing public wage rates. However, since γ was calibrated to match the
average public/private wage ratio in data, those effects are not relevant in the current setup.
In addition, changes in utility weights proved to be of no quantitative importance. Thus
the benchmark model could be considered a plausible case which adequately approximates
household’s preferences in the real world. Furthermore, the model was shown to be robust to
such changes in the preferences for consumption relative to leisure. In other words, there is
no significant undervaluation or overvaluation of components of utility, and the public good
in particular.
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Table 2.6: Moments of the model and data (alternative utility parameters)
Germany ψ2 = 0.59 ψ2 = 0.53 ψ2 = 0.49
Data ψ3 = 0.10 ψ3 = 0.16 ψ3 = 0.20
σ(y) 0.0154 0.0147 0.0144 0.0144
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 0.55 [0.52,0.57] 0.55 [0.52,0.58] 0.55 [0.52,0.58]
σ(i)/σ(y) 3.57 3.01 [2.94,3.08] 3.00 [2.94,3.07] 3.00 [2.94,3.07]
σ(np)/σ(y) 1.05 0.28 [0.27,0.29] 0.26 [0.25,0.28] 0.26 [0.25,0.28]
σ(ng)/σ(y) 1.06 2.27 [2.25,2.28] 2.25 [2.24,2.26] 2.25 [2.24,2.26]
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.73 0.56 [0.54,0.57] 0.54 [0.53,0.55] 0.54 [0.53,0.55]
σ(wp)/σ(y) 1.16 0.76 [0.74,0.77] 0.77 [0.76,0.79] 0.77 [0.76,0.79]
σ(wg)/σ(y) 3.50 1.40 [1.38,1.41] 1.41 [1.40,1.42] 1.41 [1.40,1.42]
corr(c, y) 0.80 0.96 [0.95,0.97] 0.96 [0.95,0.97] 0.96 [0.95,0.97]
corr(i, y) 0.85 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(np, y) 0.60 0.91 [0.87,0.94] 0.90 [0.86,0.94] 0.90 [0.86,0.94]
corr(ng, y) 0.11 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, y) 0.60 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
corr(wp, y) 0.60 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
corr(wg, y) 0.35 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(n, np) 0.92 0.97 [0.96,0.98] 0.97 [0.96,0.98] 0.97 [0.96,0.98]
corr(n, ng) 0.43 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.99 [0.98, 0.99]
corr(np, ng) 0.12 0.92 [0.88,0.95] 0.92 [0.88,0.95] 0.92 [0.88,0.95]
corr(np, wp) 0.21 0.83 [0.77,0.89] 0.83 [0.76,0.89] 0.83 [0.76,0.89]
corr(ng, wg) -0.38 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 0.99 [0.99,1.00]
corr(wp, wg) 0.48 1.00 [0.99,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
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2.10.8 Ramsey problem derivation
In this section, the public finance approach, pioneered by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) in
a static context with many consumption goods, is applied here in a dynamic setting with
a single consumption good. In particular, the intertemporal framework, as first outlined
in Ramsey (1927), will consist of a social planner (government), who desires to maximizes
agent’s utility subject to the constraints that describe the competitive economy. In other
words, in the optimal fiscal policy (Ramsey) framework, the government assumes the role of
a benevolent planner, who takes into account that the representative household and the firm
behave in their own best interest, taking fiscal policy variables as given. The instruments
under government’s control in this section are labor and capital tax rates, next-period public
capital, public employment and public sector wage rate. It is assumed that only linear taxes
are allowed, and that the government can credibly commit to those. Importantly, lump-sum
taxation is prohibited, as the professional literature assumes that the government cannot
redistribute income lump-sum. Thus, given the restriction to a set of linear distortionary
tax rates, only a second-best outcome is feasible. However, the emphasis on the second-best
theory makes the setup more realistic, and thus can be taken as a better approximation to
the environment in which policymakers decide on a particular fiscal policy.
Another assumption crucial to the Ramsey approach is that the activities of all agents
in the economy are observable, as information in this setup is perfect. Lastly, the govern-
ment has access to a commitment technology, which effectively will tie its own hands and
prevent it from reneging on an initially-made promise at a later point in time. Thus, in
the full-commitment scenario, the time inconsistency problem, as described by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), cannot arise; The government will made a ”once-and-for-all” decision in
period 0 and no further re-optimization will be allowed. In fact, under full commitment,
such re-optimization will never be desired by the government: whatever policy is announced
by the government in period 0 is the one that is implemented afterwards.
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It is important to emphasize that each set of fiscal policy instruments implies a feasible
allocation that fully reflects the optimal behavioral responses of the household and firm.
Alternatively, each set of fiscal policy instruments can be thought of generating a different
competitive equilibrium allocation, i.e. allocations and prices are contingent on the partic-
ular values chosen for the fiscal instruments. The difference from the analysis performed so
far in the chapter, is that in Ramsey framework, the government chooses all instruments,
instead of taking them as being exogenous. At the same time, the government also picks
optimally the allocations of agents, as dictated by the dual approach to the Ramsey problem
as in Chamley (1986).45 It will also be assumed that the government discounts time at the
same rate as the representative household. The constraints which the government takes into
account when maximizing household’s welfare include the government budget constraints,
and the behavioral responses of both the household, and the firm. These are summarized
in the DCE of the exogenous fiscal policy case (2.10.2.1)-(2.10.2.14).46 In other words, in
the dual approach of Ramsey problem, which will be utilized in this section, the choice vari-
ables for the government are {Ct, Npt , N gt , Kpt+1, Kgt+1, wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 plus the two tax rates
{τ lt , τ kt }∞t=0.47 The initial conditions for the state variable {Kp0 , Kg0} is taken as given.
Following the procedure in Chamley (1986) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the Ramsey
problem will be transformed and simplified, so that the government chooses after-tax interest
rate r˜t and wage rates w˜
p
t and w˜
p
t directly, instead of setting tax rates and prices separately,
where
r˜t ≡ (1− τ kt )rt (2.10.8.1)
w˜pt ≡ (1− τ lt )wpt (2.10.8.2)
w˜gt ≡ (1− τ lt )wgt . (2.10.8.3)
45In contrast, the primal approach all the policy variables and prices are solved as functions of the alloca-
tions, thus the government decides only on the optimal allocation.
46Stockman (2001) shows that the absence of debt and thus the inability of the government to run surpluses
and deficits has no dramatic effect on the optimal policies in the full commitment case.
47Note that by choosing next-period public capital, the planner is choosing public investment optimally.
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Next, the government budget constraint is rewritten as follows
τ kt rtK
p
t + τ
l
tw
p
tN
p
t =
rtK
p
t − (1− τ kt )rtKpt + wptNpt − (1− τ lt )wptNpt =
(1− τ lt )wgtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt . (2.10.8.4)
From the constant-returns-to-scale production function it follows that
rtK
p
t + w
p
tN
p
t = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ. (2.10.8.5)
Substitute out the identities above into the government budget constraint and using the
after-tax prices, the transformed government budget constraint becomes
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt . (2.10.8.6)
Once the optimal after-tax returns are solved for, the expression for the before-tax real in-
terest rate and private wage can be obtained from the DCE system. Solving for optimal
capital and labor tax rates is then trivial.
The transformed Ramsey problem then becomes:
max
Ct,N
p
t ,N
g
t ,K
p
t+1,K
g
t+1,w˜
p
t ,w˜
g
t ,r˜t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψ1 lnCt + ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
+(1− ψ1 − ψ2) ln
[
(N gt )
α(Kgt )
1−α
]}
(2.10.8.7)
s.t
1
Ct
= βEt
1
Ct+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
]
(2.10.8.8)
ψ2Ct = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wpt (2.10.8.9)
ψ2Ct[1 + 2γN
g
t ] = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wgt (2.10.8.10)
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
(1−θ) = Ct +K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Kpt+1 − (1− δp)Kpt (2.10.8.11)
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At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt (2.10.8.12)
Kpt+1 = It + (1− δp)Kpt (2.10.8.13)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
(2.10.8.14)
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(2.10.8.15)
Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α) (2.10.8.16)
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt (2.10.8.17)
The Lagrangian function of the government thus becomes
Lg(Ct, Npt , N gt , Kpt+1, Kgt+1, w˜pt , w˜gt , r˜t, λ1t , λ2t , λ3t , λ4t , λ5t ) =
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψ1 lnCt + ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
+(1− ψ1 − ψ2) ln
[
(N gt )
α(Kgt )
1−α
]
+λ1t
[
− Ct+1 + βCt(1 + r˜t+1 − δg)
]
+λ2t
[
ψ2Ct − ψ1[1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2]w˜pt
]
+λ3t
[
ψ2Ct[1 + 2γN
g
t ]− ψ1[1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt ]2)w˜gt
]
+λ4t
[
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
(1−θ) + (1− δp)Kpt − Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δp)Kgt −Kgt+1
]
+λ5t
[
At(Nt)
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt − w˜gtN gt −Kgt+1 + (1− δg)Kgt +GTt
]}
(2.10.8.18)
where λit, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with each constraint. FOCs:
Ct :
ψ1
Ct
+ λ1tβ(1 + r˜t+1 − δp) +
λ1t−1
β
+ λ2tψ2 + λ3ψ2[1 + 2γN
g
t ]− λ4t = 0 (2.10.8.19)
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Npt :
ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
= λ2tψ1w˜
p
t + λ
3
tψ1w˜
g
t + λ
4
t θ
Yt
Npt
+ λ5t [θ
Yt
Npt
− w˜pt ]
(2.10.8.20)
N gt :
ψ2
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
[1 + 2γN gt ] =
λ2tψ1(1 + 2γN
g
t )w˜
p
t + 2γλ
3
tψ2Ct + λ
3
tψ1(1 + 2γN
g
t )w˜
g
t − λ5t w˜gt (2.10.8.21)
Kpt+1 : −λ4t−1 + βλ4t [(1− θ)
Yt
Kpt
+ 1− δp] + βλ5t [(1− θ)
Yt
Kpt
− r˜t] = 0 (2.10.8.22)
Kgt+1 : −
β(1− ψ1 − ψ2)(1− α)
Kgt+1
− λ4t − λ5t + β(1− δg)(λ4t+1 + λ5t+1) = 0 (2.10.8.23)
w˜pt : −λ2tψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
− λ5tNpt = 0 (2.10.8.24)
w˜gt : −λ3tψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
− λ5tN gt = 0 (2.10.8.25)
r˜t : λ
1
t−1Ct−1 = λ
5
tK
p
t (2.10.8.26)
λ1t :
1
Ct
= βEt
1
Ct+1
[
1− δp + r˜t+1
]
(2.10.8.27)
λ2t : ψ2Ct = ψ1(1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2)w˜pt (2.10.8.28)
λ3t : ψ2Ct[1 + 2γN
g
t ] = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt − γ(N gt )2
]
w˜gt (2.10.8.29)
λ4t : At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
(1−θ) = Ct +K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Kpt+1 − (1− δp)Kpt (2.10.8.30)
λ5t : At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt (2.10.8.31)
It = K
p
t+1 − (1− δ)Kpt (2.10.8.32)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
(2.10.8.33)
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wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(2.10.8.34)
Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α) (2.10.8.35)
Git = K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt (2.10.8.36)
In contrast to previous studies, e.g. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994, 1999), who inves-
tigate the behavior of taxes over the business cycle, next section will concentrate on the
steady-state values of the fiscal policy instruments, as in Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).48
48In addition, in business cycles literature, capital tax rate is on average zero, and labor income tax rate
is essentially constant over the cycle. As noted by Wyplosz (2001), since the 1980s, the countercyclical use
of fiscal policies in OECD countries has declined.
Chapter 2: Fiscal policy in a RBC model with with labor-intensive public services 186
2.10.9 Steady state analysis of Ramsey equilibrium
In this section, the focus is on the long-run effect of optimal government behavior. Thus, all
time subscripts and uncertainty are eliminated to obtain:
ψ1
c
+ λ1β(1 + r˜ − δ) + λ
1
β
+ λ2ψ2 + λ3ψ2[1 + 2γn
g]− λ4 = 0 (2.10.9.1)
ψ2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 = λ
2ψ1w˜
p + λ3ψ1w˜
g + λ4θ
y
np
+ λ5[θ
y
np
− w˜p] (2.10.9.2)
ψ2
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 [1 + 2γn
g] = λ2tψ1(1 + 2γn
g)w˜p
+2γλ3ψ2c+ λ
3ψ1(1 + 2γn
g)w˜g − λ5w˜g (2.10.9.3)
−λ4 + βλ4[(1− θ)y
k
+ 1− δ] + βλ5[(1− θ)y
k
− r˜] = 0 (2.10.9.4)
−β(1− ψ1 − ψ2)(1− α)
kg
− λ4 − λ5 + β(1− δg)(λ4 + λ5) = 0 (2.10.9.5)
−λ2ψ1[1− np − ng − γ(ng)2]− λ5np = 0 (2.10.9.6)
−λ3ψ1[1− np − ng − γ(ng)2]− λ5ng = 0 (2.10.9.7)
λ1c = λ5kp (2.10.9.8)
1 = β[1− δp + r˜] (2.10.9.9)
ψ2c = ψ1[1− np − ng − γ(ng)2]w˜p (2.10.9.10)
ψ2c[1 + 2γn
g] = ψ1[1− np − ng − γ(ng)2]w˜g (2.10.9.11)
y = c+ δgkg + δpkp (2.10.9.12)
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y − r˜kp − w˜pnp = w˜gng + δgkg + gT (2.10.9.13)
i = δpkp (2.10.9.14)
r = (1− θ) y
kp
(2.10.9.15)
wp = θ
y
np
(2.10.9.16)
gi = δgkg (2.10.9.17)
Next, an important analytical result in the optimal policy framework will be demonstrated:
First, simplify the FOC for private capital (2.10.9.4) to obtain
λ4 = βλ4[(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp] + βλ5[(1− θ) y
kp
− r˜t]. (2.10.9.18)
Next, substitute out the expression for the interest rate from (2.10.9.9) into (2.10.9.18) to
obtain
λ4 = βλ
4[r + (1− δ)] + βλ5[r − r˜]. (2.10.9.19)
Now plug in the expression for (1− δ) from (2.10.9.9) into (2.10.9.19) to obtain
λ4[1− β(r + 1
β
− r˜)] = βλ5[r − r˜], (2.10.9.20)
or
−λ4β[r − r˜] = βλ5[r − r˜]. (2.10.9.21)
Hence
(λ4 + λ5)[r − r˜] = 0. (2.10.9.22)
Since λ4, λ5 > 0 by construction, it follows that r˜ = r. Therefore, in steady-state Ramsey
equilibrium, the optimal steady-state capital tax is zero. This result is consistent with earlier
findings in Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, 2013)
and Kocherlakota (2010).
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2.10.10 Measuring conditional welfare
In steady state
u(c, 1− n) = ψ1 ln c+ ψ2 ln[1− np − ng − γ(ng)2] + ψ3 ln(ng)α(kg)(1−α). (2.10.10.1)
Let A and B denote two different regimes. The welfare gain, ξ, is the fraction of consumption
that is needed to complement household’s steady-state consumption in regime B so that the
household is indifferent between the two regimes. Thus
ψ1 ln c
A + ψ2 ln(1− nA − γ(ng,A)2) + ψ3 ln(ng,A)α + ψ3 ln(kg,A)(1−α) =
ψ1 ln[(1 + ξ)c
B] + ψ2 ln(1− nB − γ(ng,B)2) + ψ3 ln(ng,B)α + ψ3 ln(kg,B)(1−α),
(2.10.10.2)
where nA = np,A + ng,A and nB = np,B + ng,B.
Next, expand the right-hand side to obtain
ψ1 ln c
A + ψ2 ln(1− nA − γ(ng,A)2) + ψ3 ln(ng,A)α + ψ3 ln(kg,A)(1−α) = ψ1(1 + ξ)
+ψ1 ln c
B + ψ2 ln(1− nB − γ(ng,B)2) + ψ3 ln(ng,B)α + ψ3 ln(kg,B)(1−α).
(2.10.10.3)
Rearrange to obtain
ψ1 ln(1 + ξ) = ψ1 ln c
A + ψ2 ln(1− nA − γ(ng,A)2) + ψ3 ln(ng,A)α
+ψ3 ln(k
g,A)(1−α) − ψ1 ln cB − ψ2 ln(1− nB − γ(ng,B)2)
−ψ3 ln(ng,B)α − ψ3 ln(kg,B)(1−α). (2.10.10.4)
Divide throughout by ψ1 to obtain
ln(1 + ξ) = ln cA +
ψ2
ψ1
ln(1− nA − γ(ng,A)2) + ψ3
ψ1
ln(ng,A)α +
ψ1
ψ 3
ln(kg,A)(1−α)
− ln cB − ψ2
ψ1
ln(1− nB − γ(ng,B)2)− ψ3
ψ1
ln(ng,B)α − ψ3
ψ1
ln(kg,B)(1−α).
(2.10.10.5)
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Raise to the exponent both sides of the equation and rearrange terms to obtain
(1 + ξ) =
cA
cB
[
1− nA − γ(ng,A)2
1− nB − γ(ng,B)2
]ψ2
ψ1
[
ng,A
ng,B
]αψ3
ψ1
[
kg,A
kg,B
] (1−α)ψ3
ψ1
. (2.10.10.6)
Thus
ξ =
cA
cB
[
1− nA − γ(ng,A)2
1− nB − γ(ng,B)2
]ψ2
ψ1
[
ng,A
ng,B
]αψ3
ψ1
[
kg,A
kg,B
] (1−α)ψ3
ψ1 − 1. (2.10.10.7)
Note that if ξ > 0(< 0), there is a welfare gain (loss) of moving from B to A. In this chapter
E is the exogenous policy case, while A will be the Ramsey policy scenario.
Chapter 3
On the cost of rent-seeking by
government bureaucrats in a
Real-Business-Cycle model
3.1 Introduction
The social cost of rent-seeking and administrative corruption in Europe can cause a sig-
nificant loss for the economy, as argued in Rose-Akerman (1999). Rent-seeking behavior,
however, can take many forms and in many instances corruption schemes are not obvious. In
particular, this chapter focuses on the non-productive activities that occur inside public ad-
ministration and models them in a dynamic general-equilibrium setting. This is achieved by
adding public employment and rent-seeking by government officials to an otherwise standard
RBC model. As in Wallenius and Prescott (2011), public sector labor choice is shown to be
important not only for fiscal policy, but also for political economy issues. The framework
in this chapter is then used to generate a theory-based measure for the cost of the waste
imposed on the economy, and proceeds to compare and contrast it with the value obtained
from the optimal fiscal policy case.
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In line with Eliott (1997), Goel and Nelson (1998), and Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.8.),
the focus in this chapter will be on particular types of government expenditure, namely
spending on wages, and its potential to produce rent-seeking behavior. In particular, the
sharp increase in public sector employment observed in EU member states in the post-WWII
era, together with the existence of a significant public wage premium, could be driven by the
tendency for bureaucracy to self-breed and expand independently. Borcherding (1977) was
the first to provide some evidence for such a hypothesis by demonstrating that only half of
the increase in real government spending can be rationalized with changes in relative prices,
or demand factors such as increase in real income, and population growth. In addition,
LaPalombara (1994) finds that the size of government budget relative to output is positively
correlated with levels of corruption (p.338).
Importantly, this bloating process in the administration and the subsequent expansion of
the public sector wage bill should raise concerns in policy makers, since larger governments
tend to lose efficiency progressively with size, an issue first expressed in Parkinson (1962).
Furthermore, a classic study by von Mises (1944) provides a possible justification for this
claim by elaborating on some of the important differences between a bureaucrat and a private
sector worker. First, labor productivity in the public sector is difficult to measure. Moreover,
a quantity corresponding to government production is also hard to define. This is driven by
the fact that public services are to a great extent composed of non-market output. Lastly, a
government employee often comes into office through the political system - by election or by
appointment of other bureaucrats, usually from the same party. Therefore, a bureaucrat is
both an employer and an employee. Once organized, bureaucrats concentrate on increasing
in numbers, keeping the status quo, and resisting change.1
In the literature on bureaucracy, the studies by von Mises (1944), Parkinson (1957), Niskanen
1Often, the expansion in bureaucracy is justified by bureaucrats themselves, who claim there is an in-
crease in the perceived demand for public services and thus there is need for more regulation, hence larger
administration.
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(1971), Warwick (1975), Tullock (1976) and Tinbergen (1985) all focus on the strong com-
petition for advancement within bureaus and the inter-unit conflicts. In particular, as noted
in Box (2004), ”public sector bureaucrats want their agencies to grow so that their status
and freedom to act are increased,” and thus each government official has a vested interest in
promotion. Furthermore, the contemporary bureaucrat is not the ideal type envisioned and
described in Weber (1963), the impartial official and the competent professional who shows
a strong ethos for working in the public administration,2 but rather a self-interested individ-
ual. In particular, Peter (1969) describes the process employed by a government worker to
obtain promotions as ”acquiring a pull” (p.48). This can occur when the employee finds a
patron, a person superior in the hierarchy, who can help with the employee’s promotion.3 In
some instances, multiple patrons may be chosen, producing a network effect, as individual
patrons talk to one another about the employee’s career prospects and advancement. In
his monograph, Klitgaard (1991) pays particular attention to bureaucratic corruption, and
investigates different cases that come as a result from bureaucratic employment. In partic-
ular, his study argues that administrative corruption, and often the use of patronage allow
bureaucrats to supplement salaries with public funds.
In an important study, Rose-Akerman (1999) also argues that corruption, or rent-seeking
behavior, is embedded in the hierarchical structure of public administration. For example,
subordinates in the administration are treated as ”family,” and some of the gains obtained
by their superiors through rent-seeking are shared with staff members, who are lower in the
hierarchy. Thus, Rose-Akerman (1978) not only distinguishes between high-level and low-
level bureaucrats, but also emphasizes inter-official competition.4 In addition, as observed in
Parkinson (1957), officials can increase and multiply by making work for each other through
the redundancy of repetitive tasks and overlapping authorities and responsibilities. In this
sense, as in McKenzie and Tullock (1978) and Reisman (1990), public professionals can be
2After all, Fry (1989) reminds that ”Weber’s ideal type is not a description of reality.” (p. 21)
3Another author, who discusses the patronage system is Gortner (1977).
4Promotions and prizes in bureaucracy will be treated as rent-seeking activities in the model as well.
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 193
regarded as self-interested maximizers of their position in a bureaucratic world, who pursue
career advancement, financial security, and try to use the organization where they work to
serve their personal interests. In a more recent study, Lambsdorff (2007) claims that if cor-
ruption involves a rent-seeking government whose members attempt to enrich themselves,
then the size of the government itself should be significantly decreased (p.4). Similar views
are presented in Rose-Akerman (1978), who associates bureaucratic corruption with bloated
agency budgets.5
Very few economists, with the notable exception of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tul-
lock (1965), and Niskanen (1971), have focused on the presence of a large bureaucracy and
provided evidence of its importance in the macroeconomic context. In addition, a very small
economic literature exists on the internal organization of the state and the incentives of gov-
ernment bureaucracy, e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Acemoglu (2005), and Becker and
Mulligan (2003). Guriev (2004), Dixit (2006, 2010), and Dodlova (2013) also point out to
the multi-tier structure of the government bureaucracy, the principal-bureaucrat-agent hier-
archy, as the main culprit for state inefficency due to the agency problem generated within
such an organizational arrangement. More specifically, elected politicians (agents) need to
elect experts (bureaucrats) to implement policies in the interest of the citizens (principal).
Thus, as argued in Tirole (1994) and Aghion and Tirole (1997), bureaucrats possess the real
authority in the government, as they have an ”effective control over decisions” (even though
they don’t have the ”formal authority”). In addition, Niskanen (1971), Bendor et al. (1985),
and Horn (1995) argue that bureaucrats use their superior information when the budget is
decided to inflate the costs of labor input.6
The focus in those studies also fall on the emergence of inefficient states, where the in-
efficiency is measured in terms of extracted rents and the excessive spending on wages of
5Bhagwati (1982) names the process ”internal corruption,” and rent-seeking activities ”directly unpro-
ductive.”
6For literature on the incentives of bureaucrats, see Laffont (2000), and Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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bureaucrats. Gregory and Lazarev (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2007) also documents cases
of overemployment of bureaucrats to boost encumbant’s party’s votes.7 Furthermore, gov-
ernment workers could be compensated with higher wages, as a favor by policymakers in
exchange of bureaucrats’ loyalty, or an an efficiency wage aiming to solve monitoring prob-
lems (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). Makris (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the
high cost of production of government services for the budget, while Migue and Belanger
(1974) argue that bureaucrats oversupply public services, while at the same time enjoying
an excessive budget, the size of which is unrelated to their labor productivity.8 The latter
could be rationalized, at least partially, with the moral hazard problem in the government
employment sector, as bureaucrats have a better information about the level of the effort
exerted, relative to the superiors.9
Despite being a possibly better description of the internal organization of the state and
the incentives of the bureaucracy, the modeling choice in those partial-equilibrium setups
cannot be easily translated and adopted in general equilibrium. Possible extensions of the
work in this chapter along those lines is left for future research, as it does not serve our
current purpose of quantifying the cost of rent seeking for the aggregate economic activity.
This chapter would therefore present an alternative channel used by bureaucrats to rent-seek
and lobby for government funds.10 Bureaucracy in the setup will be implicitly modeled as
7Egorov and Sonin (2009) point out that often policy makers would prefer a loyal bureaucrat to a capable
one.
8Roett (1999) points out that there is a public perception that public sector workers are overpaid and
underworked.
9See Dewatripont et al. (1999), Francois (2000), Dixit (2002), Prendergast (2002) and Besley and
Ghatak (2005) for the implications of moral hazard in government non-profit organizations. In addition,
Tarschys (1975) and Wildavsky (1974) argue that government bureaucracies develop internal pressures for
self-aggrandizement and expansion. Lastly, interaction among bureaucrats for budget appropriation are
discussed in Miller and Moe (1983), Moe (1997), Bendor et al. (1985), Bos (2001), and Casas-Pardo and
Puchades-Navarro (2001).
10Indeed, most of government consumption spending is on the wage bill for staff compensation (OECD
1982).
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a collection of competing bureaus, as in Niskanen (1971): every bureaucrat, in each bureau,
would want to control more and more subordinates. In addition, the bureaucrat’s preference
for power and prestige will bring utility through higher labor income, and thus higher con-
sumption.
To illustrate the processes taking place within public administration, the model setup in
this chapter incorporates a symmetric non-cooperative game that is played among gov-
ernment bureaucrats themselves to increase individual income at the expense of the other
public officials earnings.11 The symmetric rent-seeking process is modeled as in Murphy et
al. (1991)12: Each individual allocates time optimally between both productive activities
and rent-seeking. Additionally, the interaction between agents in the public sector generates
strategic complementarities, as individual rent-seeking is positively related to opponents’
choice of rent-seeking. As in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), rent-seeking increases
one’s own capacity and at the same time decreases others’ capacity level. In reality, as
pointed out in Tinbergen (1985), this correspond to public employees redistributing residual
bureau funds, expropriating vacation money (Mieczkowski 1984, p. 164), or applying bonus
schemes methodology according to rank and experience. The benefit from engaging in rent-
seeking comes at the expense of a cost incurred, which is measured in terms of time, similar
to the approach used in Angelopoulos et al. (2009).
11Note that when a large number of bureaucrats attempt to maximize identical objective functions, which
are subject to the same set of constraints, this results in a theory covering bureaucracy as a whole, as was
first attempted in Niskanen (1971).
12An incomplete list of the extraction literature that uses rent-seeking mechanism is: Krueger (1974),
Posner (1974, 1975), Tullock (1975, 1980), Congleton (1980), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Corcoran
and Karels (1985), Appelbaum and Katz (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993),
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Nitzan (1994), Tirole (1986), Khan and Sundaran (2000), Mohtadi and
Roe (1998, 2003) and Mauro (2004). Park et al. (2005) for similar setups in which rent-seekers compete with
each other for fiscal favors. For surveys of the literature of rent-seeking see Drazen (2000, Ch.11), Persson
and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 14.4) and Mueller (2003).
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The value-added of this chapter is the focus on the link between the rent-seeking behav-
ior in bureaucracy and the government wage bill, and the resulting cost imposed on the
economy as a result of the non-productive activities taking place in the public sector. An-
other novelty here is that rent-seeking occurs in a non-competitive labor market, the public
sector one, where wage rate is set above private sector pay. This stimulates entry of labor in
the sector, and as a result, public employment eventually becomes too high. In particular,
both the high public wage and employment stimulate rent-seeking by generating a positive
benefit of engaging in wasteful activities. In turn, a higher wage bill requires higher tax rates
to finance government spending. In the private sector, high taxes reduce incentives to supply
labor and accumulate capital, and decrease consumption and output. Thus rent-seeking has
a negative impact on the economy, and this chapter attempts to quantify the loss for the
economy in a general-equilibrium framework.
The study in this chapter could be also considered complementary to Park et. al (2005),
and Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), who all address rent-seeking issues using DSGE mod-
els.13 Their focus, however, falls on problems of tax collection and/or protection of property
rights, while this study concentrates on the inefficiencies on the government spending side,
and the wage bill in particular. In addition, earlier studies consider exogenous policy only,
and focus on the non-cooperative Nash (1953) solution of the rent-seeking game, while only
briefly discussing the existence (and attainability) of other subgame-perfect equilibria.14
Lastly, the rent-seeking process in the public sector can be also viewed as a ”coordination
failure” problem, as first described in Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999). There
is a bad equilibrium, from the non-cooperative game, but also a good equilibrium, where
all agents coordinate on the zero rent-seeking. A positive value of rent-seeking time chosen
13In addition, Park et al. (2004), Economides et al. (2007) and Angelopoulos and Economides (2008)
address rent-seeking in models with electoral uncertainty.
14This infinitely-repeated game can generate a very rich class of subgame-perfect equilibria, which are all
sustainable (Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 197
by bureaucrats is socially costly, as the return comes not from productive effort, but rather
from the distribution of public funds. At the same time, the positive amount of time dedi-
cated to opportunistic activities is an efficient outcome from an individual worker’s point of
view, as all agents are fully rational and maximize their utility levels. Thus, in equilibrium,
individual bureaucratic rent-seeking efforts will adjust to the point where the value of addi-
tional resources spent per bureaucrat equals the benefit that accrues to that individual.15,16
Moreover, the higher the level of output, the higher the tax revenue, and thus the larger the
pie available for redistribution.
This chapter also finds non-trivial welfare gains of cooperation in the exogenous policy case,
which is not considered in previous studies. The increase in welfare is possible if all agents
agree to coordinate on zero rent seeking, which in that case is a sustainable equilibrium.
In addition, a comparative statics exercise is performed to show that significant gains can
be realized when the economy moves to a steady-state in which wages are equalized across
sectors, and thus the main reason for the existence of rent-seeking is abolished.
Next, using the model-generated measure, rent-seeking across the EU-12 is compared to
indices of institutional quality in the government sector. Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011)
15Note that the first-best solution (the jointly optimal level) in the model results in zero rent-seeking.
16As it will be shown later in the chapter, the cost of rent-seeking can be significant at aggregate level.
However, the strategic complementarity that occurs as a result of rent-seeking by individual bureaucrats is
rather small, as compared to the aggregate. In technical terms, individual rent-seeking does not seem to
influence the other aggregate allocations (compared to the steady-state allocations obtained in Ch.2 for a
very similar model without rent-seeking). That is partially due to the fact that a particular equilibrium
outcome from the rent-seeking game was chosen, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium outcome from the
static stage game that is repeatedly played over the infinite horizon of the game. Essentially, for simplicity
and tractability, the players are assumed to ignore the history of the game (and thus possible multiplicity
of equilibria is abstracted away from). In this simple static class of rent-seeking dames, there is a unique
equilibrium. The structure of the rent-seeking game corresponds to those static models of rent-seeking, so
the uniqueness of equilibria is directly translatable. Of course, this is a rather strong assumption in the
theoretical setup, but one that ensures that the macroeconomic model will feature a unique equilibrium.
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use the ICRG index as a proxy for rent-seeking, while this chapter considers additional in-
dicators that specifically focus on public administration quality and government spending
efficiency. In general, rent-seeking from the government budget is expected to be associated
with low quality of government, high corruption, and heavy bureaucratization.17
The study in this chapter then proceeds to discuss the optimal fiscal policy, where not
only tax rates, but also different categories of government spending, as well as rent-seeking18
(from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) are optimally chosen by a benevolent Ram-
sey planner. Due to rent-seeking, public investment is lower, and government consumption
(wage bill) is excessive. Furthermore, the rent-seeking estimates can be evaluated against
findings from studies using static models with rent-seeking of tariff revenues, monopoly
profits, and regulations, as well as the costs computed in Angelopoulos et al. (2009) in a
general-equilibrium framework. Thus, using tools of modern dynamic economics, the study
in this chapter contributes to the understanding of the wasteful effect of bureaucracy for the
economy. It also provides an integrated framework to address both public economics and
political economy issues, such as public sector labor supply in a non-competitive market, as
well as the optimal production and provision of congestible government services.
The main findings of the study are that: (i) Due to the existence of a significant public
sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of work-
ing time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses in terms of output; (ii)
The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries
are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii) Under the optimal fiscal
policy regime, steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as
17The ICRG index from the IRIS dataset has been used in, among others, Knack and Kiefer (1995), Barro
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrick (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and
Persson et al. (2003).
18Rent-seeking is determined residually, as the government will influence its level only indirectly by opti-
mally setting public sector employment and wages.
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the government chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public em-
ployment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model setup in the context
of the relevant literature. Section 3.3 explains the data used and model calibration. Section
3.4 solves for the steady-state, and section 3.5 calculates the cost of rent-seeking on the
economy; Section 3.6 presents the model solution procedure, discusses the effect of technol-
ogy shocks and the impulse responses of variables. Section 3.7 discusses the optimal policy
(Ramsey) framework and solves for the steady-state. Section 3.8 presents the optimal reac-
tion of fiscal policy instruments to technology shocks, and compares and contrasts it to the
exogenous policy case. Section 3.9 acknowledges the limitations of the study, and Section
3.10 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
3.2.1 Description of the model
There are Ht households, as well as a representative firm. Each household owns physical
capital and labor, which it supplies to the firm. Household’s time endowment (normalized to
unity) can be spent working in the private and/or public sector, rent-seeking, or dedicated
to leisure. Working in the government sector imposes an additional convex transaction cost,
which decreases leisure time. The perfectly-competitive firm produces output using labor
and capital. The government uses tax revenues from labor and capital income to finance:
(1) government transfers, (2) government investment, and (3) public wage bill.
The public sector wage in this chapter is modeled as featuring a time-variant mark-up over
the private sector wage. Next, individual hours supplied in the public sector can be aug-
mented by using rent-seeking time, and the coefficient of proportionality positively depends
on one’s own rent-seeking time and negatively related to other households’ rent-seeking time.
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This is similar to the setup in Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), in which households were
able to extract part of the tax revenues, or output directly, respectively. In this chapter the
resource extraction is slightly more sophisticated, as public wages are financed from govern-
ment tax revenues, and therefore government resources are only indirectly expropriated.
3.2.2 Households
There are Ht homogenous households in the model economy, who are infinitely-lived.
19 There
is no population growth. The household h maximizes the following expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cpht , S
g
t , L
h
t ), (3.2.2.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator as of period 0; C
ph
t , S
g
t and L
h
t are household’s private
consumption, per household consumption of government services, and leisure enjoyed by
household h at time t, respectively. The parameter β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The
instantaneous utility function U(., ., .) is increasing in each argument and satisfies the Inada
conditions. The particular functional form for instantaneous utility used is as follows:
U(Cpht , S
g
t , L
h
t ) = ψ1
(Cpht )
1−σc
1− σc + ψ2
(Lht )
1−σl
1− σl + ψ3
(Sgt )
1−σs
1− σs (3.2.2.2)
where σc, σl, σs > 0 are the curvature parameters of private consumption, leisure, and govern-
ment services utility component, respectively. Parameters ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 are the weight attached
to private consumption, leisure and public services components in utility, respectively, where
0 < ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 < 1, and ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1.
Total time available to each household is split between work, Nht , rent-seeking in the public
sector, RSht , and leisure, L
h
t . Households can supply hours of work in the public sector, N
gh
t ,
in the private one, Npht , with N
h
t = N
ph
t + N
gh
t . Given a positive public sector wage, every
household will optimally choose to supply a positive amount of hours in the public sector.
Thus, the model allows everyone to engage in public sector rent-seeking.
19This number is countably infinite, and the households could be thought of being uniformly distributed
on the [0, 1] interval.
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 201
In addition, it will be assumed that the household incurs a quadratic transaction cost from
government work, γ(N ght )
2, where γ > 0. The modeling choice tries to capture some of the
market imperfections existing in the public sector labor markets, such as the high union-
ization, and the monopsony situation,as well as to help to accommodate public hours labor
choice in the framework. This assumption is also in line with evidence from case studies
in Box (2004), which shows that working in the public sector is different from working in
the private sector, as the two sectors operate under different institutional settings. Similar
to the approach adopted in Cho and Cooley (1994), and Hayashi and Prescott (2007), in
this framework contracted and effective public hours enter the household’s utility function
through different functional forms. The wage rates per efficiency unit of labor in the private
and the public sector are denoted by wpt and w
g
t , respectively. In the private sector, efficiency
level is constant and for convenience will be normalized to unity, while utilization rate in the
public sector can vary because of the rent-seeking. In addition, public wage rate will carry
a premium over the private wage rate, which is allowed to vary over time. As pointed out in
Bellante and Jackson (1979), the overpayment of public employees could be regarded as rent
as it is ”a pay level higher necessary to attract the requisite quality and quantity of labor in
the public sector (p. 248).20
Next, after joining the public sector, rent-seeking occurs, as it brings a positive benefit
from engaging in opportunistic behavior. The form of the corruption is a non-transaction
type, and can be interpreted as an abuse of power for personal advantage, or putting one’s
own interests first in the performance of a public duty. In particular, by using his or her own
20This is in line with the evidence that public sector employees are more skilled than the private sector
ones. On the other hand, Beaumont (1980) argues that public unions usually maintain that ”a public
employer should be the best employer, that its wage policy should be based on the highest rates being paid
for comparable work in the private sector” (p. 32). In addition, Bender (1998, 2003) provides empirical
support that part of the public wage premium is due to political economy factors, e.g., public employees
vote more often than the average private sector worker (Jensen et al. 2009).
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rent-seeking time, an individual’s public sector labor income can be augmented by increas-
ing the effective hours worked in the government: By supplying N ght contract hours in the
public sector, and spending RSht hours on rent-seeking, each households generates
RSht
RSt
N ght of
”efficiency units of labor,” as in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), hence total public
sector labor income becomes wgt
RSht
RSt
N ght .
21 At the same time, predatory behavior decreases
the capacity utilization of labor of the other workers in the public sector. Note that each
household is atomistic, so it takes the aggregate quantity of rent-seeking RSt as given. (In
equilibrium, RSt =
∑
hRS
h
t .) Thus, even though total public employment is exogenous for
each household,22 the individual public hours are endogenous.
As in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1993, 1996), it is assumed that each household cares
about effective hours of work only. Thus, the time constraint that each household faces in
each period (in efficiency terms) is as follows:
Npht +
RSht
RSt
N ght + γ(N
gh
t )
2 +RSht + L
h
t = 1. (3.2.2.3)
The rent-seeking technology described is a special case of a standard symmetric contestable
prize function used in the literature.23 This approach models rent-seeking as an optimal
choice made by each government bureaucrat. In addition, the size of the total pie avail-
able to government workers will be endogenously determined, as each bureaucrat chooses
individual public hours optimally. Thus each official has an incentive to choose the optimal
21Thus RS
h
RS can be interpreted as a shift parameter of the rent-seeking extraction technology. As in
Grossman (2002), this technology representation is a useful short-cut to model rent-seeking. In addition,
note that at the aggregate level, the efficiency issues disappears, as
∑
h
RSh
RS N
gh =
∑
h
RS
RSN
gh = Ng by first
applying the symmetry, and then aggregating over households.
22The mechanism has also empirical foundations: as established in Staaf (1977), in the US public education
sector, the supervisory salaries are correlated with the number of subordinates (teachers in the district).
23An inexhaustive list of studies includes Krueger (1974), Posner (1974, 1975), Tullock (1975, 1980),
Congleton (1980), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Corcoran and Karels (1985), Appelbaum and Katz
(1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Nitzan (1994) and Khan and Sundaran
(2000). For an extensive review of ”extraction technologies” the interested reader should consult Mueller
(2003) Ch. 15.
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size of their effective ”slice.” The only modeling difference in this chapter from the earlier
general-equilibrium studies on rent-seeking, e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), is that
the cost of resources spent on influencing the probability of winning,
RSht
RSt
, is measured in
terms of time and thus in utility of leisure terms instead of output/income directly. The
specification used in the current model setup can also be interpreted as an auction in which
competing bureaus lobby for a larger share of the contestable transfer, and the endogenous
sharing rule defines the rent-seeking technology. Moreover, a larger share of the pie means
higher effective public hours, which can be associated with promotion in the hierarchical
structure, higher prestige, more subordinates, power by entrenchment in an organization
and thus achievement of security and convenience.
In addition to the labor income received, each household saves by investing in private capital
Iht . As an owner of capital, the household receives interest income rtK
ph
t from renting the
capital to the firms; rt is the return to physical capital and K
ph
t denotes physical capital
stock in the beginning of period t.
The household’s physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kpht+1 = I
h
t + (1− δp)Kpht , (3.2.2.4)
where 0 < δp < 1 is the depreciation rate of private physical capital.
Finally, consumers are owners of the firms in the economy, and receive equal share of the
profit (Πht ) in the form of dividends. The budget constraint for each household is
Cpht + I
h
t ≤ (1− τ lt )
[
wptN
ph
t + w
g
t
RSht
RSt
N ght
]
+ (1− τ kt )rtKpht + Πht +GTht , (3.2.2.5)
where τ lt , τ
k
t are the proportional tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively, and
GTht denotes the level of per household lump-sum government transfer.
Each household h acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0, tax rates {τ lt , τ kt } and
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policy variables {Git, Sgt , GTt , Kgt+1}∞t=0 as given, it chooses allocations {Cpht , Npht , N ght , RSht , Iht ,
Kht+1}∞t=0 to maximize Eq. (3.2.2.1) subject to Eqs. (3.2.2.2)-(3.2.2.5), and the initial condi-
tion for physical and public capital stocks {Kph0 , Kg0}.
The optimality conditions from the household’s problem, together with the transversality
condition (TVC) for the private physical capital stock, are as follows:24
Cpht :
ψ1
Cpht
= Λt (3.2.2.6)
Kpht+1 : Λt = βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
(3.2.2.7)
Npht :
ψ2
Lt
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (3.2.2.8)
N ght :
ψ2
Lt
[
RSht
RSt
+ 2γN ght
]
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
(3.2.2.9)
RSht :
ψ2
Lt
[
1 +
N ght
RSt
]
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
(3.2.2.10)
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
ph
t+1 = 0, (3.2.2.11)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The household
equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
Next, the Euler equations describes the optimal capital and bond accumulation rule, and
implicitly characterizes the optimal consumption allocations chosen in any two neighboring
periods. Private hours are chosen so that the disutility of an hour work in the private sector
at the margin equals the after-tax return to labor. The disutility of an hour of rent-seeking
time equals the marginal increase in after-tax public sector labor income. At the margin,
the benefit of engaging in rent-seeking equals the utility cost of doing so. The last expres-
sions, (3.2.1.11), is the so-called ”transversality condition” (TVC), imposed to ensure that
the value of the private physical capital that remains after the optimization horizon is zero.
24Detailed derivation of the household’s optimality condition is provided in Appendix 3.11.1.
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This boundary conditions guarantees that the model equilibrium is well-defined by ruling
out explosive solution paths.
Divide (3.2.2.9) by (3.2.2.8), and impose symmetry (hence RSht = RSt, N
gh
t = N
g
t ) to
obtain
1 + 2γN gt =
wgt
wpt
. (3.2.2.12)
Eq. (3.2.2.12) is a typical labor supply relationship, and characterized in this framework by
a positive relationship between total public hours and the public/private wage ratio.25 Next,
divide (3.2.2.10) by (3.2.2.8) to obtain
wgtN
gh
t
wptRSt
= 1 +
N ght
RSt
. (3.2.2.13)
After some rearrangement, and by imposing symmetry once again, it can be shown that
RSt =
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
N gt . (3.2.2.14)
Optimality condition (3.2.2.14) is new in the literature on rent-seeking. As seen from above,
rent-seeking time is a product of public employment, N gt , and the net wage premium,
wgt
wpt
−1.
In other words, the corruption problem in this framework could be split into two parts: the
high public employment (”extensive margin”), and the high public wage premium (”intensive
margin”).26 Therefore, Eq. (3.2.2.14) suggests that cuts in the public wage bill are important
for curbing the size of the contestable prize and thus effectively restraining the rent-seeking
behavior of government bureaucrats.27
3.2.3 Firms
There is also a representative private firm. It produces a homogeneous final product using a
production function that requires physical capital, Kt and labor hours N
p
t . The production
25Alternatively, the equation can be interpreted as a ”wage curve” equation, similar to the one described
in Blanchflower and Oswald (1996).
26Hence RSt = 0 when w
p
t = w
g
t , and/or N
g
t = 0.
27Another instance when equilibrium rent-seeking is zero, is when all households decide to play the coop-
erative solution.
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function is as follows
Yt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ, (3.2.3.1)
where At measures the total factor productivity in period t; 0 < θ, (1 − θ) < 1 are the
productivity of labor and private physical capital, respectively.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 and policy vari-
ables {τ kt , τ lt , Git, GTt , Kgt }∞t=0 as given. Accordingly, Kpt , and Npt are chosen every period to
maximize static aggregate profit,
Πt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − rtKpt − wptNpt . (3.2.3.2)
In equilibrium, capital and labor receive their marginal products, i.e.28
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
, (3.2.3.3)
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
. (3.2.3.4)
Hence, equilibrium per-period profits are zero.
3.2.4 Government
Government invests in capital, Git, which is used in the provision of the utility-enhancing
government services. In addition, government hires labor N gt at a wage level w
g
t to produce
public consumption goods and distributes transfers Gtt(≡
∑
hG
th). The production function
for public consumption is as in Cavallo (2005), Linnemann (2009) and Economides et al.
(2011):
Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α), (3.2.4.1)
where 0 < α < 1 is the share of public employment. Since the household takes the level
of government services as given, in competitive equilibrium there will be externality arising
28Detailed derivation of the firm’s optimality condition is provided in Appendix 3.11.1.
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from the presence of public employment and investment in the government services produc-
tion function: More hours in the public sector generate more government services (a higher
level of the public good available for public consumption), which increases directly utility.
In addition, holding all else equal, an increase in public employment raises welfare indirectly
by increasing the after-tax public sector labor income, and hence consumption. Lastly, more
hours spent in the public sector decrease the amount of leisure the household can enjoy in
a certain period (and also increase rent-seeking), and thus lower welfare. The quantitative
effect will be determined by the value of the curvature parameter σs in the household’s utility
function.
Total government expenditure, GTt + G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t , is financed by levying proportional taxes
on capital and labor income. Thus, the government budget constraint is as follows:
GTt +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t = τ
k
t rtK
p
t + τ
l
t
[
wptN
p
t + w
g
tN
g
t
]
. (3.2.4.2)
Next, the law for government capital accumulation is as follows:
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (3.2.4.3)
where 0 < δg < 1 is the depreciation rate of public capital.
Government takes market prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and allocations {Npt , N gt , Kpt }∞t=0 as given.29 Fi-
nally, only four of the five policy instruments, {τ lt , τ kt , wgt , Git, GTt }∞t=0, can be exogenously
set. Government investment share in output, Giyt =
Git
Yt
, as well as the two tax rates {τ lt , τ kt }
29In the model, the assumption that the government cannot influence private sector prices in the exogenous
policy case is a technical condition that allows for the DCE to be solved. Later, in the optimal policy case,
the government will choose optimally all allocations, subjects to the constraints imposed by the DCE. First,
by choosing the tax rates on labor and capital, the government can set the after-tax returns of the factors
of production. In addition, by choosing the levels of private sector hours worked and the private physical
capital, the benevolent government implicitly determines prices, using the constraint from the decentralized
competitive equilibrium (DCE) system that in equilibrium private factors of production receive their marginal
product.
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will be fixed to their corresponding data average in all time periods; Thus, the level of gov-
ernment investment will react to private output. Note that public capital stock series will
be residually determined from a given initial stock, and public investment sequence. Next,
government transfers {GTt }∞t=0 will be set to match the employment ratio in data. Lastly,
the public wage rate will be determined residually to ensure that the government budget
constraint is satisfied in every period.
In other words, the government controls the labor demand in the public sector, and fac-
ing a supply schedule for labor services in the government sector, sets the price of labor to
clear the market. Despite the market-clearing property in this market, however, the situa-
tion is one of imperfect competition, as the price of labor is decoupled from the marginal
productivity in the public sector and, rather, determined by budgetary considerations. In
a sense, public sector labor markets will operate inside the production possibilities frontier
(as the cost of labor in the public sector exceeds its marginal revenue product).
3.2.5 Stochastic processes for the policy variables
Total factor productivity, At, will be assumed to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + at+1, (3.2.5.1)
where A0 = A > 0 is steady-state level value of the total factor productivity process,
0 < ρa < 1 is the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and at ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are
random shocks to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations at represent
unexpected changes in total factor productivity process.
3.2.6 Symmetric Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
Given the fixed values of capital and labor income tax rates, government transfers/output and
government investment/output ratios {τ k, τ l, GTy, Giy}, the exogenous process followed by
total factor productivity, {At}∞t=0, and initial conditions for the state variables {A0, Kph0 , Kg0},
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 209
a symmetric decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a sequence of
allocations {Cpht , Npht , N ght , RSht , Iht , Kpht+1, Kgt+1}∞t=0, ∀h, and prices {rt, wpt , wgt }∞t=0 so that (i)
all households maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; (iii) the government budget
constraint is satisfied in each time period, and (iv) all markets clear.30
3.3 Data and model calibration
The model in this last core chapter is calibrated to German data at annual frequency. The
choice of the particular economy was made based on the large public employment share,
as well as the significant public wage premium observed in this country. Since there is
no EU-wide fiscal authority, an individual country was chosen, instead of calibrating the
model for the EU Area as a whole. In addition, payment in the public sector in the model
is determined not by marginal productivity of labor, but rather by factors outside the model.
The chapter follows the methodology used in Kydland and Prescott (1982), as it is the
standard approach in the literature. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships
of the models will be used to set the parameter values, in order to replicate relevant long-run
moments of the reference economy for the question investigated in this chapter.
3.3.1 Model-consistent German data
Due to data limitations, the model calibrated for Germany will be for the period 1970-2007
only, while the sub-period 1970-91 covers West Germany only.31 For Germany, data on real
output per capita, household consumption per capita, government transfers and population
30The symmetric DCE system of equations for the general case, as well as the steady-state system are
presented in Appendices 3.11.2 and 3.11.3.
31The time period is particularly suitable for the study of public employment, and government wage bill
spending; Hughes (1994), for example, argues that ”[i]n the 1970s, intellectual arguments were mounted
by conservative economists that government was the economic problem restricting economic growth and
freedom.”(p. 11)
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was taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistical database was used to extract
the long-term interest rate on 10-year generic bonds, CPI inflation, average annual earnings
in the private and public sector, average hours, private, public and total employment in
Germany. Investment and capital stock series were obtained from the EU Klems database
(2009). The German average annual real public compensation per employee was estimated
by dividing the real government wage bill (OECD 2011) by the number of public employees.
3.3.2 Calibrating model parameters to the German data
In the German data, the average public/private employment ratio over the period 1970-2007
is ng/np = 0.17, and the average public/private wage ratio is wg/wp = 1.20. Next, the
average effective tax rates on labor and physical capital, obtained from McDaniel’s (2009)
dataset are τ l = 0.409 and τ k = 0.16, respectively. McDaniel’s approach was preferred to
the one used by Mendoza et al. (1984) and the subsequent updates, e.g. Martinez-Mongay
(2000), Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) and Carey and Rabesona (2002), due to its more
careful treatment of property and import taxes in the former. The labor share, θ = 0.71, was
computed as the average ratio of compensation of employees in total output. Alternatively,
average capital share, 1−θ = 0.29, was obtained as the mean ratio of gross capital compensa-
tion in output from the EU Klems Database (2009). The private capital depreciation rate was
found to be δp = 0.082, while public capital depreciation rate was δg = 0.037 over the period.
The discount rate β = 0.979 was calibrated from the steady-state consumption Euler equa-
tion to match the average private capital-to-output ratio in data. Next, parameter α = 0.62,
which measures the weight on public sector hours in the public good production was obtained
as the average ratio of public sector wage bill to total government expenditure less transfers
and subsidies, as in Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009). The value is consistent with
OECD (1982) estimates for the period 1960-78, which was obtained from a log-linear regres-
sion estimation. Additionally, the calibrated value of public capital elasticity, 1− α = 0.38,
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is consistent with the government capital effect estimated in Aschauer (1989) and Hjerppe
et al. (2006).
As in Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009), a logarithmic specification is chosen for the
utility of private consumption, namely σc = 1.
32 This follows Merz (1995) and Gomes
(2012), who argue that workers from the private and public sector are able to pool their
resources together, and thus achieve complete insurance.33 Similarly, as in Gali (2008), Cav-
allo (2009), and Gomes (2012), the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is assumed
to be approximately unity, i.e., σl = 1. In addition, the logarithmic form for the utility of
leisure has empirical support, e.g. Asch and Heaton (2008) and Falsch (2008), who find that
public labor supply elasticity in two representative sectors, secondary education and defense,
does not differ significantly from unity. The logarithmic specification for private consump-
tion and leisure may appear restrictive at first sight, but it assists greatly in matching hours
across sectors, which is the dimension of interest in this chapter.34
Next, as in Chatterjee and Ghosh (2009), the curvature on government services utility
component was set to σs = 0.95 to reflect the ”degree of relative congestibility associ-
ated with the utility benefits derived from the public goods.” Alternatively, 1/σs measures
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government services, or how responsive is the
median household (voter) to growth in public services with respect to the changes in the
median household’s income.35 Given that government services are modeled as a non-market
output, and the normalization of private consumption good to unity, total income is a good
proxy for the willingness of pay, as it represents the tax base, on which the government levies
32Hansen and Singleton (1983) obtain this value from their econometric estimation for the US as well.
33A similar claim is made in Blundell et al. (2012) in the context of family labor supply and consumption
smoothing.
34In addition, allowing for a general CRRA representation of the utility of consumption and leisure leads
to non-convergence in the optimal policy framework.
35Since all households are the same, the median household is the same as the average, or the representative
one in the model.
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taxes to finance the provision of public services. The value for σs used in the calibration is
in line with the findings in Falvey and Gemmel (1996), who estimate the elasticity 1
σs
to fall
in the [1.03, 1.07] interval for general government services (i.e. σs ∈ [0.93, 0.97]), and Gibson
(1980), who estimates that the income elasticities for public services, such as social care,
education, pollution control, parks and recreational areas, as well as highway construction
and maintenance, are slightly higher than unity. In the exogenous policy setup, parameter
σs does not affect allocations (but it affects the level of utility), since the household ignores
the externality. Thus, the level of government services will be residually determined given
the steady-state public employment and government capital stock.36
The average steady-state total hours of work in data as a share of total hours available
is n = 0.296, hence total employment in the model is consistent with the estimates in
Ghez and Becker (1975) and Juster and Stafford (1991) of the fraction of time spent work-
ing. Together with the public/private employment ratio, this yields the model-consistent
steady-state values for private and public hours, np = 0.253 and ng = 0.043, respectively.
Steady-state public hours in the model are set to the value in data. The weight on utility
from government services was set to ψ3 = 0.15, which is consistent with the value used in
Finn (1994). Next, the weights attached to private consumption ψ1 = 0.35 and ψ2 = 0.50
are set to match exactly both types of hours in data.37 Note that ψ1 is set larger than the
average time spent working, as suggested in Kydland (1995), due to the presence of govern-
ment work transaction cost, and the existence of rent-seeking in the public sector. On the
other hand, the model is roughly consistent with Bouakez and Rebel (2007), Leeper et al.
(2009), and Conesa et al. (2009), who argue that private consumption good is on average
twice as valuable as government services, as ψ1/ψ3 = 2.33, and leisure is twice as valuable
36In the optimal policy case, the congestibility condition for public services, σs < 1, turns out to be a
necessary and sufficient to produce a decrease in steady-state decrease in the rent-seeking time relative to
the exogenous policy case.
37Observe that given the pre-set value for ψ3 and the fact that ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1, by setting ψ1, ψ2 will
be residually determined.
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as the private consumption good, as ψ1/ψ1 = 1.43. The scale parameter of the transaction
cost associated with government work, γ = 2.318, is calibrated to match the average pub-
lic/private wage ratio in the data.
Total factor productivity moments, ρa = 0.943 and σa = 0.013, were obtained in several
steps: First, using the model’s aggregate production function specification and data series
for physical capital and labor, Solow residuals (SR) were computed in the following way:
lnSRt = ln yt − (1− α) ln kpt − α lnnpt . (3.3.2.1)
The logged series were then regressed on a linear trend (b > 0) to obtain
lnSRt = bt+ 
SR
t . (3.3.2.2)
Observe that the residuals from the regression above,
SRt = lnSRt − bt ≡ ln at, (3.3.2.3)
represent the stationary, or detrended, component of the logged TFP series.
Next, the AR(1) regression
ln at = β0 + β1 ln at−1 + at (3.3.2.4)
was run using ordinary least squares (OLS) to produce the estimates (denoted by the ”hat”
symbol) for the persistence and standard deviation parameters of the total factor produc-
tivity process to be used in the calibration of the model. In particular,
βˆ1 = ρ
a (3.3.2.5)
ˆat ∼ N(0, σ2a). (3.3.2.6)
Table 3.1 on the next page summarizes all model parameters used in the calibration.
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Table 3.1: Model Parameters
Param. Value Definition Source
β 0.979 Discount factor Calibrated
θ 0.710 Labor income share Data average
δp 0.082 Depreciation rate on private capital Data average
δg 0.037 Depreciation rate on public capital Data average
ψ1 0.350 Weight on consumption in utility Calibrated
ψ2 0.500 Weight on leisure in utility Calibrated
ψ3 0.150 Weight on government services in utility Set
σc 1.000 Curvature parameter of private consumption utility Set
σl 1.000 Curvature parameter of leisure utility Set
σs 0.950 Curvature parameter of the government services utility Set
γ 2.318 Scale parameter of government work transaction cost Calibrated
α 0.620 Labor share in public services production Data average
1− α 0.380 Capital share in public services production Calibrated
τ k 0.160 Effective tax rate on capital income Data average
τ l 0.409 Effective tax rate on labor income Data average
Giy 0.023 Government investment-to-output ratio Data average
GTy 0.228 Government transfers-to-output ratio Calibrated
A 1.000 Steady-state level of total factor productivity Set
ρa 0.943 AR(1) parameter total factor productivity Estimated
σa 0.013 SD of total factor productivity innovation Estimated
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3.4 Steady state results
Given the model parameters, the unique steady-state of the system was computed numer-
ically for the Germany-calibrated model. Results are reported in Table 3.2 below, where
r¯ = (1− τ k)(r− δp) denotes the after-tax net of depreciation real return to private capital.
Table 3.2: Data averages and long-run solution
Description GE Data Model
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225
gT/y Public transfers-to-output 0.170 0.228
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714
n Total employment 0.296 0.296
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043
rs Rent-seeking level - 0.009
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035
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The model performs relatively well vis-a-vis data. It slightly overestimates average consump-
tion and underestimates the investment shares in output. This mismatch is due to the fact
that the model treats government wage bill consumption as a transfer payment, and not as
final public consumption, as is the case in the national accounts. This is not an issue here
as the main objective of the model is to replicate the stylized facts in the labor markets.
However, the model accurately captures the long-run after-tax capital return, where the
latter is proxied by the average return on 10-year generic bonds net of CPI inflation. More-
over, the imputed government services is also predicted to make a significant share of output.
Along the labor market dimension, the model was calibrated to match the average time
spent working, and the wage and employment ratios in data. Given the focus on the effects
of rent-seeking in the public sector, the framework was calibrated to reproduce those stylized
facts in the steady state, as this framework will provide an important benchmark for the
measures use to quantify the loss from rent-seeking activities on the economy. Next, the ratio
of time spent rent-seeking to public employment is a non-trivial figure in steady-state: Using
p ≡ wg
wp
to denote the steady-state wage ratio, one can obtain rs
ng
= (p−1)n
g
ng
= p − 1 = 0.20.
This value is consistent with the results obtained in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), who found
that 18 % of working time in Germany is spent rent-seeking. Thus, the non-productive
rent-seeking in the public sector is also likely to generate a significant waste on aggregate
level.38
3.5 Long-Run Cost of Rent-seeking
The model in this chapter naturally suggests estimates of rent-seeking time. It also pro-
vides estimates that aim to quantify the loss from rent-seeking in terms of output. In turn,
given the calibration objective in this chapter to match hours in each sector, the values for
38Note that given the structure of the problem, and the symmetry imposed, a first-best solution is to set
rent-seeking to zero, as this results in a higher welfare. This is investigated Appendix 3.11.4. The other
special case, when the government sets equal wages in the two sectors, is also presented in Appendix 3.11.4.
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other EU countries can be easily obtained from data averages after some transformations.
Given the calibrated values for different countries in EU, a ranking can be constructed for
different countries. Finally, the model-based estimates are compared to empirical measures
of institutional quality. One such index is the compound International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), from which the values for a selected set of European countries were obtained by
Angelopoulos et al. (2009).39 Additionally, a second set of indicators, the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) were extracted from the WDI database. A detailed description of
the indices used in this chapter is provided in Appendix 3.11.5. The chosen indices reflected
government size, control of corruption, expenditure effectiveness of public funds, government
effectiveness, and the efficiency of public administration.40
The first measures to be used in the comparison with indices is the steady-state rent-seeking
time itself, which was computed as:
rs = (p− 1)ng. (3.5.0.7)
Second, rent-seeking time is also expressed in relative terms as a share of public hours41 to
obtain:
rs
ng
=
(p− 1)ng
ng
= p− 1. (3.5.0.8)
Next, several estimates of the loss imposed on the economy, in terms of output, were also
calculated. The first such expression is named ”wasteful lobbying cost,” as it represents
the opportunity cost of using time to engage in rent-seeking activities, which is not directly
productive (but only indirectly increases the probability of winning the contestable prize,
and/or increases the labor income from government work), instead of using the time to
39For more detailed discussion of this index, interested readers should consult Knack and Keefer (1995)
40World Values Studies compute a ”general trust” measure, which is also highly correlated with indices of
corruption and institutional quality (La Porta et al. 1997) and where the measure aims to capture the level
of social trust and confidence in the government.
41Since rent-seeking occurs only in the public sector, it does not make much sense to express it relative to
the total labor supply.
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produce public services, which have utility-generating effect. The analytical representation
of this cost is as follows:
wgrs
y
=
pwp(p− 1)ng
y
=
(p− 1)png
np
wpnp
y
= θ(p− 1)pn
g
np
. (3.5.0.9)
Furthermore, the value of the contestable transfer, the government wage bill, could also be
regarded as a wasteful expenditure. This is because public sector wage and employment are
determined in a non-competitive market, and public consumption is valued much less than
the private consumption good. In other words, the wage payed to government employees is
unrelated to productivity of labor in the government services production function. Moreover,
the share of government wages in output can also be represented as a product of ”primitives”
as follows:
wgng
y
=
pwpnp
y
ng
np
= pθ
ng
np
. (3.5.0.10)
Therefore, the total waste in the economy is the sum of the lobbying cost and the wage bill
share. Given that government employees are not entirely wasteful, the combined measure
presented below could be regarded as the upward bound of the total loss in the economy
from rent-seeking, expressed relative to output. The analytical representation obtained is as
follows:
wgrs
y
+
wgng
y
= θ(p− 1)pn
g
np
+ pθ
ng
np
= θp2
ng
np
. (3.5.0.11)
As seen from above, in the long run, the cost of rent seeking as a share in output depends
only on the private labor share in output, the gross public wage mark-up p (i.e. the average
public/private wage ratio), as well as the average public/private employment ratio. Thus,
the model predicts that countries with a high labor share in aggregate production function,
high public employment share in total, and high wages in the public relative to the private
sector, will feature the highest losses.
Since the model was constructed to match those dimensions in data, estimates of the mea-
sures above were easily computed from OECD (2011) data for a cross-section of EU countries,
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without explicitly calibrating the model for all the countries, but rather by simply computing
the required averages for the corresponding country from OECD data directly. Following
Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), all measures are presented and ranked in Table 3 on the
next page, together with the ICRG index first. A lower rent-seeking cost corresponds to a
higher ranking. A higher value of the ICRG index reflects better institutions, and a higher
ranking for the country.42
Table 3.3: Rent-seeking results in EU member countries
Country rs p ng/np rs/ng w
grs
y
wgng
y
wg(ng+rs)
y
ICRG
Austria 0.016(5) 1.28(5) 0.207(4) 0.28(5) 0.050(5) 0.180(5) 0.23(5) 47.22(5)
Belgium 0.021(7) 1.28(6) 0.285(9) 0.28(6) 0.066(7) 0.231(10) 0.30(7) 47.46(4)
Finland 0.003(2) 1.03(2) 0.353(11) 0.03(2) 0.008(2) 0.226(9) 0.23(6) 48.76(3)
France 0.001(1) 1.01(1) 0.320(10) 0.01(1) 0.002(1) 0.204(7) 0.21(3) 46.62(6)
Germany 0.010(3) 1.20(3) 0.170(2) 0.20(3) 0.029(3) 0.145(1) 0.17(1) 48.92(2)
Greece 0.038(11) 1.41(9) 0.260(7) 0.41(9) 0.090(9) 0.220(8) 0.31(11) 34.36(11)
Ireland 0.015(4) 1.22(4) 0.236(6) 0.22(4) 0.036(4) 0.169(2) 0.21(2) 44.37(7)
Italy 0.025(8) 1.30(7) 0.266(8) 0.30(7) 0.070(8) 0.232(11) 0.30(10) 40.90(8)
Netherl. 0.028(9) 1.69(11) 0.166(1) 0.69(11) 0.118(11) 0.171(3) 0.29(8) 49.40(1)
Portugal 0.020(6) 1.30(8) 0.217(5) 0.30(8) 0.052(6) 0.175(4) 0.23(4) 40.13(10)
Spain 0.034(10) 1.60(10) 0.195(3) 0.60(10) 0.112(10) 0.187(6) 0.30(9) 40.40(9)
Results in Table 3.3 above show that the cost of lobbying is 2.9 % of GDP for Germany,
but can reach 9 % of GDP in Greece, 11.8 % in the Netherlands, and 11.32 % in Spain.
The magnitude of these is in line with Magee et al. (1989), who show in a static model
that 5-15 % of an economy’s capital and labor is lost in predatory lobbying. Next, when
the share of the public wage bill is added, the costs rise significantly. Germany is still the
42Overall, countries with larger shares of the government wage bill in output also feature higher tax rates.
However, since this chapter focuses on the relationship between rent-seeking and the government wage bill,
and not on the effect of rent seeking on tax revenues, this stylized fact in data is not discussed.
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leader with the lowest loss (17 %), while Greece features the highest figure (31 %), followed
immediately by Belgium (30 %), Italy (30 %), and Spain (30 %). These values are also
comparable with earlier studies, e.g., using a static framework, Mohammad and Whalley
(1994) compute redistributive activity costs to be 25-40 % of Indian GNP, while Ross (1984)
calculates it as 38 % of Kenyan GNP.43 Lastly, the size of the rent-seeking cost in terms
of output is comparable to the estimates in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), who use a DSGE
framework with a rent-seeking extraction of the government tax revenue to calculate the cost
to be in the range of 0-16 % of GDP across the EU-12 countries.
Next, as documented in Table 3.4 on the next page, rent-seeking estimates and loss measures
are found to be moderately- to highly-correlated to other indices of institutional quality. As
expected, rent-seeking time in steady-state is very strongly negatively related to the indices
of bureaucratic efficiency, where the values range between −0.50 and −0.73. The public
wage premium is also moderately negatively related to institutional quality. This could
be an indicator that public sector wages are indeed determined within a political economy
environment. Lastly, the public/private employment ratio is essentially uncorrelated with
the index values. The two loss measures, the lobbying cost and government wage bill as
shares in output, are moderately to strongly negatively correlated with different indicators
of bureaucratic efficiency.44
43These studies, however, focus on bureaucrats whose rent-seeking activity is tariff revenue extraction.
44Interestingly, the two loss measures produce the same correlations with the indices. This effect, however,
is an almost direct consequence of how the two measures were constructed, as the lobbying cost is proportional
to the government wage bill, with the coefficient of proportionality equal to (p− 1).
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix
Index rs p ng/np rs/ng w
grs
y
wgng
y
wg(ng+rs)
y
ICRG index -0.68 -0.27 0.01 -0.27 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
control of corruption index -0.58 -0.16 -0.09 -0.16 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
public administration index -0.50 -0.12 -0.02 -0.12 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26
expenditure effectiveness index -0.73 -0.37 0.12 -0.37 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
government effectiveness index -0.57 -0.19 0.04 -0.19 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
In the next step in the analysis, rent-seeking time was plotted against the indices. As seen
from Fig. 3.1 on the next page, this generated a good fit in a cross-section of EU countries.
There is a clear negative relationship with the indices of institutional quality, and a positive
one with the size of government. In the next section, the behavior of the model outside
of the steady-state is investigated. In particular, the transitional dynamics of the model
economy and the responses of the variables in the face of a surprise technological innovation
are presented and discussed.
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Figure 3.1: Rent-seeking time vs. indices of institutional quality
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3.6 Model solution and impulse responses
Since there is no closed-form general solution for the model in this chapter, a typical approach
followed in the RBC literature is to log-linearize the stationary DCE equations around the
steady state, where xˆt = lnxt− lnx, and then solve the linearized version of the model. The
log-linearized system of model equations is derived and summarized in Appendices 3.11.6
and 3.11.7. The linearized DCE system can be represented in the form of first-order linear
stochastic difference equations as in King, Plosser and Rebello (1988, 1999):
AEtxˆt+1 = Bxˆt + CEtεt+1, (3.6.0.12)
where A,B, and C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked
vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control vari-
ables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt rˆst gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000) generalized
eigenvalue decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. Using the model solution,
the impulse response functions (IRFs) were computed to analyze the transitional dynamics
of model variables to a surprise innovation to productivity.
3.6.1 The Effect of a positive productivity shock
Figure 3.2 shows the impact of a 1% surprise TFP innovation on the model economy. There
are two main channels through which the TFP shock affects the model economy. A higher
TFP increases output directly upon impact. This constitutes a positive wealth effect, as
there is a higher availability of final goods, which could be used for private and public con-
sumption, as well as for investment. From the rule for the government investment in levels,
a higher output translates into a higher level of expenditure in that category (not pictured,
identical to output response). Next, the positive TFP shock increases both the marginal
product of capital and labor, hence the real interest rate (not illustrated) and the private
wage rate increase. The household responds to the price signals and supplies more hours in
the private sector, as well as increasing investment. This increase is also driven from both the
intertemporal consumption smoothing and the intra-temporal substitution between private
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 224
consumption and leisure. In terms of the labor-leisure trade-off, the income effect (”work
more”) produced by the increase in the private wage dominates the substitution effect (”work
less”). Furthermore, the increase of private hours expands output further, thus both output
and government spending categories increase slightly more than the amount of the shock
upon impact. Over time, as private physical capital stock accumulates, the marginal prod-
uct of capital falls, which decreases the incentive to invest. In the long-run, all variables
return to their old steady-state values. Due to the highly-persistent TFP process, the effect
of the shock is still present after 50 periods.
With regard to public sector labor dynamics, however, there is the additional effect of an in-
crease in productivity leading to an increase in income and consumption. Higher income and
consumption lead to greater tax revenue. In particular, the growth in government revenue
exceeds the increase in the fiscal spending instruments. As a result, the additional funds
available are spent on government investment and the wage bill. In turn, the increase in the
latter leads to an expansion in both public sector wages and hours. In addition, the model
in this chapter generates an interesting dynamic in the wage and hours ratio, which is not
present in models with stochastic public employment, such as Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005)
or Linnemann (2009). The two wage rates, as well as the two types of hours move together,
but less than perfectly so, thus making the model consistent with the empirical evidence
presented in Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008). In addition, as in the data, public
sector labor variables react more strongly to positive technological innovations than do their
private sector counterparts.
Given that both public wages and hours react strongly and positively to technological im-
provements, the new variable in the model, rent-seeking time also increases. The intuition
behind this result is that during unexpectedly good times, tax revenues are larger than
usual, increasing the amount of funds ”up for grabs,” which are expropriated by government
bureaucrats in the form of excessive salaries to government bureaucrats.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock in Germany
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Rent-seeking time in the model thus responds very strongly to the dynamics of output, as
it is related to the tax base in the labor income generated in the economy.
Overall, a positive innovation to total factor productivity has a positive effect on the al-
locations and prices in the economy. The novelty is that the endogenous public sector hours
model generates an important difference in the composition of household’s labor income
with the public sector share increasing at a much faster rate than the private sector labor
income. Another important observation to make is that the TFP shocks, being the main
driving force in the model, induce pro-cyclical behavior in public wages and hours. The
shock effects are smaller and variables reach their peak very quickly. This means that the
impulse effect dies out relatively fast. However, the transition period can still take up to 100
years. This illustrates the important long-run effects of TFP shocks on the wage- and hours
ratios.
However, an important limitation of the exogenous policy analysis performed so far is that
both tax rates were taken to be fixed. In addition, government investment share was ex-
ogenously set, and public wage rate was a residually-determined instrument that always
adjusted accordingly to balance the budget. In effect, by construction all interaction be-
tween the two tax rates was precluded, by fixing each to the corresponding average effective
rate in data over the chosen period of study. These restrictions will be lifted in the next sec-
tion, and the optimal fiscal policy framework will be considered in an environment, in which
the two tax rates, government investment, public employment (and hence also government
services as well), public sector wage rate, and thus effectively the optimal rent-seeking time,
are chosen jointly by a benevolent government, whose preferences are perfectly aligned with
the household’s utility function.
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3.7 The Ramsey problem (Optimal fiscal policy under
full commitment)
In this section, the government assumes the role of a benevolent planner, who takes into
account that the representative household and the firm behave in their own best interest,
taking fiscal policy variables as given. The instruments under government’s control in this
section are labor and capital tax rates, next-period public capital (and hence public invest-
ment), public employment and public sector wage rate (thus the Ramsey planner effectively
determines rent-seeking time). Government transfers are held fixed at the level from the
exogenous policy case. It is assumed that only linear taxes are allowed, and that the govern-
ment can credibly commit to those. Thus, given the restriction to a set of linear distortionary
tax rates, only a second-best outcome is feasible. However, the emphasis on the second-best
theory makes the setup more realistic, and thus can be taken as a better approximation of
the environment in which policymakers decide on a particular fiscal policy.
It is important to emphasize that each set of fiscal policy instruments implies a feasible
allocation that fully reflects the optimal behavioral responses of the household and firm. Al-
ternatively, each set of fiscal policy instruments can be thought of as generating a different
competitive equilibrium allocation, i.e. allocations and prices are contingent on the partic-
ular values chosen for the fiscal instruments. The difference from the analysis performed so
far in the chapter, is that in the Ramsey framework, the government chooses all fiscal instru-
ments, instead of taking them as being exogenous. At the same time, the government also
selects optimally the allocations of agents, as dictated by the dual approach to the Ramsey
problem as in Chamley (1986).45 It is also assumed that the government discounts time
at the same rate as the households, and treats each household the same. The constraints
which the government takes into account when maximizing household’s welfare include the
45In contrast, the primal approach all the policy variables and prices are solved as functions of the alloca-
tions, thus the government decides only on the optimal allocation.
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government budget constraints, and the behavioral responses of both the household, and the
firm. These are summarized in the symmetric DCE of the exogenous fiscal policy case.46,47
In other words, in the dual approach of Ramsey problem, which will be utilized in this sec-
tion, the choice variables for the government are {Ct, Npt , N gt , Kpt+1, Kgt+1, wpt , wgt , rt}∞t=0 plus
the two tax rates {τ lt , τ kt }∞t=0.48,49 The initial conditions for the state variable {A0, Kp0 , Kg0},
as well as the sequence of government transfers {Gtt}∞t=0 and the process followed by total
factor productivity {At}∞t=0 are taken as given.
Following the procedure in Chamley (1986) and Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004), the Ramsey
problem will be transformed and simplified, so that the government chooses the after-tax
interest rate r˜t and wage rates w˜
p
t and w˜
p
t directly, instead of setting tax rates and prices
separately, where
r˜t ≡ (1− τ kt )rt, (3.7.0.1)
w˜pt ≡ (1− τ lt )wpt , (3.7.0.2)
w˜gt ≡ (1− τ lt )wgt . (3.7.0.3)
Thus, the transformed government budget constraint becomes
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKpt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt . (3.7.0.4)
46The DCE system is summarized in Appendix 3.11.5.
47Stockman (2001) shows that the absence of debt and thus the inability of the government to run surpluses
and deficits has no dramatic effect on the optimal policies in the full commitment case.
48Note that by choosing next-period public capital, the planner is choosing public investment {Git}∞t=0
optimally. Similarly, by choosing public employment and the wage ratio optimally, the government chooses
rent-seeking time {RSt}∞t=0 optimally as well.
49In reality government often acts as a ”Stackelberg leader.” Such an assumption could change the results
in important ways, as it matters whether the government chooses sequentially, or whether the government
chooses once and for all. Here the focus is on the latter case: it is assumed that there is a perfect commitment
device used by the government, and no (profitable) deviations from the pre-announced plan are possible.
The time-consistent case, or the political competitive equilibrium, is left for future research: The interested
reader should consult Marcet and Marimon’s (1992, 1999) work on recursive contracts, which is closely
related to such a setup.
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Once the optimal after-tax returns are solved for, the expression for the before-tax real in-
terest rate and private wage can be obtained from the DCE system. Solving for optimal
capital and labor tax rates is then trivial.
The transformed symmetric Ramsey problem (rent-seeking is substituted out) then becomes:
max
Ct,N
p
t ,N
g
t ,K
p
t+1,K
g
t+1,w˜
p
t ,w˜
g
t ,r˜t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ψ1 lnCt
+ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− γ(N gt )2
]
+
ψ3
1− σs
[
(N gt )
α(Kgt )
1−α
](1−σs)}
(3.7.0.5)
s.t
1
Ct
= βEt
1
Ct+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
]
(3.7.0.6)
ψ2Ct = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wpt (3.7.0.7)
ψ2Ct[1 + 2γN
g
t ] = ψ1
[
1−Npt −N gt −N gt [(w˜gt /w˜pt )− 1]− γ(N gt )2
]
(1− τ lt )wgt (3.7.0.8)
RSt = N
g
t
[
(w˜gt /w˜
p
t )− 1
]
(3.7.0.9)
At(N
p
t )
θK
(1−θ)
t = Ct +K
g
t+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +Kpt+1 − (1− δp)Kpt (3.7.0.10)
At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ − r˜tKt − w˜ptNpt = w˜gtN gt +Kgt+1 − (1− δg)Kgt +GTt (3.7.0.11)
Kpt+1 = It + (1− δp)Kpt (3.7.0.12)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
(3.7.0.13)
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(3.7.0.14)
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Sgt = (N
g
t )
α(Kgt )
(1−α) (3.7.0.15)
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt . (3.7.0.16)
After numerically solving for the unique steady-state, the full characterization of the long-
run Ramsey equilibrium is summarized in Table 3.5 on the next page, where the same values
for the parameters from the exogenous policy section (see Table 3.1) were used.
As in Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Ohanian (1997), parameter ξ is in-
troduced to measure the consumption-equivalent long-run welfare gain of moving from the
steady-state allocations in the exogenous policy case to the equilibrium values obtained under
Ramsey policy. In other words, the value of ξ measures the share of steady-state consump-
tion under the exogenous policy that the household has to be compensated with, in order to
achieve the same level of utility as the one under the Ramsey policy. A fraction ξ > 0, which
is the case reported in Table 3.5 on the next page, demonstrates that the agent is better-
off under Ramsey, while ξ < 0 would have implied that the agent is worse-off under Ramsey.50
50However, a case with ξ < 0 can never occur under optimal policy.
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Table 3.5: Data averages and long-run solution: exogenous vs. optimal policy
Description GE Data Exogenous Ramsey
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.718
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.229
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.053
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.793
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 1.442
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.229
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.102
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.277
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.080
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.379
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.603
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.770
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.294
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.264
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.030
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.008
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.112
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.022
τ k Capital income tax rate 0.160 0.160 0.000
τ l Labor income tax rate 0.409 0.409 0.442
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 96.47
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.095
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 232
There are several additional important findings in the Ramsey equilibrium that can be seen
in Table 3.5 on the previous page. First, as expected, total discounted welfare is higher
under the Ramsey regime.51 Next, private consumption share is lower, while private capital-
and investment shares are higher, thus the interest rate is lower. The model generates a zero
steady-state optimal capital tax, and a higher labor tax rate. All these results are consistent
with the findings in earlier studies, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Sargent
and Ljungqvist (2004) and Kocherlakota (2010). In addition, earlier studies that use the
representative-agent setup, e.g. Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992), have shown
that tax reforms which abolish capital taxation, even at the expense of a higher tax burden
on labor, still produce significant welfare gains for the society.
Next, due to the presence of a second labor market, as well as the endogenous public sector
hours, sophisticated labor market interactions are generated. In the framework presented
in this chapter, the labor market structure allows for labor flows between sectors. Further-
more, the government internalizes the public services externality in its choice. Thus, it picks
the socially optimal levels of public hours and capital stock to provide the optimal level of
the public consumption good. In addition, the planner chooses a different mix between the
inputs used in the provision of government services: a higher level of government investment
is undertaken, while fewer public hours are employed than the in the DCE solution. As a
result, public investment (and thus public capital) share is more than double than that of
the exogenous policy case. As a result, the amount of the public good produced relative to
output is also slightly higher. In addition, public hours are substituted for private hours,
keeping the total virtually unchanged.
In terms of the relative price of labor in the two labor markets, both the after-tax pri-
vate and public wage rates increase slightly. The higher public/private wage ratio, and thus
51The positive values of utility are due to the domination of the government services term, given that
σs < 1 (but close to unity).
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 233
the higher public wage premium in the optimal policy case overcompensate for the increase
in the labor tax. Furthermore, the public/private hours ratio is lower, due to the substitu-
tion away from labor in the government sector. In other words, the increase in the public
wage premium is driven by budgetary considerations, as the public wage is the residually-
determined fiscal instrument that balances the per-period government budget constraint. In
addition, the result is consistent with economic logic and scarcity argument: relatively fewer
hours are employed in the public sector, thus the steady-state public wage rate is higher.
Furthermore, optimal government wage consumption is significantly lower. In turn, opti-
mally chosen rent-seeking level is also lower, as the public employment effect dominated the
public wage premium effect.52,53,54
The value-added of the rent-seeking model with endogenous public hours and wages is that
it generates predictions about the long-run effects of fiscal policy through labor markets, as
52This effect is due to the fact that public goods are congestible, or that 0 < σs < 1. For a case when
σs ≥ 1, a case not supported by empirical data, optimal rent-seeking is higher than in the exogenous case,
which is counterintuitive, and thus not considered here. In particular, a value higher than unity for σs results
in a higher public wage premium and government investment, but dampens the negative effect on public
employment.
53Alternatively, the rent-seeking chosen in the exogenous policy case can be interpreted as being ”third-
best,” as households ignore the utility effect of public hours working through the government services pro-
duction function, and thus the DCE choice is inferior to the second-best choice made by the benevolent
Ramsey government.
54In the model, the transaction utility cost of working in the public sector is what generates the public
sector wage premium. Obviously, a better compensation as a government employee attracts entry in the
sector. In addition, since the wage rate is assumed to be paid per efficiency units of public sector hours of
work, it is always in the interest of a worker in the public sector to invest in efficiency. This is done by
allocating some time to rent-seeking. In equilibrium, a positive amount of rent-seeking would exist even
in the optimal fiscal policy scenario, as rent-seeking is a product of public sector employment level and
the public wage premium. In the presence of transaction costs, the wage premium still persists, and given
that a positive number of government employees are demanded, rent-seeking is still positive in the optimal
policy case. Such level of rent-seeking is second-best, as the government cannot use lump-sum instruments
to achieve the first-best level of rent-seeking, which is indeed zero.
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well as the level of rent-seeking in the government sector, which is in line with earlier studies.
In particular, the benevolent Ramsey planner corrects two inefficiencies in the government
sector, the excessive employment and the scarcity of public capital.55 Moreover, the wage-
and employment ratios, the optimal composition of the government wage bill consumption,
as well as the distribution of spending across government expenditure categories were all
important elements of the analysis on the optimal amount of rent-seeking activity within
the public administration. The novel results obtained in this chapter were generated from
the incorporation of a richer government spending side, are new and interesting for policy
makers, as previous research had ignored these important dimensions.
The result that cuts in the wage bill have expansionary effect on the economy is not new to
the empirical macroeconomic studies, e.g. Algan et al. (2002), Alesina (1997), Alesina et al.
(2001), Alesina et al. (2002), and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). However, the optimal public
wage and employment aspects in the analysis are novel in the modern macroeconomic liter-
ature, given the predominance of setups with single wage rates, and exogenously-determined
public employment. In addition, given the doubling in public investment share, the fixed
level of government transfers, and the reduction of the public wage share in output, the
loss of capital income tax revenue requires steady-state labor tax to increase by only 3.3%
relative to the rate used in the exogenous policy case. The changes in the distribution of
spending, as well as the optimal amount of rent-seeking, are new results in both the optimal
policy and political economy literatures. As seen in Table 3.5, if those aspects are ignored,
important public finance aspects are missed.
Finally, note that the restriction σs < 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition to gener-
ate lower rent-seeking under Ramsey. This value does not deal with rent-seeking theory per
se, but rather captures an important characteristic of public goods, namely their congestible
nature.56 This plausible assumption can be viewed as a technical condition: In the general
55These features of the public sector are first noted in Baumol (1965).
56In addition, 1/σs is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of government services, which in the data
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case, with CRRA utility for government services, optimal public wages are higher, and opti-
mal public employment is lower. However, only when σs < 1, the compositional effect on the
wage bill is such that optimal rent-seeking is lower than the value in the exogenous policy
case.
In the next section, the analysis is extended to the behavior of the Ramsey economy out-
side of the steady-state. The transitional dynamics of model variables, and rent-seeking in
particular, under optimal policy setup is also analyzed. In particular, the optimal responses
of the fiscal instruments and the other prices and allocations to positive shocks to TFP is
presented and discussed.
3.8 Optimal reaction of fiscal policy instruments to
productivity shocks
The optimal policy model is now solved using the first-order linearization procedure from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to study the dynamics of prices and allocations outside the
steady-state.57 The model solution is then used to study transitional behavior in response
to a surprise innovation in total factor productivity. Under the optimal policy (Ramsey)
regime, endogenous variables would generally behave differently to the responses to a positive
technology shock under the exogenous fiscal policy case. Fig. 3.3 summarizes all responses
to a 1% surprise innovation to total factor productivity. To highlight differences across
regimes, Fig. 3.4 plots on the same graph both the IRFs from the exogenous policy case and
the optimal ones. The new variables in the system are the five fiscal policy instruments -
capital and labor taxes, as well as public investment (hence public capital), public wage rate
and public employment. Note that by choosing the two wage rates, and employment in the
public sector, the planner determines the optimal amount of rent-seeking time. Therefore,
is also slightly higher than unity, 1/σs ∈ [1.03, 1.07], hence σs ∈ [0.93, 0.97].
57Given the absence of curvature in the model, the second-order approximation to the equilibrium system
of equations did not change results significantly.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under Ramsey policy
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock under exogenous and
Ramsey policy
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by intervening in the public sector labor market, the benevolent government can influence
the private sector labor market, and thus affect the course of the economy. In addition,
the government can use the available fiscal instruments at its disposal to affect rent-seeking
among bureaucrats, and thus reduce the loss due to these counter-productive activities.
In period 0, after the realization of the unexpected technology innovation, capital tax stays
unchanged.58 This result is in line with previous findings in the literature, e.g. Chari and
Kehoe (1994, 1999) who show that in a standard RBC model capital tax rate does not re-
spond to productivity shocks. In other words, the benevolent government would not deviate
from the optimal zero steady-state capital tax rate even in the face of uncertain productivity
shocks.59 Next, labor income tax rate increases upon the impact of the positive surprise in-
novation in TFP and then slowly returns to its old steady-state; the substantial persistence
observed in line with earlier studies (Chari and Kehoe, 1994, 1999). However, due to the
richer structure of the and endogenously-determined government spending, the magnitude
of the response in the labor tax is higher.
Furthermore, given that public spending categories are optimally chosen in this framework,
the setup generates considerably more interaction among the variables than does the stan-
dard RBC model. For example, public investment increases substantially, as the government
under the Ramsey regime chooses also public capital and government services optimally.
Next, as in the exogenous policy case, public sector wages will increase more relative to the
private sector wage. The higher volatility in public wages, as discussed in earlier sections,
is an artifact of the presence of transaction costs from government work. The change in the
public/private wage ratio in turn triggers a reallocation of labor resources from the private
58At first glance the huge percentage deviation from the steady-state for capital tax can be misleading.
However, noting that the steady-state capital tax rate under Ramsey is of order 10−10 ≈ 0, it follows that
the log-deviation from the steady-state is a very very large number indeed, as the denominator is close to
zero, although the absolute value of the change is minute.
59This is also a result of the logarithmic specification of the household’s utility of consumption.
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to the public sector. Next, the outflow of hours from the firm leads to an increase in the
marginal product of capital; hence, the real interest rate increases. However, from the com-
plementarity between private labor and capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function,
private capital decreases. Therefore, due to the fall in the levels of the two private inputs,
output increases by less than the size of the technology shock.
In addition, given the jump in government investment, private consumption and invest-
ment fall upon the impact of the shock. Overall, the difference in the dynamics in the main
model variables under the Ramsey regime is due to the fact that the government chooses
the optimal levels of public hours and capital (and hence also public investment). Over
time, attracted by the above-steady-state real interest rate, more private investment is un-
dertaken by the government. In turn, private capital accumulation increases, and the usual
hump-shape dynamics appears. Higher capital input increases the marginal productivity
of labor, and private labor starts slowly to recover to its old steady-state. As time passes,
private consumption response also turns positive, and the shape if its response follows the
dynamic path of private capital. Lastly, the benevolent Ramsey planner chooses to suppress
the positive response of rent-seeking to technological improvements. This follows directly
from the fact that in the optimal policy case, the government optimally chooses both public
employment and the public/private wage ratio.
Overall, the positive innovations to TFP have a positive effect on the economy. Additionally,
there is a long-lasting internal propagation effect on the economy. This is due to the fact
that there are two labor markets featuring different wage rates, and labor can flow between
sectors in response to changes in the relative wage. Moreover, there is complementarity
between public hours and the public capital, which reinforces the complementarity between
private and public consumption in the household’s utility. The quantitative effect of public
sector labor market, however, completely dominates capital response in terms of the initial
dynamics. Nevertheless, in the long-run, the private capital accumulation effects becomes
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the dominant one, as dictated by the standard neoclassical RBC model.
An interesting result is that a significant portion of the private gains are channeled to the
public sector in the form of higher spending on public wages and public investment. Indeed,
in this model both categories are productive expenditures, as labor and capital are combined
in the provision of the public good. Even though the household suffers a little from the lower
private consumption, this negative effect is overcompensated for by the increase in leisure
(as there is a greater fall in private hours fall relative to the increase in private hours), the
decrease in rent-seeking, and a higher level of public good consumption. Overall, it takes
more than 100 years for all the model variables to return to their old steady states.
3.9 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future
research
This section analyses the key assumptions of the model and proposes some possible exten-
sions to the current framework. First, it was assumed that the government sector wage
bill is the pool of public resources, which are up for grabs. In reality a much larger rent
component is the tax revenues, an avenue pursued in Angelopoulos et al. (2009), and thus
not discussed here. In the model in this chapter, a positive rent exist because of the higher
public wages, and the high public employment. In addition, given the individual decision
making in a DCE, a positive amount of rent-seeking time is chosen by each government
bureaucrat. Rent-seeking in the model disappears if wages are equalized across sectors, or
in case all agents decide to play the cooperative solution to the rent-seeking game.
Second, the model assumed that each individual could work in both the private and the
public sectors, or equivalently, that workers from different sectors could safely pool together
their resources and thus achieve complete insurance against variations in consumption. A
possible extension is to model government officials and private sector workers separately,
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as their preferences, and their attitude to risk might differ. This modeling choice, how-
ever, would complicate the algebra too much with limited promise of providing analytically
tractable and interesting results. Still, this line of research is left on the agenda for future
work.
Third, it was assumed that only public bureaucrats were allowed to engage in rent-seeking,
and the only rents available were the funds from the wage bill. In reality, a much larger
flow of funds are tax revenues, which can be expropriated for private gains by either public
bureaucrats, or business people. A model along these lines, but with private sector indi-
viduals, is presented in Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011). Furthermore, such schemes are
usually organized and jointly implemented by public bureaucrats and firm-owners. There
will be insiders and outsiders to the scheme, both in the private and in the government
sector, or honest and corrupt individuals. However, in the model presented in this chapter,
all consumers own shares in the firm, and work as bureaucrats at the same time, so there are
no outsiders. A very simple attempt in a partial-equilibrium setting is considered in Hillman
and Ursprung (2000), but in the current setup, it greatly increases the complexity of the
problem, and thus is left for further research.
Fourth, the model did not elaborate on the rent-seeking function. The simplest possible form
of the contestable logit function was chosen to abstract away from possible non-linearities.
The framework ignores rent-seeking in groups, and possible asymmetries in the distribution
of the ”prize.” Such extensions are possible (see Congleton et al. 2008), but make the model
cumbersome, and thus were not considered in this chapter. The simpler, and much more el-
egant representation of the auctioning mechanism was preferred instead in order to preserve
model elegance and ensure analytical tractability.
Lastly, a very small economic literature exists on the internal organization of the state
and the incentives of government bureaucracy, e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Acemoglu
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(2005), and Becker and Mulligan (2003). Guriev (2004), Dixit (2006, 2010), and Dodlova
(2013) also point out to the multi-tier structure of the government bureaucracy, the principal-
bureaucrat-agent hierarchy, as the main culprit for state ineffiency, due to the agency problem
generated within such an organization. More specifically, elected politicians (agents) need to
elect experts (bureaucrats) to implement policies in the interest of the citizens (principal).
Thus, as argued in Tirole (1994) and Aghion and Tirole (1997), bureaucrats possess the real
authority in the government, as they have an ”effective control over decisions” (even though
they don’t have the ”formal authority”). In addition, Niskanen (1971), Bendor et al. (1985),
and Horn (1995) argue that bureaucrats use their superior information when the budget is
decided to inflate the costs of labor input.60 In addition, government workers could be com-
pensated with higher wages, as a favor by policymakers in exchange of bureaucrats’ loyalty,
or an an efficiency wage aiming to solve monitoring problems (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000).
The latter could be rationalized, at least partially, with the moral hazard problem in the
government employment sector, as bureaucrats have a better information about the level of
the effort exerted, relative to the superiors.61 In spite of being a possibly better description
of the internal organization of the state and the incentives of the bureaucracy, the modeling
choice in those partial-equilibrium setups cannot be easily translated and adopted in general
equilibrium. Possible extensions of the work in this chapter along those lines is thus left for
future research.
60For literature on the incentives of bureaucrats, see Laffont (2000), and Laffont and Martimort (2002).
61See Dewatripont et al. (1999), Francois (2000), Dixit (2002), Prendergast (2002) and Besley and
Ghatak (2005) for the implications of moral hazard in government non-profit organizations. In addition,
Tarschys (1975) and Wildavsky (1974) argue that government bureaucracies develop internal pressures for
self-aggrandizement and expansion. Lastly, interaction among bureaucrats for budget appropriation are
discussed in Miller and Moe (1983), Moe (1997), Bendor et al. (1985), Bos (2001), and Casas-Pardo and
Puchades-Navarro (2001).
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3.10 Conclusions
This chapter studied the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the
link between the rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage
bill, which was taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public officials were
modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking
extraction technology in the government administration was modeled as in Murphy et al.
(1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework
with public sector. The model was calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007.
The main findings are: (i) Due to the existence of a significant public sector wage premium
and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-
seeking, which in turn leads to significant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the
rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to
indices of bureaucratic inefficiency; (iii) Under the optimal fiscal policy regime, steady-state
rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a
higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment level, thus achieving
a decrease in rent-seeking.
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3.11 Technical Appendix
3.11.1 Optimality Conditions
Firm’s Problem
The profit function is maximized when the derivatives of that function are set to zero.
Therefore, the optimal amount of capital - holding the level of technology At and labor input
Npt constant - is determined by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to
Kpt equal to zero. This derivative is
(1− α)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )−θ − rt = 0 (3.11.1.1)
where (1− θ)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )−θ− rt is the marginal product of capital because it expresses how
much output will increase if capital increases by one unit. The economic interpretation of
this First-Order Condition (FOC) is that in equilibrium, firms will rent capital up to the
point where the benefit of renting an additional unit of capital, which is the marginal product
of capital, equals the rental cost, i.e the interest rate.
rt = (1− θ)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )−θ (3.11.1.2)
Now, multiply by Kpt and rearrange terms. This gives the following relationship:
(Kpt )(1− θ)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )−θ = rt(Kpt ) or (1− θ)Yt = rt(Kpt ) (3.11.1.3)
because
(Kpt )(1− θ)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )−θ = (1− θ)At(Npt )θ(Kpt )1−θ = (1− θ)Yt (3.11.1.4)
To derive firms’ optimal labor demand, set the derivative of the profit function with respect
to the labor input equal to zero, holding technology and capital constant:
θAt(N
p
t )
θ−1(Kpt )
1−θ − wpt = 0 or wpt = θAt(Npt )θ−1(Kpt )1−θ (3.11.1.5)
In equilibrium, firms will hire labor up to the point where the benefit of hiring an additional
hour of labor services, which is the marginal product of labor, equals the cost, i.e the hourly
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wage rate.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Npt and rearrange terms to yield
Npt θAt(N
p
t )
θ−1(Kpt )
1−θ = wptN
p
t or θYt = w
p
tN
p
t (3.11.1.6)
Next, it will be shown that in equilibrium, economic profits are zero. Using the results above
one can obtain
Πt = Yt − rtKpt − wptNpt = Yt − (1− θ)Yt − θYt = 0 (3.11.1.7)
Indeed, in equilibrium, economic profits are zero.
Consumer problem
Set up the Lagrangian
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
{
ψ1 lnCt + ψ2 ln
[
1−Npt −
RSht
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
]
+ ψ3 lnS
g
t
+Λt
[
(1− τ lt )(wptNpt + wgt
RSht
RSt
N ght ) + (1− τ kt )rtKpt +GTt − Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δ)Kpt
]}
(3.11.1.8)
This is a concave programming problem, so the FOCs, together with the additional, bound-
ary (”transversality”) conditions for private physical capital and government bonds are both
necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
To derive the FOCs, first take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Ct (holding all other
variables unchanged) and set it to 0, i.e. LCt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
ψ1
Ct
− Λt
}
= 0 or
ψ1
Ct
= Λt (3.11.1.9)
This optimality condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of
wealth.
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Now take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Kpt+1 (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LKpt+1 = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− Λt + EtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]}
= 0 (3.11.1.10)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
−Λt + βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= 0 (3.11.1.11)
Move Λt to the right so that
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (3.11.1.12)
Using the expression for the real interest rate shifted one period forward one can obtain
rt+1 = (1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
Yt+1
Kpt+1
+ (1− δp)
]
= Λt (3.11.1.13)
This is the Euler equation, which determines how consumption is allocated across periods.
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Npt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNpt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N gt −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt
}
= 0 (3.11.1.14)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wpt = 0 (3.11.1.15)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wpt (3.11.1.16)
Plug in the expression for wht , that is,
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(3.11.1.17)
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into the equation above. Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )θ
Yt
Npt
(3.11.1.18)
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t N gt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNgt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2(1 + 2γN
gh
t )
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
}
= 0 (3.11.1.19)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2(1 + 2γN
gh
t )
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
= 0 (3.11.1.20)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2(1 + 2γN
gh
t )
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
RSht
RSt
(3.11.1.21)
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t RSht (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LRSht = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
}
= 0 (3.11.1.22)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
− ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
+ Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
= 0 (3.11.1.23)
Rearranging, one can obtain
ψ2(1 +
Nght
RSt
)
1−Npt − RS
h
t
RSt
N ght −RSht − γ(N ght )2
= Λt(1− τ lt )wgt
N ght
RSt
(3.11.1.24)
Lastly, a transversality condition need to be imposed to prevent Ponzi schemes, i.e borrowing
bigger and bigger amounts every subsequent period and never paying it off.
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0 (3.11.1.25)
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3.11.2 Per capita stationary symmetric DCE
Since the model in stationary and per capita terms by definition, there is no need to transform
the optimality conditions, but only impose symmetry i.e. Zht = Zt = zt. Thus, the system
of equations that describes the DCE is as follows:
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ (3.11.2.1)
yt = ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δp)kpt + git (3.11.2.2)
ψ1
ct
= λt (3.11.2.3)
λt = βEtλt+1
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
]
(3.11.2.4)
ψ2
1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(ngt )2
=
ψ1
ct
(1− τ l)α yt
npt
(3.11.2.5)
ψ2
1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(ngt )2
[1 + 2γngt ] =
ψ1
ct
(1− τ l)wgt (3.11.2.6)
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (3.11.2.7)
rt = (1− θ) yt
kpt
(3.11.2.8)
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(3.11.2.9)
gTt + g
i
t + w
g
tn
g
t = τ
krtk
p
t + τ
l
[
wptn
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t
]
. (3.11.2.10)
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (3.11.2.11)
git = g
iy
t yt (3.11.2.12)
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rst = n
g
t
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(3.11.2.13)
sgt = (n
g
t )
α(kgt )
1−α (3.11.2.14)
Therefore, the DCE is summarized by Equations (3.11.2.1)-(3.11.2.14) in the paths of the
following 14 variables {yt, ct, it, kpt , kgt , git, rst, npt , ngt , sgt , wpt , wgt , rt, λt}∞t=0 given the process fol-
lowed by total factor productivity {at}∞t=0, the values of government investment shares giy,
the fixed level of government transfers gT and capital and labor tax rates {τ k, τ l}.
3.11.3 Steady-state
In steady-state, there is no uncertainty and variables do not change. Thus, eliminate all
stochasticity and time subscripts to obtain
y = a(kp)1−θ(np)θ (3.11.3.1)
y = c+ δpkp + gi (3.11.3.2)
ψ1
c
= λ (3.11.3.3)
1 = β
[
1− δp + (1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
]
(3.11.3.4)
ψ2
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 =
ψ1
c
(1− τ l)θ y
np
(3.11.3.5)
ψ2
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 [1 + 2γn
g] =
ψ1
c
(1− τ l)wg (3.11.3.6)
ip = δpkp (3.11.3.7)
r = (1− θ) y
kp
(3.11.3.8)
wp = θ
y
np
(3.11.3.9)
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gT + gi + wgng = τ krkp + τ l
[
wpnp + wgng
]
. (3.11.3.10)
gi = δgkg (3.11.3.11)
gi = giyy (3.11.3.12)
rs = ng
[
wg
wp
− 1
]
(3.11.3.13)
sg = (ng)α(kg)1−α (3.11.3.14)
3.11.4 Nash equilibria with zero rent-seeking
Cooperative solution
This subsection compares the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution to a case where
all households coordinate on the first-best solution for rent-seeking. In particular, in every
period, before choosing allocations, all households meet and discuss the possibility of engag-
ing in rent-seeking activities. Throughout the discussion, they realize that if rent-seeking,
they bargain again themselves, and thus agree not to rent-seek, as that would be jointly
socially optimal outcome. Indeed, such a pre-communication results in sizable welfare gains,
as shown in Table 3.6 on the next page. Aside from some slight differences in hours, there
are no significant differences between the allocations in the tho equilibria. Note also that
the transaction cost parameter in the cooperative solution is slightly lower.
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Table 3.6: Data averages and long-run solution: non-cooperative vs. cooperative equilibrium
Description GE Data Non-cooperative Cooperative
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.225
gT/y Public transfers-to-output ratio 0.170 0.228 0.228
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.145
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.200
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.207
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.714
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.300
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.256
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.044
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.000
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.035
γ Transaction cost parameter - 2.318 2.298
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 95.42
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.025
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Wage equalization across sectors
The second special case is when the government sets equal wages across sectors, and thus
eliminates rent-seeking. This is still a non-cooperative Nash solution, in which transaction
costs from working in the government are no longer present, as γ = 0 (there is no public
wage premium). Again, as seen in Table 3.7, with the exception of hours, there are no other
differences in steady-state allocations across equilibria. Still, the welfare gains of setting
wages equal across sectors brings substantial gains in the exogenous policy case.
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Table 3.7: Data averages and long-run solution: non-cooperative vs. equal-wages equilibrium
Description GE Data Non-cooperative Equal-wages eq.
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.784 0.784
i/y Private investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.192 0.192
gi/y Public investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.346 2.346
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
sg/y Public services-to-output ratio 0.193 0.225 0.225
gT/y Public transfers-to-output ratio 0.170 0.228 0.242
wpnp/y Private labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill share in output 0.130 0.145 0.121
rk/y Private capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
wg/wp Public/Private wage ratio 1.200 1.200 1.000
wp Private sector wage rate - 1.006 1.006
wg Public sector wage rate - 1.207 1.006
w˜p After-tax private wage rate - 0.595 0.595
w˜g After-tax public wage rate - 0.714 0.595
n Total employment 0.296 0.296 0.301
np Private employment level 0.253 0.253 0.257
ng Public employment level 0.043 0.043 0.044
rs Rent-seeking time - 0.009 0.000
ng/np Public/private employment ratio 0.170 0.170 0.170
r¯ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.035 0.035
γ Transaction cost parameter - 2.318 0.000
U Total discounted welfare - 95.02 95.82
ξ Welfare gain - 0 0.052
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3.11.5 Data description
ICRG: The ICRG index is based on annual values for indicators of the quality of gover-
nance, corruption and violation of property rights over the period 1982-1997. It has been
constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of Maryland, from monthly
ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This index takes values within the range
0-50, with higher values indicating better institutional quality. The reported numbers are
the averages over 1982-1997, and are taken from Angelopoulos et al. (2009). Knack and
Keefer (1995) explain in detail the how the index was constructed.
Control of corruption index: Control of Corruption index measures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The
index is obtained from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The units
in which the control of corruption is measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The values are
averaged over the 1996-2009 period.
Quality of Public Finances (Size of government, Public Administration, Gov-
ernment expenditure effectiveness): The Quality of Public Finances (QPF) composite
index is composed of sub-indices which distinguish between five dimensions through which
public finances can impact long-term economic growth drawing on the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on the links between public finances and long-term economic growth. The
dimensions considered in this chapter are: (i) the size of government (dimension QPF 1),(ii)
the composition, efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure (dimension QPF 3), and (iv) the
structure and efficiency of the public administration (dimension QPF 4) QPF is defined as
all fiscal policy arrangements and operations that support achieving macroeconomic goals of
fiscal policy, in particular long-term economic growth. Scores range from -30 to +30 with an
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EU-15 average of 0. Assuming a normal distribution a value between -10 and -30 is deemed
as very poor, between -4 and -10 as poor, between -4 and +4 as average, between +4 and
+10 as good, and between +10 and +30 as very good. Scores were calculated using linear
unweighted average. More information on the index is contained in the European Commis-
sion (2009) report.
Government effectiveness index: The scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 (distributed accord-
ing to a standard normal distribution), with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
In ”Government Effectiveness” category the quality of public service provision, the quality
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service
from political pressures, and the credibility of the governments commitment to policies is
combined to one index. The main focus of this index is on ”inputs” required for the gov-
ernment to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The
values are averaged over the 1996-2009 period.
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3.11.6 Log-linearization
Log-linearized production function
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ (3.11.6.1)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln yt = ln at + (1− θ) ln kpt + θ lnnpt (3.11.6.2)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln yt
dt
=
d ln at
dt
+ (1− θ)d ln k
p
t
dt
+ θ
d lnnpt
dt
(3.11.6.3)
1
y
dyt
dt
=
1
a
dat
dt
+
1− θ
kp
dkt
dt
+
θ
np
dnpt
dt
(3.11.6.4)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt (3.11.6.5)
Linearized market clearing
ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git = yt (3.11.6.6)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git] = ln(yt) (3.11.6.7)
Totally differentiate with respect to time
d ln[ct + k
p
t+1 − (1− δ)kpt + git]
dt
= d ln(yt) (3.11.6.8)
1
c+ δkp + gc
[
dct
dt
c
c
+
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
− (1− δp)dk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
]
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(3.11.6.9)
Define zˆ = dzt
dt
1
z
. Thus passing to log-deviations
1
y
[
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit
]
= yˆt (3.11.6.10)
cˆtc+ kˆ
p
t+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp + gigˆit = yyˆt (3.11.6.11)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δ)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (3.11.6.12)
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Linearized FOC consumption
ψ1
ct
= λt (3.11.6.13)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnψ1 − ln(ct) = lnλt (3.11.6.14)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ1
dt
− d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(3.11.6.15)
or
−d ln ct
dt
=
d lnλt
dt
(3.11.6.16)
−dct
dt
1
c
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(3.11.6.17)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−cˆt = λˆt (3.11.6.18)
Linearized no-arbitrage condition for capital
λt = βEtλt+1[(1− τ kt+1)rt+1 + (1− δp)] (3.11.6.19)
Substitute out rt+1 on the right hand side of the equation to obtain
λt = βEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (3.11.6.20)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnλt = lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ)
yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)] (3.11.6.21)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnλt
dt
=
d lnEt[λt+1((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ) yt+1kpt+1 + (1− δ
p)]
dt
(3.11.6.22)
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1
λ
dλt
dt
= Et
{
1
λ((1− τ kt+1)(1− θ) ykp + 1− δp
[
((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp)dλt+1
dt
λ
λ
+
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)
kp
dyt+1
dt
y
y
−
[
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
(kp)2
]
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
]}
(3.11.6.23)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
λˆt = Et
{
λˆt+1 +
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp yˆt+1
− (1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
((1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ 1− δp)kp kˆ
p
t+1
]}
(3.11.6.24)
Observe that
(1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp = 1/β (3.11.6.25)
Plug it into the equation to obtain
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
yˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
kˆpt+1
]
(3.11.6.26)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1
(3.11.6.27)
Linearized MRS(ct, n
p
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − rst − ngt − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)θ
yt
npt
(3.11.6.28)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)θ
yt
npt
(3.11.6.29)
lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2]
+ ln(1− τ lt ) + ln yt − lnnpt (3.11.6.30)
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Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(3.11.6.31)
1
c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − rst − γ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + rst + γ(nt)
2
]
dt
−dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(3.11.6.32)
dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
drst
dt
1
rs
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(3.11.6.33)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt − nˆpt (3.11.6.34)
Group terms to obtain
cˆt = − 1− n
g − γ(ng)2
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 rˆst −
ng(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + yˆt
(3.11.6.35)
Linearized MRS(ct, n
g
t )
ψ2ct = ψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (3.11.6.36)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnψ2ct = lnψ1[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2](1− τ l)wgt (3.11.6.37)
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lnψ2 + ln ct = lnψ1 + ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2] + ln(1− τ lt ) + lnwgt
(3.11.6.38)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnψ2
dt
+
d ln ct
dt
=
d lnψ1
dt
+
d ln[1− npt − ngt − rst − γ(nt)2]
dt
+
d ln(1− τ lt )
dt
+
d lnwgt
dt
(3.11.6.39)
1
c
[
dct
dt
]
= − 1
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
d
[
npt + n
g
t + rst + γ(nt)
2
]
dt
−dτ
l
t
dt
1
1− τ l +
dwgt
dt
1
wg
(3.11.6.40)
dct
dt
1
c
= − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
dnpt
dt
1
np
− rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
drst
dt
1
rs
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2
dngt
dt
1
ng
− τ
l
1− τ l
dτ lt
dt
1
τ l
+
1
wg
dwgt
dt
(3.11.6.41)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t + wˆ
g
t (3.11.6.42)
Linearized private physical capital accumulation
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (3.11.6.43)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kpt+1 = ln(it + (1− δp)kpt ) (3.11.6.44)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kpt+1
dt
=
1
i+ (1− δ)kp
d(it + (1− δp)kpt )
dt
(3.11.6.45)
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Observe that since
i = δpkp, it follows that i+ (1− δp)kp = δpkp + (1− δp)kp = kp. (3.11.6.46)
Then
dkpt+1
dt
1
kp
=
1
kp
dit
dt
i
i
+
kp
i+ (1− δp)kpt
dkpt
dt
kp
kp
(3.11.6.47)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆpt+1 =
δpkp
kp
iˆt +
(1− δp)kp
kp
kˆpt (3.11.6.48)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (3.11.6.49)
Linearized government physical capital accumulation
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (3.11.6.50)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kgt+1 = ln(g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt ) (3.11.6.51)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kgt+1
dt
=
1
gi + (1− δg)kg
d(it + (1− δg)kgt )
dt
(3.11.6.52)
Observe that since
gi = δgkg, it follows that gi + (1− δg)kg = δgkg + (1− δg)kg = kg. (3.11.6.53)
Then
dkgt+1
dt
1
kg
=
1
kg
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
kg
i + (1− δg)kgt
dkgt
dt
kg
kg
(3.11.6.54)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆgt+1 =
δgkg
kg
gˆit +
(1− δp)kg
kg
kˆgt (3.11.6.55)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (3.11.6.56)
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Linearized government budget constraint
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git = τ kt rtkt + τ ltwptnpt . (3.11.6.57)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
= ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (3.11.6.58)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d
dt
ln
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
=
d
dt
ln
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
. (3.11.6.59)
or
1
(1− τ l)wgng + gi
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
1[
τ krk + τ lwpnp
] d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
.
(3.11.6.60)
Note that
(1− τ l)wgng + gi = τ krk + τ lwpnp (3.11.6.61)
Hence
d
[
(1− τ lt )wgtngt + git
]
dt
=
d
[
τ kt rtkt + τ
l
tw
p
tn
p
t
]
dt
. (3.11.6.62)
or
−wgng dτ
l
t
dt
τ l
τ l
+ (1− τ l)ng dw
g
t
dt
wg
wg
+ (1− τ l)wg dn
g
t
dt
ng
ng
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
= rk
dτ kt
dt
τ k
τ k
+ τ kk
drt
dt
r
r
+ τ kr
dkt
dt
k
k
+ wpnp
dτ lt
dt
+ τ lnp
dwpt
dt
wp
wp
+ τ lwp
dnpt
dt
np
np
(3.11.6.63)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (3.11.6.64)
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Total hours/employment
nt = n
g
t + n
p
t (3.11.6.65)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnnt = ln(n
g
t + n
p
t ) (3.11.6.66)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d lnnt
dt
=
d ln(ngt + n
p
t )
dt
(3.11.6.67)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
+
dnpt
dt
)
1
n
(3.11.6.68)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
ng
ng
+
dnpt
dt
np
np
)
1
n
(3.11.6.69)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
ng
n
+
dnpt
dt
1
np
np
n
(3.11.6.70)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆt =
ng
n
nˆgt +
np
n
nˆpt (3.11.6.71)
Linearized private wage rate
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(3.11.6.72)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnwpt = ln θ + ln yt − lnnpt (3.11.6.73)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwpt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(3.11.6.74)
Simplify to obtain
dwpt
dt
1
wp
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(3.11.6.75)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (3.11.6.76)
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Linearized real interest rate
rt = (1− θ) yt
kpt
(3.11.6.77)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rt = ln(1− θ) + ln yt − ln kpt (3.11.6.78)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rt
dt
=
d ln(1− θ)
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d ln k
p
t
dt
(3.11.6.79)
Simplify to obtain
dr
dt
1
r
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dk
p
t
dt
1
kp
(3.11.6.80)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (3.11.6.81)
Linearized government investment
git = g
iyyt (3.11.6.82)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln git = ln g
iy + ln yt (3.11.6.83)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln git
dt
=
d ln giy
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(3.11.6.84)
or
dgit
dt
1
gi
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(3.11.6.85)
Passing to log-deviations
gˆit = yˆt (3.11.6.86)
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Linearized government services
sgt = (n
g
t )
α(kgt )
(1−α) (3.11.6.87)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln sgt = α lnn
g
t + (1− α) ln kgt (3.11.6.88)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
dsgt
dt
1
sg
= α
dngt
dt
1
ng
+ (1− α)dk
g
t
dt
1
kg
(3.11.6.89)
sˆgt = αnˆ
g
t + (1− α)kˆgt (3.11.6.90)
Linearized rent-seeking rule
rst = n
g
t
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(3.11.6.91)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rst = lnn
g
t + ln
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(3.11.6.92)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rst
dt
=
d lnngt
dt
+
d
dt
ln
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
(3.11.6.93)
drst
dt
1
rs
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
+
d
[
wgt
wpt
− 1
]
dt
1[
wg
wp
− 1
] (3.11.6.94)
rˆst = nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t
wg
wp
ng
rs
+ wˆpt
ng
rs
(wg − 2) (3.11.6.95)
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Linearized technology shock process
ln at+1 = ρ
a ln at + 
a
t+1 (3.11.6.96)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln at+1
dt
= ρa
d ln at
dt
+
dat+1
dt
(3.11.6.97)
dat+1
dt
= ρa
dat
dt
+ at+1 (3.11.6.98)
where for t = 1
dat+1
dt
≈ ln(eat+1/ea) = at+1 − a = at+1 since a = 0. Pass to log-deviations
to obtain
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (3.11.6.99)
3.11.7 Log-linearized DCE system
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt (3.11.7.1)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt + (1− δp)kpkˆpt − gigˆit (3.11.7.2)
−cˆt = λˆt (3.11.7.3)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (3.11.7.4)
cˆt = − 1− n
g − γ(ng)2
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + yˆt (3.11.7.5)
cˆt = − n
p
1− np − rs− ng − γ(ng)2 nˆ
p
t −
rs
1− np − rs− ng − γ(ng)2 rˆst
− n
g(1 + 2γng)
1− np − ng − rs− γ(ng)2 nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t (3.11.7.6)
Chapter 3: On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a RBC model 267
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (3.11.7.7)
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (3.11.7.8)
−τ lwgng τˆ lt + (1− τ l)wgngwˆgt + (1− τ l)wgngnˆgt + gigˆit
= τ krkτˆ kt + τ
krkrˆt + τ
krkkˆt + τ
lwpnpτˆ lt + τ
lwpnpwˆpt + τ
lwpnpnˆpt (3.11.7.9)
gˆit = yˆt (3.11.7.10)
rˆst = nˆ
g
t + wˆ
g
t
wg
wp
ng
rs
+ wˆpt
ng
rs
(wg − 2) (3.11.7.11)
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (3.11.7.12)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (3.11.7.13)
sˆgt = αnˆ
g
t + (1− α)kˆgt (3.11.7.14)
aˆt+1 = ρ
aaˆt + 
a
t+1 (3.11.7.15)
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The model can be now solved by representing it in the following matrix form
AEtxˆt+1 = Bxˆt + CEtεt+1, (3.11.7.16)
where A,B,C are coefficient matrices, εt is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked
vector of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control vari-
ables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt rˆst gˆ
i
t sˆ
g
t
]′
. Klein’s (2000) generalized
eigenvalue (”Schur”) decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model. The MATLAB
function to solve the above linear system is solab.m. The inputs are matrices A,B,C defined
above and nk = 3, which is the number of state variables. The outputs are the coefficient
matrices M and Π which solve the linearized system. A solution to an RBC model is in the
form of (approximate) policy, or transition rule, which describes the evolution of each vari-
able. In particular, the predetermined and non-predetermined variables can be represented
in the following form:
Etsˆt+1 = Πsˆt (3.11.7.17)
zˆt = M sˆt (3.11.7.18)
To simulate the model, one requires a sequence of normally distributed disturbances, {t}∞t=0
for the three exogenous shocks with sample size T , the initial values of the endogenous
predetermined variables, {kp0, kg0 , a0} (a0 = 1), and the evolution of the endogenous non-
predetermined variables in model solution form
sˆt+1 = Πsˆt + Dεt+1 (3.11.7.19)
zˆt = Msˆt, (3.11.7.20)
where
D =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 (3.11.7.21)
Based on the above representation, MATLAB code was written to simulate the model. The
computation of impulse responses using the linearized model solution is straightforward.
Chapter 4
Thesis Summary, Conclusions and
Future Research
This thesis has undertaken a thorough analysis of the effects of a large public employment
sector on business cycles and welfare, and characterized optimal government spending across
the wage bill and public investment categories. The study in this dissertation also presented a
first attempt to explore the relevance of bureaucracy for the macroeconomy by examining the
cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats on aggregate activity. Chapter 1 constructed
an RBC model augmented by a public sector union maximization problem and conducted a
thorough assessment of the model’s fit relative to a model with exogenous public employment
and a single wage rate prevailing in the economy. In addition, several important fiscal
regime reforms were also considered. Next, Chapter 2 characterized optimal fiscal policy in
an RBC model with endogenous public wages and hours, and evaluated it relative to the
exogenous (observed) one. Lastly, Chapter 3 computed the welfare cost resulting from the
presence of rent-seeking bureaucrats in the public administration. This was achieved by
modeling bureaucrats as agents competing with one another for a contestable transfer, i.e.
the government wage bill. In addition, Chapter 3 compared and contrasted the rent-seeking
time measure with the amount of wasteful activity occurring under a benevolent government.
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Main findings and contributions (Chapter 1)
Chapter 1 attempted to answer the question as to whether the benchmark Real-Business-
Cycle (RBC) model, augmented with a union in the public sector, could match labor market
fluctuations observed in a representative European economy (Germany) better than ear-
lier/alternative models, and whether a strong union presence in the public sector was relevant
for the welfare effect of fiscal regime changes. Answering these questions required a careful
calibration and simulation of a relatively standard RBC model augmented with a public
union optimization problem. To this end, the setup in Chapter 1 combined two elements
used in earlier research to address new aspects of the economy and produce new results: it
adopted the public sector union maximization problem from Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al.
(2009, 2012) and incorporated it into a RBC model with government employment, i.e. Finn
(1998). Furthermore, the model with the public sector union in this chapter also featured a
much richer public finance structure, in both tax revenue and expenditure categories. While
all these features are important for understanding the aggregate fluctuations, these aspects
were not addressed in the earlier studies on the dynamic general equilibrium effects of public
sector unions. Thus, the individual quantitative effect of union optimization was assessed
relative to Finn’s (1998) setup with exogenous public hours and a single wage rate.
Compared to earlier models with public sector unions in an RBC framework, the study
in Chapter 1 also offered a much more detailed evaluation of a general equilibrium model
by conducting a full characterization of the model’s fit. In addition to presenting relative
volatilities and contemporaneous correlations of model variables with output, the auto- and
cross-correlation functions were also computed and compared to their empirical counterparts,
where the latter were obtained from an unrestricted VAR. Along all those dimensions, the
study was shown to be superior to a comparable model with exogenous public hours and a
single competitive wage rate (Finn 1998; Cavallo 2005; Linnemann 2009).
Overall, the public sector union model proved to be useful for studying fiscal policy in Ger-
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many. The impulse responses showed that a shock to government consumption share has a
significant negative wealth effect. In contrast, the shock to public investment ratio produced
positive wealth effects, which had a long-term impact on output. Lastly, endogenously-
determined public wage and hours were shown to add to the distortionary effect of contrac-
tionary tax reforms and produce significantly higher welfare losses. In particular, the union
model required larger changes in tax rates to achieve a pre-specified increase in tax revenue,
as compared to Finn’s (1998) model with exogenous public sector hours. Thus, endogenous
public hours were shown to be quantitatively important for fiscal policy evaluation. Ignoring
the interaction between hours and wages led to a significant underestimation of the welfare
effect of tax regime changes.
However, despite its good performance vis-a-vis data, several aspects of the model used
in Chapter 1 failed to capture important features of the real economy. For example, al-
though the model captured the dynamic correlation between major variables relatively well,
it failed to capture the contemporaneous correlation between public hours and wages, as
well as the contemporaneous correlation between public and private hours. This implies
that the simple public sector union maximization function should be extended further to
capture those aspects in data.
Main findings and contributions (Chapter 2)
Next, Chapter 2 addressed new effects of fiscal policy. To this end, Chapter 2 calibrated a
DSGE model with realistic public sector taxation and spending categories to study the labor
market effects of fiscal policy in Germany over the period 1970-2007. Two fiscal regimes were
compared and contrasted in the chapter - the exogenous (observed) fiscal policy case and
the optimal policy one. Chapter 2 attempted to compute the optimal size (and composition)
of the public wage bill, the efficient level of government investment, as well as the optimal
level of provision for the labor-intensive public good. Addressing these research questions
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required an RBC model with a richer and more realistic government spending side, and
an endogenous private-public labor choice in particular. However, the presence of a public
employment decision margin, as a separate labor market choice made by the household,
had not been sufficiently investigated in the literature. Chapter 2 argued that when public
sector labor choice was ignored, then important effects on allocations and welfare, driven
by government wage-setting and household’s decisions on hours, would be missed. Hence,
an otherwise standard general-equilibrium model was thus augmented with a convex cost of
working in the government sector to reflect the fact that wages in the private and the public
sector were determined within different institutional settings (thus linking the analysis with
the study undertaken in Chapter 1). Chapter 2 argued that if public sector labor choice
is ignored, then important effects on allocations and welfare, driven by government wage-
setting and household’s decisions on hours, will be missed.
The second novelty in the framework presented in Chapter 2, which added value to earlier
studies, was the more interesting and meaningful role attributed to government employees.
In particular, the study modeled in greater detail the mechanism of public good provision.
The setup modeled the government as an employer, needing labor hours to provide public
goods. In contrast to Cavallo (2005) and Linnemann (2009), labor was combined with gov-
ernment capital (instead of government purchases) to produce valuable government services.
Therefore, government investment was a productive government spending category in the
setup, and public sector wage consumption was not entirely wasteful. Importantly, when
hiring workers, the government was able to set the public sector wage rate, an assumption
which is consistent with data, e.g. Perez and Schucknecht (2003). Overall, the interaction
between the two types of labor and capital stocks were the major driving force behind the
new results obtained in Chapter 2.
In line with earlier findings in the literature, the optimal steady-state capital tax was zero,
as it was the most distortionary tax to use. In addition, a higher steady-state labor tax was
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needed to compensate for the loss in capital income tax revenue. The new results in Chapter
2 were that under the optimal policy regime, public employment was lower, while govern-
ment employees were better compensated. These results occurred because the benevolent
Ramsey planner chose to provide the optimal amount of the public good, substituted labor
for capital in the input mix for both public services production and private output. As a
result, the government wage bill decreased, while public investment was three times higher
than in the exogenous policy case.
Main findings and contributions (Chapter 3)
Chapter 3 analyzed the effect of a large public administration on the on aggregate economy
in European countries. Furthermore, the research in this chapter contributed to the body
of both macroeconomic and political economy literature by focusing on the rent-seeking be-
havior of bureaucrats in the public sector. By incorporating an auctioning mechanism from
game theory into an otherwise standard RBC model, the setup tried to quantify the cost
of rent-seeking that is produced as a result of the non-productive behavior of government
bureaucrats competing for a larger share of a contestable transfer, which in Chapter 3 was
assumed to be the wage bill. After all, public administration consists of a system of bureaus,
and this type of organization in the government sector is shown to produce significant losses
for the economy through the rent-seeking mechanism.
The research in this chapter argued that each bureau head could be perceived as a ra-
tional income-maximizing individual, who wants to attract more public funds for his/her
agency. Another contribution of this chapter was that very few economists, with the notable
exception of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tullock (1965), and Niskanen (1971), focused on
the presence of a large bureaucracy and provided evidence of its importance for the economy,
but only in a partial-equilibrium context. In addition, Chapter 3 in this thesis aimed to fill
this gap in the literature by motivating and presenting a more intricate channel used by
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bureaucrats to rent-seek and lobby for government funds.
To illustrate the processes taking place within public administration, the model setup in
Chapter 3 incorporated a symmetric non-cooperative game that was played among gov-
ernment bureaucrats themselves to increase individual income at the expense of the other
public officials earnings. The interaction between agents in the public sector generated
strategic complementarities, as individual rent-seeking is positively related to opponents’
choice of rent-seeking. Another novelty in Chapter 3 was that rent-seeking occurred in a
non-competitive labor market, that of the public sector one, where the wage rate was set
above private sector pay. This stimulated the entry of labor in the sector, and as a result,
public employment eventually became too high. In particular, the high public wage and
employment both stimulated rent-seeking by generating a positive benefit of engaging in
wasteful activities.
In the model presented in Chapter 3, the positive amount of time dedicated to oppor-
tunistic activities was an efficient outcome from an individual worker’s point of view, as all
agents were fully rational and maximized their utility levels. Thus, in equilibrium, indi-
vidual bureaucratic rent-seeking efforts adjusted to the point where the value of additional
resources spent per bureaucrat equals the benefit that accrues to that individual. In turn,
a higher wage bill required higher tax rates to finance government spending. In the private
sector, high taxes reduced incentives to supply labor and accumulate capital, and decreased
consumption and output. Thus rent-seeking had a negative impact on the economy, and
Chapter 3 attempted to quantify the loss for the economy in a general-equilibrium frame-
work.
The model in Chapter 3 with rent-seeking by government bureaucrats also performed well
vis-a-vis data in the relevant dimensions. The main findings from the study were that due
to the existence of a public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment,
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a significant amount of working time was spent rent-seeking. In addition, the mechanism
described in Chapter 3 found strong empirical support in the face of different indices of insti-
tutional quality. The model predicted that rent-seeking in the public sector led to significant
losses in terms of output, with Germany featuring the lowest cost, and Greece, the highest,
followed by Belgium, Italy, and Spain. In addition, the model-generated cost measures of
rent seeking in a cross-section of EU countries were highly correlated with indices of insti-
tutional quality.
Finally, Chapter 3 characterized the optimal fiscal policy regime under rent-seeking. To
this end, the exogenous (observed) fiscal policy case was compared and contrasted to the
optimal policy one. Under the optimal policy regime, and with congestible public goods,
steady-state rent-seeking was significantly smaller relative to the exogenous policy case. In
addition to the zero capital tax rate, and the higher labor tax rate, the benevolent govern-
ment planner chose to invest more in public capital, and set a higher public wage premium
but a much lower public employment, thus achieving an overall decrease in the level of
rent-seeking relative to the value obtained in the exogenous case.
Limitations of the study and directions for future re-
search
In this final section of the thesis, the limitations of the study are properly acknowledged, and
presented to motivate several directions for future research. Overall, the analysis utilized a
representative-agent framework (or simplifying calculations by assuming a symmetric decen-
tralized equilibrium), and thus abstracted from possible consumer/firm heterogeneities and
distributional effects. In addition, the setup adopted the perfect private capital and labor
market formulation to focus on the public sector labor market modeling. Furthermore, since
the models focused on the real effects on the economy, the setups described did not feature
money and/or nominal rigidities.
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In the model setup in Chapter 1, the union optimization problem generated identical dynam-
ics of public sector hours and wages, which constrained the ability of the model to match the
behavior in the two variables well simultaneously. Moreover, in reality public sector unions
and government usually bargain over nominal wage increases, and against redundancies.
They do not negotiate hours and the level of the real wage directly. For example, before
engaging in negotiations, unions take into consideration labor productivity in the private
sector and the private wage, which are then used as leverage in negotiations over the public
wage. Finally, the simple union objective function used in this chapter ignored other pos-
sible demands by unions, such as job security, work conditions, government pensions, other
non-monetary benefits, etc. Indeed, as a possible direction for future research, some of these
factors could be incorporated to extend the basic model.
Next, the analysis performed in Chapter 2 was based on the strong assumption that the
government budget is balanced every period and that the household can work in both sec-
tors. This assumption is not very realistic, as labor supply decisions are made sequentially
in the real world. A worker usually decides on a sector first, and only then on the number
of hours worked in the selected sector. Furthermore, it is a stylized fact in labor data that
most of the variations in hours worked in data are driven by changes in employment rates
rather than by changes in hours worked per person. Thus, the model is too simple and
cannot distinguish between employment and hours per person in the two sectors. A possible
extension, left for future research, would be to setup a model with heterogeneous-agents,
who search for work according to a directed search process, similar to that used in Gomes
(2009, 2012).
Another drawback of the model setups presented in this thesis was that they abstracted away
from debt issues, which are important for EU economies. However, in the setups discussing
optimal fiscal policy with full commitment, however, Stockman (2001) has shown the pres-
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ence of debt not to be relevant. Nevertheless, as a possible extension of the model in Chapter
2, government bonds could be introduced, together with a long-run target debt/GDP ratio
that has to be met in the long-run. Studying the transitional dynamics of the economic
variables and the adjustment in the different of public finance categories, in the presence of
endogenous public hours and wages, could be a possible avenue for future work.
Additionally, since the analysis in Chapter 2 focused on the long-run full commitment case,
the setup abstracted away from electoral uncertainty and thus ignored possible departures
from the full-commitment case. Across the political spectrum in most democratic societies,
there are different parties with diverse objectives that compete for the popularity vote at
parliamentary/presidential elections. In particular, different parties might have different
preferences for the level of public employment. Government jobs can be created in the pub-
lic sector to generate political support and increase the chances of re-election. However, such
considerations, as well as possible departures from the full commitment case, and a focus
on ”loose commitment” as in Debortoli and Nunes (2010), or time-consistent policies as in
Klein and Rios-Rull (2003), Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008) and Martin (2010), will
be put on the agenda for future research.
Aside from political considerations, the observed premium at macroeconomic level is also
likely to be a by-product of aggregation of microeconomic data. In the German Socio-
Economics Panel (SOEP), as well as in the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
database, for example, the age-skill profile of public employees is skewed to the left: the
average public employee is older, more skilled, more experienced, and is more likely to oc-
cupy managerial positions as compared to his/her private sector counterpart. However, such
distributional and occupational dimensions are outside the scope of a simple RBC model
with a representative household. Therefore, further work to endogeneize the public wage
premium, perhaps within a heterogeneous-agents framework, needs to be undertaken.
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Finally, the limitations of the model used in Chapter 3 are also acknowledged: The the-
oretical setup assumed that each individual could work in both the private and the public
sectors, or equivalently, that workers from different sectors could safely pool together their
resources and thus achieve complete insurance against variations in consumption. A possi-
ble extension is to model government officials and private sector workers separately, as their
preferences, and their attitude to risk might differ. This modeling choice, however, would
complicate the algebra too much with limited promise of providing analytically tractable
and interesting results. Therefore, this line of research is left on the agenda for future work.
In addition, the setup in Chapter 3 allowed only public bureaucrats to engage in rent-
seeking, and the only rent available was the wage bill. In reality, tax revenues represent a
much larger flow of funds, which can be expropriated for private gains by either public bu-
reaucrats, or business people. Furthermore, such schemes are usually organized and jointly
implemented by public bureaucrats and firm-owners. Lastly, the model discussed in Chapter
3 did not elaborate on the rent-seeking function, and ignores aspects covered in microeco-
nomic and game theory literature, such as rent-seeking in groups, and possible asymmetries
in the distribution of the ”prize”. Possible model extensions along those lines are left for
future research.
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